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Phenomenology is the kind of reflective thinking that probes mean-
ing in order to discover its native roots and source of origination. it offers 
a method of clarifying various levels and modes of activity responsible for 
constituting sense. This activity is presupposed, even if not explicated, in 
making sense of our communicative practice. The field of communication 
cannot be adequately understood without the comprehension of various 
communicative activities and what those activities signify. no doubt, other 
approaches claim the capacity of analyzing such activities, yet phenomeno-
logical analyses attempt to research such activities without prejudgments 
and metaphysical admixtures. 
however, the almost exclusive emphasis on the results of other meth-
odological practices has caused the authentic contribution of the necessary 
activities, responsible for the outcome, to be ignored. other methodologi-
cal procedures function in a straightforward and naive way and, thus, have 
lost their productive capacity. They become reduced to anonymity and re-
main as habits for a continuous effecting of the same typological results. 
one of the fundamental assumptions of the scientific community is 
the conception that judgments have an enduring identity. Although the 
results of a scientific study are checked for their validity, the course and 
process of their development are not scrutinized. in fact, the scientific com-
munity transmits results, but not the course and process of their formation. 
Scientific discourse is based on the presupposition that a proposition has 
an objective identity at all times for all people. in this way, identity becomes 
the basis for validity. By being handed down as a result, the resolution is 
severed from the source, which alone can provide the ground for their veri-
fication and reconstruction. 
The logical concepts, on the one hand, produce results that are reflec-
tive of practical interest, predominantly oriented to payoff and the techni-
cal calculation of these results. on the other hand, the theoretical interest 
focuses on the operations of consciousness involved in the production of 
these results. The logician is guided by an epistemological and practical 
interest. Logical concepts are of a practical interest and, hence, are neces-
sarily related to judgments. however, it is through reflection, specifically 
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phenomenological reflection, that the intentional mechanisms responsible 
for the judgments abiding validity are brought to light. The abiding validity 
provides the character and stability for those judgments that are the funda-
mental assumption of all theoretical constructs. no science can be truly sci-
entific unless it becomes aware of the operations used in the formations of 
logical objectivities. Without exploring the acts of consciousness, through 
which objectivities are formed, logic cannot justify its goals and the method 
it employs for its realization. Thus, the transcendental position is the condi-
tion for logical (scientific) discourse. Through the transcendental position, 
one can strictly delimit and delineate the applicability of the method (pro-
cedure) employed. 
The field of communication science has most recently been attracted 
to the theme of intersubjectivity. The theme has been developed through 
various orientations as a fundamental feature of sociality. Those involved 
in phenomenological analysis and hermeneutics have done the most ex-
tensive work in the area1. Students of this theme have concentrated on the 
affirmation of intersubjectivity at a premethodical level. By doing so, they 
have neglected to elaborate on the necessary reflective acts that determine 
the conditions for the method that verifies the intersubjective dimension. 
The method that is in question is the method of bracketing. This method 
properly belongs to the enterprise of phenomenology and, specifically, the 
school of edmund husserl. 
The science of communication generally accepts that the relationship 
between the sender and the receiver of a message is determined through the 
channel. The channel is the medium of communication. We know that the 
behavior of the other is a manifestation that is communicative even without 
a specific intention. in the broadest sense, the channels are communica-
tive modalities, which include spoken word, written word and gesture. in 
as much as each of these modalities may be understood as speeches, the 
latter is communication because it is a bearer of intentional activity. if we 
observe the character of these channels, we can distinguish a quality of im-
mediacy; in talking, i turn to one that listens and consider the person as a 
1 Waldenfels, B. (1971). Zwischenreich des Dialogs [The in-between Region of Dialog]. Den 
haag netherlands: Martinus nijhoff; Waldenfels, B. (1980). Der Spielraum des Verhaltens 
[The Scope of Behavior]. frankfurt am Main, West Germany: Suhrkamp; Apel, K.-o. 
(1980). Toward a Transformation of Philosophy (G. Adey & D. frisby, Trans.). London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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listener. When speaking, i am not aware of my voice, its pitch, its volume, 
its phonetic components, but of what they mean, what they say, and what 
they signify2. 
Speech as communication is a turning-discursively-toward that is 
based on the twin assumptions of a saying-to-intention and paying-atten-
tion-to. The one to whom i speak and who listens to me, who pays attention 
to my speech, interlocks (the turning-toward, saying-to and pay-attention-
to are structures). This intentional unification is the intersubjective dimen-
sions of discourse. This intersubjective dimension articulates the meaning-
ful characteristics of the channel, in which the empirical components, such 
as black marks of the written page, noises of a sonorous body, or the mus-
cles of the hand, can function. The channel bears the meanings that consti-
tute the transcendental aspect of phenomenology and the transcendental 
dimension called intersubjectivity. it is incumbent upon us to elucidate the 
method and clarify the terminology in order to see this dimension3. 
Ontology and Science 
over the recent years, the science of communication has begun to show 
a guarded interest in phenomenology as a viable approach for the under-
standing and analysis of human communicative processes. Various articles 
have appeared in communication journals attempting to show the function 
of phenomenology within the science of communication, and even jour-
nals have been established in which various scholars are engaged in phe-
nomenological analysis of communicative processes. The task of this work 
is manifold: first, it will delimit the “nature” of phenomenology as science, 
its aims and its basic structure; second, it will evaluate the various major 
communication theories prevalent in contemporary scholarship in order 
to assess their strengths and weaknesses and to show what phenomenology 
can add to the understanding of the communication process; third, it will 
show the function of phenomenology within the various communicative 
processes, such as language, social interaction, bodily expression, commu-
2 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). consciousness and the Acquisition of Language (h. Silverman, 
Trans.). evanston, iL: northwestern university Press; Waldenfels, B. (1980). Der Spiel-
raum des Verhaltens [The Scope of Behavior].
3 Stewart, J. (1978). foundations of Dialogic communication. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
64, 183–201.
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nicate transmission of structures and their meaning through institutions; 
fourth, it will provide concrete examples of phenomenological analyses 
of various communicative processes at various levels and their relation-
ships. in this sense, the work is both theoretical and practical. Although 
phenomenology has developed its specific terminology, unfamiliar to the 
uninitiated, the work will avoid unnecessary use of technical terms and will 
substitute them with terms or phrases that are familiar to the reader. once 
the reader has a working knowledge of phenomenological method, the re-
placement of terminology will not be a detraction from understanding the 
function of phenomenology within the science of communication. 
Phenomenology emerged in the late 19th century within the contro-
versy of the foundations of science and logic. The explanatory power of the 
method of the physical sciences, at that time, had assumed such preemi-
nence that they found themselves in the position to make claims of being 
the basis of all objective knowledge. Any endeavor, desiring to assume the 
name of science, was compelled to assume that the basis of all knowledge 
must lie in the empirical-naturalistic or physicalistic approach. following 
this lead, sciences, such as psychology and even physiology, advanced the 
notion that because logic is fundamental to scientific work, it too should be 
based on empirically observable and describable facts. After all, the claim 
went; human beings use logic in their scientific theories and, therefore, logic 
should be based on the empirically observable functions of human beings. 
Psychology, being the empirical study of the human mind and its scientifi-
cally decipherable laws, should assume the burden of being a foundational 
science for logic. By implication, this also means that psychology should be 
the basis of all sciences, insofar as all sciences employ logical procedures in 
their theoretical work. Psychology should become the science of all sciences, 
which would provide a solid, empirical base, from which the laws of logi-
cal operations would be derived for all scientific endeavors; this, moreover, 
would provide all sciences with an objective base and exclude all subjective 
factors, such as human intentions, volitions, desires and emotions. 
What such a proposed foundation means is that the laws of logic and 
even mathematics consist of generalizations of empirically observable psy-
chological phenomena or facts. We know that people count, and, hence, 
numbers can be derived from the fact of counting; we know that people can 
only see one color at one time and not two, and, therefore, we can derive the 
9
Chapter I. Introduction to Phenomenology
notion that one thing cannot be blue and red at the same time and in the 
same respect. if we generalize this notion from the various observations of 
our empirical experience, we can derive the principle of noncontradiction: 
that it is false to say that the same thing can have two opposing character-
istics at the same time and in the same respect. This view can be completed 
by adding the concepts of association and causality. The present blue color 
of a thing reminds me of, or is associated with, the previous experiences 
of blue and not red, thereby leading to the notion that past experience is a 
corrective for the present and the present for the past. At the same time, this 
view is guaranteed by the notion of causality. The things and their proper-
ties leave or cause impressions in the human experience. hence, the blue 
color causes one to see blue and not red, which allows one to correct one’s 
experiences by rechecking the source of the impression. hence, not only 
the principle of contradiction is derived from empirical observation, but 
any contradictory statement could be checked by showing the causes and 
observational procedures that would have given rise to such statement. 
This view is quite reasonable and can be substantiated on the readily 
available evidence offered by sciences and even nonscientific observations. 
Phenomenology calls this view naturalistic. it assumes that all experience 
is based on natural physical and psychological processes. Taken at its face 
value, it claims that every psychological experience is correlated one-to-one 
to a physical event that causes the given experience. When one sees a spe-
cific color, one can give a cause for the vision in terms of specific light waves 
hitting the retina; when one feels a sharp pain, one can point to the sharp 
object that causes the pain. on these grounds, the claim can be made that 
the only valid experience of the world is one that is caused by the objects 
of the physical world. Any other experience is subjective and scientifically 
unwarranted. if there are any other experiences, they must be reduced to 
their causal inception in empirical experience. for example, if we have ide-
as, the ideas must be traced to their causal origins in the empirical world. 
if we have religious beliefs, the beliefs must be shown to be the products of 
causes in upbringing, unfulfilled empirical desires, or a wild imagination. 
Phenomenology calls this process of explanation of non-empirical compo-
nents by empirical components reductionism4.
4 Spiegelberg, h. (1971). The Phenomenological Movement. The hague: nijhoff.
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Plausible as reductionism may sound, specifically when it is seen as 
an explanatory hypothesis, phenomenology raises a number of questions 
based on what is called phenomenological experience. for example, why 
does one want to reduce one domain, that is, the logical, to another domain, 
the empirical? is there an ontological prejudice lurking in the assumption 
that the only valid experience is empirical? Moreover, the reduction of one 
domain to another assumes the presence of both. it is quite possible to deal 
with each domain separately, decipher its own structure and describe it as 
it is given in itself. This consideration prompted husserl, the father and 
major exponent of modern phenomenology, to call for the return “to the 
things themselves”5. This call means that one should take experience on its 
own terms, as it is given in itself, whether this experience is empirical, logi-
cal, theoretical or practical. When a logician is engaged in logical proofs, 
he is not dealing with empirical, but with logical components. he “sees” 
the components and their relationships; he “sees” the correctness or incor-
rectness of the logical procedures without any empirical vision. This “see-
ing” is an experience that deals with a domain having its own prerequisites 
and procedures that, even in the process of their reduction to an empirical 
explanation, have their own validity and are assumed by the reductionist. 
This suggests (for phenomenology) that reductionism, which is intent on 
explaining experience in tenus of only one domain, the empirical-accepts 
an ontological prejudice concerning the nature of objective being. This 
prejudice is assumed, although not demonstrated. Were we to return to the 
things themselves, we would discover that experienced objectivity is much 
broader than the “naturalistic” prejudice permits. When a mathematician 
deals with mathematical components, such as negative numbers, he has no 
recourse to any empirical data for such components, even though he sees 
them and their function in vast mathematical constructs. The mathemati-
cian not only does not have a recourse to empirical data, but he does not 
even pay attention to his psychological experiences as facts within his own 
life; in fact, he must exclude them as irrelevant to his work. Moreover, were 
he to glance at his psychological facts and give a description of them, he 
would discover that he could derive neither the mathematical objects, with 
which he is concerned, nor the structure of this experience of such objects. 
The two domains, the mathematical and the psychological, have nothing 
5 husserl, e. (1962). ideas i (B. Gibson, Trans.). London: collier.
11
Chapter I. Introduction to Phenomenology
to do with each other, except when a psychologist wishes to apply math-
ematics, such as statistics, to deal with psychological facts. Yet, even the 
experience of application assumes the distinction between the two domains 
of objectivity and experience and constitutes a distinct process that can be 
understood in its own right apart from mathematics and psychology. 
Such reflections led phenomenology to evaluate, very strictly, the nat-
uralistic prejudice and the validity of reductionism. Let us take the natural-
istic prejudice first. Beginning with the notion that psychology can provide 
the foundations of logic, husserl (1962)6 pointed out that such an attempt 
is absurd. Psychology, in contrast to physics for example, is one of the most 
recent sciences that have not yet demonstrated with any rigor the laws of 
psychological processes. it is an uncertain science and its proposed laws are 
constantly challenged by divergent schools of psychology. how then could 
it be a foundation for logic, which is strict and certain science and on which 
axioms and procedures the rest of the sciences are based? it is, to say the 
least, nonsensical to base the strictest of all known sciences on a least strict 
and uncertain science. But assuming that someday psychology is to become 
a strict science, and certain of its laws, even then it could not be the basis of 
logic. The laws of psychological facts do not imply the laws and procedures 
of logic, although the formulation of psychological laws assumes as a basis 
the laws of logic. Moreover, the very notion of law, even psychological law, 
cannot be taken in a simplistic manner. What we call empirical laws cannot 
be reduced to empirical observations. We do not observe laws, we observe 
phenomena, which either confirm or negate the conception of a particular 
law. But the law is not identical with the observed phenomena. if that were 
the case, then the law would change with the changes of the observed phe-
nomena; in which case science would cease. Yet, science functions on the 
assumption that although the phenomena change, the laws governing the 
phenomena remain constant. This implies that the experience of the laws of 
phenomena remain constant, which also implies that the experience of the 
laws of phenomena is in no way empirical, although it is necessary for sci-
ence. in turn, laws cannot be reduced to the empirical phenomena. none-
theless, because we are dealing with laws, we cannot assume that they are 
there although they are not experienced. in such an assumption, we would 
have some kind of mysticism, wherein we would be concerned with some-
6 husserl, e. (1970). Logical investigations (findlay, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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thing that is objective although experientially inaccessible. Phenomenology 
maintains that this would be a mystery only under the assumption of the 
naturalistic ontology and of empirical experience as the sole access to ob-
jectivity. if we broaden the notion of experience to include the experience 
of objectivities that are not empirically given, then the mystery dissolves. 
it is a very common practice for a scientist to say “Let us look at the laws” 
of some natural phenomena. The scientist is not just looking at the things 
around him, but at the laws. it can be said that he sees them directly, that he 
is aware of them although not at the empirical level7. 
But phenomenology takes a further step. even if the strict science of 
physics were taken as the basis of logic, it could not account, on its own 
grounds, for logical experience. To know in detail the mechanical laws of 
a typewriter and to describe how it makes empirical marks on the paper, it 
does not constitute an explanation of the logical formulations written on 
the paper. Moreover, the physical explanation, even if formulated into laws, 
does not imply the logical structures with which the scientist deals. it is 
simply the case that the two domains are distinct. hence, even the physical-
empirical phenomena and its laws do not constitute the base for logic and 
its experience. if we do not know logic already, no sum of physical marks 
made on paper would allow us to infer the logic that is expressed during the 
writing. This can be taken even further. The structure of the laws of physics, 
which presupposes logic, is not identical with the structure of this particu-
lar typewriter and the marks that it makes on the paper. The typewriter 
constitutes an empirical “example” of mechanical laws that can be applied 
to many mechanical processes. Were we to maintain a strict relationship 
between empirical characteristics of the physical world and our direct per-
ception of those characteristics, we would not be able to claim that two 
distinct empirical processes are governed by the same physical laws; after 
all, in each case we would have an entirely different set of empirical impres-
sions, which, within themselves, would not have any indication that they 
follow identical laws. All we could say is simply that they are different. 
even at a quite unsophisticated level, the aforementioned considera-
tions indicate that there are distinct domains of objectivity that can be pre-
sent for distinct levels of experience. Phenomenology would point out that 
7 farber, M. (1967). The foundations of Phenomenology: edmond husserl and the Quest 
for Rigorous Science of Philosophy. Albany, nY: SunY Press.
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this distinction allows us, at least minimally, to think of scientific formula-
tion of hypotheses that may or may not be true. Such a formulation can take 
place at a purely logical level and experience, whereby the empirical expe-
rience would constitute a specific case, an “example” for “visualization” of 
the correctness or incorrectness of the hypothesis. if this were not the case, 
then each hypothesis would have to be derived from the empirical data and, 
hence, be applicable only to such data and none other. in brief, there would 
be no room for variation. 
But in the scientific procedures, hypotheses are formulated that direct 
scientific research into areas that have not yet been empirically experienced. 
As logically constructed laws of the phenomena, they are experienced with-
out any empirical components. it is possible to change the empirical data 
without affecting the experience of the identity of the hypothesis; in turn, 
it is possible to vary hypotheses without changing the empirical data. The 
same empirical datum can be viewed under the structures of various hy-
potheses. This variation suggests that there is no one-to-one correlation be-
tween empirical and logical experiences; from this, it follows that the logical 
experience is not caused by empirical characteristics of the world of things.
even at this level, the phenomenological implications for the science of 
communication are obvious. indeed, the communicational process is con-
cerned with things, humans and events, yet the laws of communication and 
their logic are not based on just the empirically given events. Although com-
municating about things and events, we are involved in a process that is at 
variance with the things and events. here again, the things and events may 
vary empirically, yet the communicative process may remain constant and, 
in fact, repeatable. conversely, the things and events may remain constant, 
whereas the communication process may change. for example, we may 
communicate about most diverse things in terms of their pragmatic value; 
the pragmatic value remains constant, so to speak, amidst the changing 
things. or we may communicate about one thing in terms of its scientific, 
aesthetic, economic and even religious value. Although the thing remains 
constant, the communication process shifts from scientific to aesthetic 
structures and logical requirements. indeed, there is a correlation between 
the communicative process and the things and events, yet the correlation 
is not a causal one. Things do not cause one to communicate about them 
scientifically, in terms of extremely complex mathematical and logical struc-
14
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tures; yet, it is precisely such structures within the communicational process 
that constitute the modalities of our experience of things. hence, things and 
events, including ourselves, are not given simpliciter, but are given in terms 
of experiential structures, without which things would not be given. And 
it is these experiential structures, within which communication takes place 
and which are shared in the communicational processes. Phenomenological 
understanding of experience explains such common communicative devices 
as “how do you see the situation?” Although the situation is given, what is 
shared is the view of the situation. communication is not a mere reaction to 
a situation, but involves the way the situation is experienced. 
These considerations suggest that the experiential process itself is not 
explainable in terms of a causal relationship of the experiencer to the expe-
rienced things. To capture the sense of the experiential process, it is neces-
sary to offer additional distinctions between the naturalistic assumption of 
empirical reality and the way that it makes sense or has meaning for us. 
When we make a judgment about a sunset, a mountain range and a sea 
storm, and pronounce that they are magnificent, we are communicating a 
meaning that we attach to three distinct events or situations. This suggests 
that the empirical phenomena and the meaning ascribed to them in our 
experience are two distinct processes. This is not to be taken as if the mean-
ing is something psychologically subjective and, hence, private. empirical-
psychological processes are distinct from the meaning ascribed to events 
for the following reasons: 
1. When we make a statement, such as “The storm is furious,” we may 
vary the sounds empirically. We may say it in German, chinese or french, 
without changing the meaning of the statement. We may say it slowly, rapid-
ly, we may stutter, and yet across these variations the meaning remains con-
stant. The meaning is distinct from the empirical modalities of its expression. 
2. in the process of making the statement, we may have various chang-
ing psychological attitudes: we may be elated, afraid or indifferent; we may 
perform psychological associations with previously experienced storms 
and the way we were terrified. All these psychological variations do not 
change the meaning of the statement; the meaning remains constant. 
3. even if in our vocal expressions the psychological attitudes are 
manifest, such as when one voices the statement indifferently, exuberantly, 
and so on, one does not change the meaning of the statement; one merely 
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reveals one’s psychological relationship to the storm. What one primarily 
communicates is the meaning, understanding of which is required for the 
understanding of the psychological states expressed through empirical 
sounds or gestures. 
4. in the same manner, we can ascribe meaning to our own psychologi-
cal states, when we say, for example, “My fear has no reasonable grounds” 
or “My psychological life is all messed up”. here, too, the psychological atti-
tudes and empirical states are “meant” in a particular way and the meaning 
constitutes a particular manner, in which we experience our own psyche. 
This indicates that the experience of our own psyche is not identical with 
that psyche. 
Again, we find the same kind of differentiation and correlation that we 
noted earlier. Various psychic and empirically changing processes may be 
meant in one way, may be experienced in terms of one meaning, when we, 
for example, judge that our love, hate, indifference, like and dislike have be-
come “worthless” in relationship to someone; conversely, we may judge one 
psychological phenomenon in terms of various meanings; our indifference 
may be valuable, practical, aesthetically distancing and, in case of scientific 
work, laudable. These considerations point to one fundamental phenom-
enological notion: the constancy hypothesis, adduced by “naturalism,” is 
inadequate to explain experience. The constancy hypothesis states that for 
every experiential component there is a one-to-one causal relationship ei-
ther to an external or an internal event. Yet, as was briefly shown, such a 
correlation does not obtain and, in principle, is not given in experience. 
Although correlated to the empirical-natural world of things and events, 
including subjective states and processes, the experiential process is distinct 
from and at variance with the natural phenomena. 
The preceding distinctions between the natural-empirical phenom-
ena and the modes of experiencing these phenomena lead phenomenol-
ogy to conclude that the experiential process consisting of sense-making 
and meaning structures has its own conditions and requirements apart 
from, although correlated to, the natural phenomena. Moreover, because 
the natural phenomena are given within the context of the experiential 
process, it is necessary to investigate this process in its own right. only 
by understanding this process can we fully appreciate the ways, possible 
or actual, that nature in all of its facets can be experienced. Yet, to attain 
16
The Science of communicaTion 
this process, phenomenology finds it necessary to employ a specific method 
called bracketing. The term bracketing means that all assumptions about na-
ture and empirical phenomena, all being, in brief, all reality, must be placed 
into parenthesis, must be set aside as if it were an irrelevant function in 
experience. This does not mean that phenomenology doubts the existence 
of nature or that it is skeptical about its characteristics or their accessibil-
ity to experience. Rather, the bracketing serves the purpose to direct our 
attention away from the naturalistic assumptions toward the experiential-
process. Bracketing does not change or interfere in any way with the natural 
process. everything goes on as before. The only change is that whatever be-
longs to the naturalistic assumption is placed out of play to open room for 
the investigation of the experiential dimension. The naturalistic assump-
tion includes a vast array of phenomena: nature itself, historically trans-
mitted theories about nature, human psycho-physical processes, cultural 
objects, ethical and aesthetic assumptions and even most secure scientific 
theories8. This is not to say that the validity of these theories is experience, 
i.e., what kind of experience would be required for their presence to the 
subject. The same holds for all the other mentioned domains of objectiv-
ity: phenomenology does not doubt the existence of aesthetic objects; it 
only wishes to decipher the experience required for the giveness of aesthetic 
objects. There is no objection to science and scientific procedures, no ob-
jection to arts and the modes of their operation and even no objection to 
psychology and its domain of investigation. All these domains are accepted 
as they are within their own parameters or, as phenomenology would say, 
within their own essential structures. What phenomenology insists upon is 
that the “experience of ” psychological states as objects is not identical with 
the experiential process or that the process of experiencing of an art work 
is not derivable from the characteristics of the art work in a causal fashion. 
Moreover, phenomenology insists on taking the objective domains within 
their own parameters as they are given in themselves without any reduction 
of one domain to another for explanatory purposes. it can be shown that 
each domain has its own essential structural components and correlatively 
specific required experiential processes for their presence to the subject. 
for example, when dealing with a particular psychological state, we are not 
dealing with chemistry. We can look at the state, describe its characteristics, 
8 husserl, e. (1962). ideas i, p. 59.
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and, in turn, describe the ways that the state is experienced. When we are 
confronted with the domain of chemistry, we are required to undergo a 
different set of experiences in face of an object that belongs to chemistry 
and not to psychology. Phenomenology is not interested whether one do-
main can be reduced to the other; that question is left for ontology, which 
assumes a certain reality “in itself ” apart from experience. This reality is 
not doubted by phenomenology; it is simply not made into an “object” of 
concern. its main concern lies in the manner, in which the various objective 
domains are given in experience and what kind of experience is required 
for each domain to be present to the subject9.
experientially speaking, the bracketing reveals an absolute domain, 
in relation to which the objects of the natural world are relative. Things 
change, they are contingent, yet the experience of them is essential. for ex-
ample, the very notion that “all things are contingent” is an experiential in-
sight into an essence of all things that belong to experience. With the notion 
of an “insight into an essence”, we are led to the delimitation of the first and 
rudimentary experiential structures in correlation to the “natural” things 
and events. The first level is the one between the perceptual process and the 
material, spatial thing. While observing a particular material-spatial object, 
the perceiver may perform various acts, such as closing and opening the 
eyes, and moving about the thing and seeing it from different sides without 
the loss of the identity of the object. The object remains constant through 
the multiplicity of perceptual acts and their disruption and, hence, is totally 
distinct from the perceptual process. As phenomenology would say, the ob-
ject is transcendent, i.e., apart from and outside of the process of experien-
tial activity. nor does the object “cause” the perceptual process. After all, the 
unseen side that i am about to see does not cause me to move to the other 
side of the thing, because it is not yet causally present to my vision. 
Without the structure of identical and continuous “transcendent” object 
and the variation of perceptual activities, no experience would be possible. 
At this level, something must remain identical and continuous, to which 
the various perceptual acts are correlated; otherwise, with each act the ob-
ject would be different and no continuity between the acts would be given. 
All such acts assume a continuity and a synthesis because they are related to 
the same thing, they are perceptual acts of the same object. i see the object; i 
9 husserl, e. (1962). ideas i, p. 82.
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walk around it; i touch it. Through all these activities, the object is the same. 
This means that the object is not derived from the perceptual acts or from 
experiential activity in general. That is to say, perception does not project, 
in some mysterious way, its own objects. it accepts the object as it is present 
through the perceptual activity. 
it is to be noted that the perceptual process of any spatial thing involves 
an approach to the object from various sides and perspectives, through 
which the object appears to the experiencer. Yet, a strict distinction must 
be made between the side of the things and a perspective, from which the 
thing is seen. The side of the thing belongs to the thing. But a perspective 
is taken to the thing by the experiencer in such a way that the experiencer 
must assume a spatial position to the thing and even to the side of the thing. 
hence, a perspective constitutes a spatial modality of perception, in terms 
of which the experiencer presents the thing, its sides and various charac-
teristics of the thing to himself or herself. The process of perspective con-
stitution requires that the perceiver be in a position to move, i.e., have a 
kinesthetic capacity. in order to see something from various sides, the ex-
periencing subject must be able to move oneself. Although the thing and its 
sides are absolutely correlated to the perspectives of the experiencer, neither 
is derivable from the other. The thing is spatial, whereas the perspectives we 
take to the thing are not given in space; they are experienced directly in 
such a way that it is impossible, strictly speaking, to take a perspective to a 
perspective. We can only assume a perspective to a spatial thing. 
This process could be extended to include not only the thing given in 
perception, but also its sides and, indeed, its various characteristics. even 
a color of a side of the thing is given from various angles of observation.
Although there is no ultimate perspective, there is, of necessity, per-
ceptivity in the perception of spatial things. Regardless of who would wish 
to experience a spatial thing, the experiencer must regard the thing from 
various perspectives. This suggests one fundamental facet of phenomenol-
ogy: it seeks to discover the essential characteristics of experience and of 
experiential process, which are essential for the experience of objects, re-
gardless of who the experiencer may be. This means that phenomenology’s 
aim is to get away from subjective skepticism and relativism and to discover 
universal and necessary structures that would be valid for all experiencing 
subjects at all times and everywhere. hence, it can claim that at the percep-
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tual level the requirements are such that there must be a spatial object with 
sides given in and through the variation of perceptual acts and perspectives. 
under any other conditions, perceptual experience could not occur. At the 
same time, this experience involves an object, essence of which lies in its 
“indefinite explorability” through continuous perceptual perspective varia-
tions. These perspective variations could be performed by anyone, anytime 
and anywhere and the perspectives could be described and communicated 
to anyone. hence, communication is possible not only because we have 
a world of common objects, but primarily because we can have the same 
experience, which can be directly, communicated. once again, it must be 
stressed that phenomenology, dealing with experience, has nothing to do 
with subjectivism or with some private or inaccessible experiences belong-
ing to the internal process of some mysterious subject. Suffice it to say, as 
husserl pointed out, that even a God, in order to experience a spatial object, 
would have to submit his experiential process to perspective variation and a 
series of perceptual-kinesthetic movements10. 
Within the context of phenomenological experience, the communica-
tive process assumes the following shape. it is to be noted that although deal-
ing with spatial things we do not pay attention to our experiential process; 
we are directed to the things. Yet, the experiential process is the background, 
in terms of which the things are given to us. We do not usually look at the 
perspectives we take or the movements we perform, but rather at the things, 
their sides and characteristics. The same can be said of the communicative 
process. When we are communicating, we are directed to the object of our 
communication; we communicate about things, humans, events and so 
forth. Yet, for those things to be present in various modalities in commu-
nication, the communicative process is assumed as a “silent background”. 
This silent communicative background is identical with, or is at least 
an expression of, the experiential process that is also a background, in 
terms of which things are experienced. What the communicative process 
depicts are things as they are given to us in experience, it moves with the 
experiential process. When we say “seen from this angle, the blue of the 
object is brighter”, we have the following process: we are in the presence of 
an object possessing a specific characteristic. in communicational process, 
the characteristic is an object of communication and, indeed, of experience. 
10 husserl, e. (1962). ideas i, p. 90.
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Yet, at the same time, the communication includes a position, a perspec-
tive, from which the object is seen. Without this perspective, which can be 
assumed by the communicative partner, the communicative process would 
not be complete. Basically, what is being communicated is what is being ex-
perienced. Without the experiential process given within communication, 
the thing would not be given or seen as it is, nor would it be transmitted to 
the communicative partner. 
We are now in a position to take another step toward the broadening 
of the experiential process and toward a further distinction between the 
natural objects and the experiential dimension. As it was noted, the process 
of perception may vary, whereas the object of perception remains constant. 
But what is the constant object, given in experience that can remain? in 
terms of a common and even scientific understanding of nature, the spatial 
thing, although relatively constant, is nonetheless in a process of slow self-
transformation. hence, it cannot yield the condition of being constant in 
all respects. it is common to say that the table i saw yesterday is the same 
table i see today. But what can be the sense of “sameness” here? At least 
temporally, the table is different and cannot be transposed back to yesterday. 
Moreover, the very notion of perceptual experience of a spatial object does 
not permit us to say that we see the object; strictly speaking, we can only see 
one side of the object from a particular perspective. Perceptually, the object 
is never given as such. one could perhaps say that the object becomes a sum 
of sides and characteristics. But the problem is what unifies those sides and 
characteristics into an identical object? obviously, it is not something given 
in perception. hence, phenomenology points out that even perceptual pro-
cess requires another level of experience that is not perceptual, but essential. 
Modern philosophy has many arguments for and against the “existence” 
of essences; in fact, these arguments divide entire philosophical schools 
into idealism, empiricism, naturalism, realism and even subjectivism. But 
if we recall the phenomenological procedure that brackets all questions and 
assumptions of existence and deals only with the question of experience, 
then we can dispense with these arguments and simply pay attention to the 
requirements of experience itself. if experience requires essential compo-
nents, then such components must be accepted experientially without any 
regard to the ontological question of their existence or non-existence. And 
precisely such components are discovered in experience. What phenom-
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enology points to is that experience is always involved in essential insights, 
even when such insights remain a mere possibility and may never have a per-
ceptual correlate. At the same time, the perceptual process itself is ruled by 
essential insight, without which such a process would not have a synthesis. 
even when we say that there are no experienced essences, we are communi-
cating an essential insight, which is understandable by anyone, even when it 
is contested. or once again, when one says that all experience is contingent, 
one is involved in communicating an essential insight. This suggests that 
experience is always involved in something essential accessible to all. Take 
another example: when we teach children basic arithmetic, we use all kinds 
of objects to exemplify the arithmetic relationships. our teaching process 
is not involved in showing the children a set of perceptual objects, but by 
means of them evoking an essential insight into mathematical procedures 
that are not perceptual. Yet, precisely this essential, nonperceptual insight is 
what allows the children to make sense of the objects used to communicate 
the mathematical structures and relationships. The essential insight is not 
derived from the various objects used to exemplify and reveal the insight. 
The real, natural objects are here bracketed, for the sake of the experience 
that is essential and not dependent upon these particular perceptual ob-
jects. The perceptual facts may constitute an occasion for, or an example 
of, an essential insight, but they are not the cause of the insight. The facts 
are contingent, the experiential insight into their contingency is essential11. 
The notion of essentiality can be applied to the perceptual experience of 
the spatial object. While perceiving a spatial object here and now; we are led 
by an insight into the spatiality of any natural object, into its structure, and 
with respect to this individual object, into the type of an object that it is. This 
essential insight into the object is not identical with the individual object, 
because we can change the individual objects within the parameters of their 
typology without discarding the identity of our insight. The insight into the 
essential structure in experience allows us to unify the various sides and per-
spectives and to continue the exploration of the object indefinitely. hence, 
the question whether the essence exists or not is irrelevant, what is relevant is 
an essential insight into or a generalization of the perceived objects. As sug-
gested earlier, we do not perceive the identity of that an essential insight into 
a typology is a condition for the experience of a spatial object and that the 
11 husserl, e. (1962). ideas i, p. 99.
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perceived object may be changed within the limits of the typology without 
destroying the experience of all of them being of the identical kind, this is 
not to say that the typology is derived from a generalization of the perceived 
objects, as suggested earlier, we do not perceive the identity of the object: 
we only perceive sides and facets of the object. Yet, a necessary condition 
of experience is the presence of an insight into an essence, a typology of an 
object, to which we can return irrespective of space and time and the spatio-
temporal changes, to which the empirical object may be submitted. 
The insight into essence in experience is one of the conditions for com-
munication. in most communication processes, we do not have the per-
ceptual objects before us. if this were necessary, we would never be able 
to communicate about anything except what was given in immediate per-
ception. Moreover, even when we communicate about things, which are 
present or which we have experienced perceptually, we find that in the first 
case the communicating parties never have the perceptual thing in full view 
or perceive it from the same perspective; after all, the two perceivers can 
never occupy the same spatial location at the same time and see the object 
from precisely the same perspective. in the second case, although the com-
municating parties might have seen spatial objects, these objects perceptu-
ally were somewhat distinct. Yet, in communicational process, they agree of 
having seen a table or a box. What allows the communicability is the phe-
nomenological fact of having an insight into an essence of what a table or a 
box is as a typology. Without this insight, the communicating parties would 
be required to go and see perceptually all the sides of the particular table or 
a box in order to understand what is being communicated. But as already 
noted, even in this case all one would see are sides and facets, but not the 
object as such. even in this case, one would require an insight into a typolo-
gy for the understanding of what the other person is saying. in case we were 
tempted to use the hypothesis of memory and association of previous expe-
riences with the present, the requirement of essential insight would remain. 
first of all, if the communicative parties were to associate their previous 
experiences of things with the present experience, the experiences would 
not yield a common ground for communication. After all, perceptually the 
objects were not alike. Secondly, if in the present experience the commu-
nicating parties have only perceptual experience of the sides and facets of 
the thing, to add previous experiences of sides and facets of other things 
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does not account for the fact that they are communicating about the thing 
as a unity of sides and facets. This suggests that communicability assumes 
an insight into a typology as a condition of mutual understanding. in this 
phenomenological view, any object of a particular typology could be used 
as a perceptual example of an insight, which one has in one’s experience. 
Against subjectivism of experience, phenomenology points out that 
the essence of typology is nothing “intrinsic” to the experiencing subject, 
but is an object of experience. it is an experiential given. We can assign at-
tributes to it, we can judge the propriety or impropriety of such attributes, 
and we can correct our views or be corrected by others in the process of 
communication. in fact, this process of judging, communicating and at-
tributing is not time or space bound, nor is the typology an object of our 
experience. We can come back to the process, check our own and other 
judgments and look again at the typology and what properties belong to 
it. This release from spatio-temporality is precisely a basic requirement for 
communication. Although the means of communication may be tempo-
ral, sounds, marks on paper, the structure of the communicative process, 
and the object, about which the communicative process is engaged, are not 
temporal and, hence, they are accessible to anyone any time. When we read 
a story or a theoretical treatise from the past, written by persons we have 
never met, we have no empirical evidence of those persons, nor any way to 
check the manner, in which they received their empirical impressions and 
the surroundings that have “caused” such impressions. Yet, when we read 
the printed pages, we know what is communicated to us, even when we do 
not know when the pages were written. Were we to see the case otherwise, it 
would be impossible to repeat, in principle, the same question or to recheck 
the correctness of our attributions with respect to a particular typology; 
after all, we would, at least temporally, be in a different circumstance, with 
different empirical input, causing us to react differently. Yet experientially, 
we can look back to our previous logic, correct it, reevaluate it, regardless of 
the differences in our natural causal situation. 
These considerations lead phenomenology to yet another conclusion. 
in the process of communication, it is possible to change the natural means 
of communication, the empirical modes of sending messages without 
changing the object of communication, nor the message that is being trans-
mitted about the object. This means that the natural means are bearers of, 
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but are not the message. That is to say, the causal relationship between the 
natural means of transmitting the message and the natural person, who is 
being affected by such means, do not constitute the communicative process, 
even if they are a necessary condition for such a process. The conditions for 
the expression of something do not constitute the expression. The hand, as 
a condition for writing, not only does not imply the shape of the alphabet 
(after all, there are so many distinct alphabets), but, above all, does not im-
ply the grammar of a particular language. Rather, the structure of grammar 
can be exemplified by handwriting, by speaking, by computerized process 
and by other means of codification. hence, communicative experience is 
at a level of typological and repeatable structures, accessible to all,\ and 
exhibited by most divergent natural-empirical phenomena. This is not to 
deny the value of the latter phenomena; it is to show that these phenomena 
in themselves do not present a complete view of communication. 
Although the experienced essences and the activities, in which they 
appear, are the domain of phenomenological concerns, they are always cor-
related to their naturalistic-empirical content. Yet phenomenology, concern 
of which is direct experience, maintains a strict distinction between them in 
order to show the process of experience devoid of ontological impediments. 
An example, at the perceptual level, would make this experiential process 
more vivid. While observing a spatial object, such as a desk, we see it from 
one of its sides. The side is a limited appearance of the table. At the same 
time, we must assume a perspective to the table. The perspective belongs 
to the perceptual process of the experience as a necessary modality for the 
table to be given from one side. By moving about the table, we change our 
perspective and a different side of the “same” table appears. in order for the 
two sides to be the sides of the “same” table, and for the two perspectives to 
be the perspectives of the same subject, two conditions must be met: (a) the 
maintenance of the object as “same” throughout the variations of the sides, 
and (b) the continuity of an identical perceiver throughout the changing 
perceptual perspectives and activities. Without these conditions, all we 
would have on the object side is a succession of sides and aspects instead 
of being sides of ... and, indeed, it would not even make sense to speak of 
sides; on the subject side, there would be a mere succession of perspectives 
that would not have a synthesis as perspective positions of the same subject 
related to an identical object. 
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But the required identity and continuity of the perceiver and the object 
are experiential, requiring no presuppositions of existence or non-existence 
of nature. Despite the perceived sameness of the table, all that we actually 
perceive are its various sides and facets; yet, in none of them do we perceive 
anything as an identity. The identity is an experienced typology of a kind of 
object it is; although the typology is required and is correlated to the per-
ceived table, the experience of the typology as identical and continuous is 
not given merely at the empirical level. hence, if we bracket the question of 
existence or non-existence of the natural table and deal with it as it is given 
in experience, we shall find that the experience of the table has a structure 
and a process that is distinct from the table, even if the particular table can 
be used as an example of an insight into a type of an object that it is. Because 
the process of perspective variations does not belong to the perceived par-
ticular spatial object, it is the way that the object is present to the subject. 
This requirement for typology does not belong to just this table, but to a 
multitude of spatial objects that could function as a table. 
The question whether the typologies exist or not is an ontological-
speculative question that is irrelevant for phenomenology. What is relevant 
is that such typologies and essential structures, given in direct experience, 
constitute the conditions for our perceptual experience. As “timeless”, in 
the sense that we can return to them in experience, even when the specific 
object is abolished, they are given as objects of our direct insight. hence, 
when we said that a spatial object is experience able indefinitely, that one 
perspective leads to another, that one side points to another and that exte-
rior aspects lead to interior aspects, we were concerned with the essence of 
any spatial object and the requirements that one would have to submit to in 
order to experience such an object. Moreover, when we communicate about 
the spatial object, we are involved in the essential aspects given in experi-
ence for communicability about the individual object given in perception. 
even when we communicate about individuals, we are involved with an es-
sential insight into what individuality is, what distinctness and uniqueness 
are. Were communication limited to empirical process alone, we would 
never communicate, because we would be locked to the succession of the 
given sides and the perspectives by virtue of which of the sides are present 
to us, without the sides being sides of a unitary and identical object. 
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The requirement of essential experience is extended in phenomenol-
ogy into every facet of perceptual as well as theoretical experience. for ex-
ample, perception of a quality, such as color, requires an essential insight 
into what a quality is and what are the essential differences between types 
of qualities, such as color and sound. The particular, perceptual colors and 
sounds become instantiations or examples of the essential experience. The 
experience of red is not red; rather, it is a process of perspective variations 
and changes in illumination, distance, paying attention, focusing and con-
trasting. Through all this process, the essential insight into the color red 
remains constant, whereas the particular perceptual red constitutes an 
example of the essence. here again, the ontological question of the per-
ceived red is bracketed; what is attended to is the experiential process and 
its constitutive elements that allow this particular color to be present to the 
subject. The particular red is transcendent to, and outside of the process of, 
experience, although experience refers to it. What allows communication 
is not the sharing of some subjective impressions, but the transmission of 
the experience of the quality accessible to all. That is to say, the experiential 
process is subjectively indifferent. 
By bracketing the question of the existence or non-existence of the per-
ceptual object, phenomenology also brackets the question of the existence or 
non-existence of essential structures. it is only concerned with the manner, in 
which they function in experience. At the same time, phenomenology shows 
that the experience of essences is distinct from perceptual experience and is 
not caused by or reducible to the perceptual experience or natural process. 
We may take totally divergent natural objects and judge them to be a group. 
The group is not identical with the given objects not only because they com-
prise a set of distinct causal influences and are generically distinct, but be-
cause we can replace the objects indefinitely without altering the experience 
that they still comprise a group. When we communicate our experience, we 
are communicating about the group, about the ways of collecting most diver-
gent objects into a group despite the fact that the communicating parties have 
never experienced the same empirical objects. 
When a science of communication constructs explanatory theories 
about communicational processes and communicates them to other mem-
bers of the scientific community, such a science does not require that the “re-
ceivers” of the theory must have had the same objective-perceptual experi-
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ence or the same subjective internal states in order to understand the theory. 
The theoretical components, their validity and internal consistency, are 
judged in terms of their own logic. indeed, the theory may be incorrect, but 
this does not abolish its comprehensibility and communicability. After all, to 
say that the theory is void of perceptual support assumes that the one who 
makes such a charge has nevertheless experienced the theoretical structure 
in its own right. otherwise, such a charge would not make any viable sense. 
The presence of the theoretical components, which may not have any 
perceptual correlate, is accepted by scientists in the communicative process. 
At the same time, the process of experiencing such components, the mak-
ing of judgments, the formulation of propositions, the process of analysis 
and synthesis, are accepted by scientists without any regard to the subjective 
states of the proposition makers or analyzers. in fact, such states are at that 
time bracketed as irrelevant and not belonging to the domain of discussion. 
This means that the experiential process and the theoretical components, 
with which it deals, a process and components that are repeatable at will, 
are not derivable from the subjective states or some presumed naturalistic 
position of the scientists. if this condition were not met, then any causal 
variation of the external or internal environment during the scientist’s pres-
entation and communication of the theory would change the components 
of the theory and the analytic process and construction of propositions re-
lated to the theoretical components. But in this case, no scientific commu-
nication would be possible. experiential evidence shows that the variation 
of the natural-causal relationships does not affect the communication of 
scientific experience. Any scientific-theoretical process, if it were based on 
a naturalistic explanation, would be reduced to constant skepticism and 
anthropocentrism. The theory would be comprehensible and communica-
ble only under invariant conditions not only of the person, who would be 
communicating this theory, but also of the persons, who would be listen-
ing to the communication. Moreover, the listeners would have to somehow 
decipher every psychophysiological state of the communicator and assume 
precisely the same state for the understanding of what is being communi-
cated. in addition, the listeners would have to have precisely the same im-
pressions that the communicator has, otherwise they would not be dealing 
in principle with the same object or from the same side and perspective. 
To complicate things further, the theory could not be communicated in 
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another environment, because its validity would be coextensive with the 
conditions, under which it was communicated the first time. There would 
be an entirely different theory. But obviously, even scientists, who maintain 
the naturalistic base of explanation of all experience, do not operate that 
way and, in fact, they assume that their theory is valid irrespective of the 
causal conditions, under which the scientists are operating. 
The preceding discussion opened a level of objective experience that, 
although correlated to subjective states and perceptual phenomena, has an 
objectivity of its own. That is to say that despite their nonperceptual charac-
ter, the typologies, the theoretical components and the experiential process 
dealing with them can be investigated objectively irrespective of their spa-
tio-temporal location and, thus, communicated, and to such an extent that 
they constitute the ground for the process of communication. Yet, such a 
process involves some fundamental aspects not yet discussed. These aspects 
consist of the sense and meaning required for the comprehension of experi-
ence and of the perceptual phenomena, to which experienced is related. 
it is quite common in the communication process to ask what a word 
or a something, such as a perceptual component or a theoretical factor, 
means. in fact, there is an entire philosophical movement dealing with the 
clarification and analysis of the meaning of linguistic terms. This suggests 
for phenomenology that meaning plays a fundamental role in experience 
and communication and that without it neither experience nor communi-
cation would make much sense. Because the experiential and communica-
tive process is involved in sense-making, phenomenology assumes the task 
of deciphering at what level of experience the process of meaning is given.
it hardly needs to be repeated that the meaning of a sentence is not 
identical with the marks made on a paper or with the sounds emitted by the 
speaker. The marks and sounds may vary as perceived components without 
changing the meaning they transmit. At the same time, there is a varia-
tion between the meaning of a sentence and the object referred to in the 
sentence. for example, “The Victor at Jenna” and “The defeated of Water-
loo” are two statements with different meanings; yet, the meanings refer to 
one and the same person, namely napoleon. The converse also holds: one 
statement can refer to two distinct objects. This suggests that meaning is 
not derived from the empirical-naturalistic phenomena, such as sounds, 
marks or things and events of nature. Yet in turn, our experience of things, 
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events, marks and so forth, is fundamentally involved in meaning. one 
would have to say, perhaps, that we, the subjects, attach meaning to the 
things, events and marks. But such a view is problematic to say the least. 
first of all, our own subjective experience may vary without inducing any 
variation in the meaning attached to such an experience. Different subjec-
tive processes and psychological states may have the same meaning. for 
example, when someone says that “My body and my psyche are sick”, the 
variation of psychophysiological functions does not affect the meaning that 
is attributed to these functions, although we could not experience the func-
tions without the meaning. This suggests that meaning cannot be treated 
as a subjective experience that is somehow added to objective events. This 
is the reason why phenomenology, in order to extricate meaning from an 
enmeshment in subjective-naturalistic states and objective-naturalistic 
phenomena, brackets both. once again, this is not to imply that the sub-
ject ceases to be; rather, the subject with its internal states and processes is 
understood in terms of a more fundamental level of experience based on 
meaning. Phenomenology does not ask whether meaning exists; it takes it 
as a given function in experience12. 




having touched upon the method of phenomenology and the manner, 
in which it evaluates the naturalistic position, in the following section we 
briefly evaluate the various theoretical positions from positivism through 
structuralism and semiology. The evaluation is not designed to show that 
such positions are wrong, but mainly to show what phenomenology adds to 
the understanding of the communication process. in addition, the critique 
is designed to identify unjustified presuppositions and unquestioned ontol-
ogies not for the sake of rejection, but in order to place them in an experien-
tial context and to note the range of their validity. it must be stressed that it 
is not the rightness or wrongness of such positions, but merely the limits of 
such positions that will be evaluated and critiqued. At the same time, each 
theoretical stance will be “asked” to adhere to its own principles and not to 
introduce something, so to speak, through the back door. The latter task is 
perhaps the most difficult, because in this short survey it is impossible to 
present all the possible answers and objections that could stem from phe-
nomenological critique. nonetheless, an effort will be made to maintain as 
fair an evaluation as possible.
one of the major theoretical-methodological trends, stemming from 
the success of physical sciences, is positivism. its first assumption is that 
the final or ultimate reality is physical, that is, spatiotemporal. its second 
assumption is that we are part of that reality and are completely bound to 
its causal laws. if at times we can create the illusion that there is something 
outside of or apart from physical reality, such notions must be shown to be 
ultimately based on and explainable by physical laws. hence, although we 
may imagine that there is a consciousness having a specific function, such 
a function and the language used to express it must be reduced to, and 
translated into, physical explanation and physicalistic language. The third 
assumption of positivism is that it states that all experience is empirical, and 
all science must rest on such an experience. The experience is comprised of 
a causal impact on our physical organism by the environment. one could 
say that experience is a reaction to stimuli. This leads to the claim by posi-
tivistic science that human behavior is a reaction to stimuli. if we can de-
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cipher the stimuli, we can predict human behavior in advance, that is, we 
can deal with human behavior scientifically. The fourth assumption of posi-
tivism states that any scientifically tenable proposition would have to be a 
generalization from individual experienced cases. Any other proposition 
would be either a tautology or a poetic saying having no scientific import. 
Although we have already dealt with various components of positiv-
ism, without naming them, a closer scrutiny of its principles will reveal 
what phenomenology adds to the understanding of experience beyond 
positivism. first of all, the notion that reality is ultimately physical is not 
a product of direct empirical experience. When we observe objects, what 
we directly perceive are colors, sounds and the touch of smooth or rough 
surfaces, which do not imply anything physical. even if we assume the di-
rect perception of objects, such as tables, trees, humans and so forth, what 
would allow us to say that all these divergent things are physical? one could 
answer that they are in space and time, that we can weight them, measure 
them and calculate their movements. But neither space and time, nor the 
measures of speed and location are something that we perceive empirically. 
Assuming that space and time are relations among physical objects, it is still 
the case that we do not have physical impressions of relations. even at this 
level, positivism imports something into its ontology, which is not of physi-
cal nature. At the same time, it imports measures and numerical systems 
that have no spatiotemporal locations. unless, of course, we are prepared to 
maintain the absurd proposition that numbers are in our physical brain or 
are identical with the marks made on our measuring implements, we have 
to admit of experience that is not necessarily within the ken of positivistic 
metaphysics. Yet, when we analyze the brain, we do not find numbers, but 
a multitude of physiological processes. At the same time, if our measuring 
standards were identical with the marks on the implements, then the only 
criterion we could have for the accurateness of our implements would be 
precisely the implement. it would be impossible to correct our implements. 
each implement would “speak for itself ” and a comparison of two imple-
ments would simply lead us to conclude that one is longer than the other, 
but not that one is more accurate than the other. Yet, when we take a 
Mathematician, who is concerned with numbers and their relation-
ships, one is not dealing with his brain or the marks on the implements, he is 
facing a mathematical reality. To reduce such a reality to physical states, it re-
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quires (a) that we already have such a reality and its relationships and (b) that 
the components of such a reality are derivable from another domain. Yet, in 
order to derive the first from the second, one must assume the first; other-
wise the whole process of reduction would make no sense. Phenomenology, 
by bracketing the assumption of being, one is free to survey the experience of 
these domains as they are present to the subject. in fact, husserl claimed that 
positivism is insufficiently positive, because it does not accept what is given 
in direct and positive experience13. By accepting each domain, be it empiri-
cal, logical, theoretical, valuative or aesthetic, as it is directly present to the 
experiencer, husserl claimed that he is the true positivist without any onto-
logical assumptions. Phenomenology does not deny that there is a physical 
reality; it simply suspends the assumption of such a reality in order to inves-
tigate the kind of experience required of the positivist to maintain the thesis 
of such a reality and the limits that are placed on such an experience. Yet, at 
the same time, it extends the concept of what is given to the experiencer in 
order to deal with other domains, as they are given in themselves. it is only 
on the basis of such an extension, that any subsequent ontology could func-
tion when it purports to reduce one domain to the other or to explain one 
in terms of the other. Phenomenology does not object to such an attempt at 
explanation, but it leaves this task to metaphysicians. of course, the problem 
with the latter is its speculative character and fruitless argumentation. 
The second principle is also problematic. To claim that there is no such 
reality as consciousness is, on the one hand, to assume it, and on the other, 
it is to use it in the process of its denial and theory construction in order to 
explain it away. The notion that everything real must be within the context 
of causality is belied by the direct observation of various human functions. 
first of all, causality requires a spatial nexus. Yet, even our psychological 
processes, such as a succession of ideas, have no spatial location, although 
they may have a temporal succession in the form of “one after the other”. 
or take psychological events, such as love or hate: the spatially observable 
changes in our physiology, such as blood pressure, heart rate, perspiration 
and so forth, may be identical in both cases and, indeed, may be produced 
by running, even though our experience of love is completely different from 
hate and running. Reductionism would have to claim that anytime one 
runs and increases one’s blood pressure, heart rate and perspiration, one 
13 husserl, e. (1962). ideas i, p. 84.
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could be judged to be in love. Second, maintaining the principle of causality 
and behavior, it is possible to describe human behavior in terms of direct 
empirical and measurable evidence. Yet, if we maintain that principle, we 
would have to say that when a person is shaking the coke machine, he is 
simply moving his arms and his body in a particular way and that the ma-
chine is caused to move accordingly; but we could not say that the person 
is angry with the machine. Such a notion would be an inference from the 
empirically observed behavior; yet, such an inference is no longer given at 
an empirical level. After all, perhaps the person is dancing with the ma-
chine. What is required is an understanding of the intent of the actor and 
not just his empirical behavior. Third, consciousness must be assumed as an 
active process that can survey mental and physical states and the relation-
ship between them. The behavioral positivist, although showing the causal 
relationships between the mental states and physical reality, must be out-
side of that relationship in order to carefully select the related factors and to 
exclude the irrelevant factors and, indeed, to impartially survey them. if the 
scientist cannot be a nonparticipating observer, he cannot give us an objec-
tive view. But it is precisely consciousness that can experience processes 
without being a component within those processes. The scientist, in fact, 
assumes that consciousness is a detached and external observer if his find-
ings and observations are to gain scientific objectivity. consciousness is an 
irreducible process, without which scientific work makes no sense. Because 
this requirement is unavoidable, phenomenology accepts consciousness as 
it is given and not as it is conceived by some ontology. fourth, without 
experience and its constant components, which are not submitted to spa-
tiotemporal changes, scientific work would be exposed to constant causal 
transformations; the scientist could not detachedly survey the field, but 
would have to react to every causal influence in his environment. Moreover, 
he could never repeat the “same” experiment, because from day to day the 
causal conditions would change and the components of his experiment, at 
least the physical, would be different. What allows the repetition of a scien-
tific experiment is the experience of the identical and repeatable typology of 
the experiment, a typology that the scientist experiences and uses to recon-
struct the physical elements. The scientist does not construct the physical 
components of his experiment as a reaction to physical stimuli. Rather, he 
is directed by the experienced, although perceptually not given, essence of 
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the experiment, within context of which there is a range of variations of the 
physical components. hence, the very scientific methodology presupposes 
phenomenological experience for the essential theoretical and hypotheti-
cal components as identical throughout a multitude of physical and causal 
processes. Such an experience is the ground for scientific communication. 
When a scientist reads a paper about his experiments, the listeners (a) have 
not been submitted to the same causal environment as the reader; (b) the 
listeners are not observing and measuring the reader’s behavior, but are at-
tending to the structure and logic of the presentation, a presentation that 
although being expressed physically is not identical with the expressions. 
Phenomenology submits that although the speaker deals with the experi-
ments, his ability to communicate his experiment is the consequence of the 
experience that he shares with the listeners and not his behavior that his au-
dience can observe. if his audience were to attend to his behavior, it would 
miss what he is saying. The experience is shared, clarifiable and repeatable 
by both the speaker and the listeners. clarification is possible only if the 
speaker and the listeners are attending to the same essential composition of 
the experiment and the ways, in which the experiment is meant. 
The third principle was partially considered in our discussion of phe-
nomenology’s conception of experience. Yet, some issues must be touched 
upon in order to show the problems when experience is causally interpreted. 
Taking causal explanation of experience scientifically, it would have to be 
maintained that perception depends on a one-to-one correlation between 
the physical input and the experience that this input evokes. hence, in the 
case of vision, it would have to be maintained that light waves hit your ret-
ina, move through various chemical media and then locate themselves in a 
particular area of the brain. This constitutes our vision. if this were the case, 
we would never see the object; what would be present to us would be the 
light waves in our brain, and all our experience would be closed within the 
brain; we would never know the “outside” world. Moreover, we would not 
even be able to claim that we have a brain, because we have never seen it. 
The objection could be that we have seen the brains of others; yet, strictly 
speaking, even in this case the only experience we have are the light waves 
emitted by the supposed brain of the other. The only avenue that is left is to 
“infer” the presence of external objects. Yet, in this case, we are importing 
a function that is not empirical and causal, but logical, a function that can 
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not only observe the process of light waves and their causal function in our 
brain, but can also be capable of correlating such light waves to proper ex-
ternal objects. Yet, this indicates that there must be an experiential process 
that can signify the external world and its objects. it is in turn capable of 
deciphering the function of causal processes as means or a medium of vi-
sion, but not as vision. This suggests that a causal explanation of experience 
confuses the means of experience with the actual process of experience. 
Another causal explanation rests on the notion that the physical objects are 
basically spatiotemporal entities composed of extension, size, weight and 
location; their qualitative properties, such as color, sound, touch and so 
forth, are the impressions that are subjective. in brief, the color green does 
not belong to the object, but to the subject. The experience of the green 
is green. once again, direct experience belies such an assumption on the 
following grounds: (a) when we observe a quality of an object, we see the 
quality “on” the object and not in our subjective impressions. We see the 
green from various perspectives, under various conditions of illumination 
and so forth, constituting our experiential process of the green. The green 
is not within the experiential process; rather, it is an objective property of 
a thing. (b) if the qualitative aspects were in us, and because our senses 
present us only with qualitative properties, then we could never get beyond 
them to the “physical thing”. The physical thing could only be inferred. Yet, 
in this case we once again assume a power of inference that is not deriv-
able from the qualitative impressions. (c) The correlation of the qualitative 
impressions to a particular object assumes an access to that object in our 
experience. Were this not the case, then we would be at a loss as to which 
quality belongs to which object within the temporal succession of qualita-
tive impressions. Such a theory, which is intent on excluding consciousness 
and of reducing it to a sum of qualitative impressions, introduces, through a 
back door, a function of inference, a function of consciousness that must be 
directly aware of the object. Moreover, such a function must be capable of 
correlating the succession of qualitative impressions to an identical object. 
Yet, direct experience testifies that we need not infer from an impression 
the presence of an object; we see the object as having qualities. Again, such 
a theory would preclude any communication. The subjective impressions of 
one subject are private and cannot be transmitted to anyone else. even if this 
were possible in some mysterious way, no two subjects could have the same 
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qualitative impressions; hence, the communication of one subject’s impres-
sions to another would not lead to understanding, because the receiver does 
not have such impressions, that is, he/she has never been in the precise situ-
ation of the other subject. for communication to occur, the “sender” of the 
message would have to take the receiver to the precise situation, in which 
the impressions occurred. But because events are constantly changing, no 
such transportation would solve the problem. Two subjects, closed within 
their own impressions, have no theoretical access to communication. Yet, 
as phenomenology suggests, we communicate at a meaningful and essential 
level and with precise experiential requirements. When speaking about the 
green quality of a thing, the subject not only sees the color green, but also 
transmits a typology that is experienced by all and that can be exemplified 
by anyone’s empirical experience by a variety of impressions and perspecti-
val variations. finally, it can be shown that there is no constant correlation 
between the physical characteristics of an object and the psychophysiologi-
cal process of the subject and how the characteristics are experienced. if we 
were to take precise visual stimuli and trace them through our physiologi-
cal processes, we would find that our direct perception does not correspond 
to the so-called objective conditions, both internal and external. Although 
in accordance with such conditions we should see blue, green and yellow, 
we actually see grey14. But not only grey as an individual stimulus; we see 
grey in a context of other chromatic components, against which the color 
grey is delimited. This suggests that (a) our perception is not expressible by 
the constancy hypothesis, that is, a one-to-one correlation between stimu-
lus and response and (b) that there is no individuated impressions given in 
perception; rather, each qualitative experience is given in a context of other 
qualities and our perception of it depends on the context. for example, the 
color yellow may be dull among greens and greys, but very bright among 
blacks and reds. A particular chromatic impression is a function of an en-
tire perceptual field15. What positivism would want to call atomistic stimuli 
or impressions are not experiential, but ideal theoretical constructs. even in 
this sense, positivism transcends direct experience toward components that 
are not empirically given. 
14 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception (c. Smith, Trans.). new York: 
humanities Press.
15 ibid., p. 44.
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The fourth principle, the principle of generalization, is rooted in the 
entire history of philosophy. Yet, it assumes greatest preeminence in empir-
icism and positivism with their intent to exclude anything that would sug-
gest some a priori knowledge or experience. As already noted, conscious-
ness is denied as a valid objective function. if experience is to be limited to 
the empirical components, then, indeed, the scientific methodology cannot 
extend its range beyond such components. This can be granted to a scientif-
ic procedure that would wish to remain on a most primitive level. Yet, even 
at this level, certain problems appear that are difficult to explain within the 
positivistic context. Assuming that there is no consciousness, the only ex-
perience that is available is one of individual or atomistic components. how 
would such components yield general propositions? They do not gener-
alize themselves, and because there is no such function as consciousness, 
then no generalization can occur. if it does, then positivism is guilty of in-
troducing a function that is excluded in principle by its theoretical stance. 
Generalization requires an experiencer, who can survey the particulars and 
find something common among them; the commonality cannot be a prop-
erty of any of the particulars, because in this case we would still possess 
a particular. how can a particular encompass all other particulars or be 
subsumed under it? The usual answer that is offered is that generalization 
is a summation in the sense of enumeration; in other words, the general 
proposition states nothing more than the sum of the observed individuals. 
But summation is a function that is not identical with the succession of 
atomistic impressions and our reaction to them. Moreover, summation as-
sumes a function of counting, a conscious and active process of surveying 
the individual cases and not a simple reaction to a momentary impression. 
in fact, it is a very deliberate and selective function that excludes irrelevant 
stimuli instead of simply reacting to them. At the same time, this function-
called by phenomenology consciousness is not only concerned with the in-
dividual cases, but already employs mathematical generalities, such as sum, 
all, some, unit and so forth. These requirements cannot be accounted for on 
the basis of empirical impressions as the sole source of experience. it should 
be pointed out that the process of generalization from the individual cases 
to universal propositions must submit to the phenomenological condition 
of an insight into an essence, an essential structure, toward which the gen-
eralization is oriented. Without such a structure, we would not know what 
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we are generalizing toward. Generalization and the construction of general 
propositions require the phenomenological experience of essential struc-
tures that are not bound to any specific empirical impression. it is precisely 
this condition that allows scientific communication. it can transmit not the 
private individual impressions locked within themselves, but structures 
that can be exemplified by a variety of individual cases. 
other problems, arising within the positivistic-behavioral context, 
consist of the claim that the only meaningful propositions are those that 
can be empirically verified. in fact, verification should be the meaning of 
such propositions. however, when we formulate hypotheses that are to be 
verified, we do not yet have the empirical content of such hypotheses. All 
we have are a set of general propositions that, according to such a theory, 
cannot have any meaning. Yet, it is experientially obvious that when such 
hypotheses are communicated, their meaning is understood and shared by 
all parties prior to verification. Moreover, such hypotheses direct the percep-
tual process toward the selection of proper empirical data. What directs such 
a process? obviously, they are directed not by the empirical impressions, 
because we do not yet have them. it must be, phenomenology claims, our 
consciousness that formulates these hypotheses using essential insights into 
structures and the meanings that it ascribes to these structures16. Without 
it, the scientific enterprise as a deliberate search for the “right” data would 
make no sense. This, in fact, accounts for our possibility to speak of scien-
tific predictability. To predict means to anticipate events, for which we have 
no current empirical impressions. hence, prediction is a conscious function 
that is not based merely on empirical experience. By extending the notion of 
experience to include the experience of structures and meaning, phenom-
enology can readily show that the empirical-perceptual process is directed 
by deliberate conscious constructions, indeed, active and not merely reactive 
constructions, which allow science to function and communicate. 
The phenomenological critique should not lead to the conclusion that 
phenomenology rejects positive empirical facts. it accepts evidence as it is 
given, without introducing any theoretical components, such as atomistic 
impressions into the perceptual process. it accepts the atomistic impres-
sions not as perceptual, but as theoretically constituted experience and a 
16 husserl, e. (1970). Logische untersuchungen [Logical investigations]. Tuebingen West 
Germany: Max niemeyer Verlag, p. 50.
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particular structuration of that experience, namely, temporal succession of 
theoretically constructed units. Phenomenology does not claim that such 
an experience is invalid; it simply points out that its validity is not at the em-
pirical level of experience. it accepts atomistic conceptions, yet, it points out 
that the experience of such facts contains structural components capable of 
arranging facts atomistically. indeed, it points out that every fact is correlat-
able to an essential mode of experience and every essential mode of expe-
rience is correlatable to an exemplifying fact. Although they do not cause 
one another, they are consciously “directed” to one another. hence, in the 
communicative process, while attending to essential structures, we are at 
the same time directed to the factual, although for each individual distinct, 
datum. in this manner, there is no loss of individual perception and no 
immersion at the same time into individual and inexpressible experience. 
in addition, phenomenology offers the ability to experience insights into 
possibilities, into hypothetical structures that may not have an empirical 
content, although they may have an extremely high significance for social 
life. hence, it can deal with values, religious questions, political dogmas and 
fiction, inclusive of the arts. each has an experiential access although no 
empirical content can be offered for such experience; the content remains 
symbolic, on the basis of which much of human cultural and communica-
tive process rests. construction of symbolic systems is hardly tenable on the 
positivistic-behavioral model, yet, many factors of our lives flow with the 
process of symbolic communication. 
following the positivistic-behavioral model, a communication theory 
would have to claim that communication occurs between two separate enti-
ties, whereby the one, who emits a signal, is a sender of a message, and the 
other is the recipient of the message. What does it mean to say that some-
one sends a message? on the basis of positivistic-behaviorism it is hard to 
comprehend how one could send a message. first, all behavior is a reaction 
to external stimuli. This means that the person does not send a message, 
but reacts to a disturbance. in order for the receiver to grasp the message, 
he would have to experience the disturbance that the other is experienc-
ing; otherwise, the message would say nothing. Yet, if it is assumed that the 
sender initiates the message, then the sender acts deliberately and with con-
scious intent; the action is not merely a reaction, but an initiation, a sponta-
neous process of consciousness. in this case, the notion of purely empirical 
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behavior as a mere reaction must be surrendered as a basic explanation of 
communicative process. 
What constitutes a message? if the claim is to be made that the message 
is identical with the empirical impulses, transmitted from a sender to the 
receiver, then one would have to adhere to the principle that for a precise set 
of impulses as causal, there should be a precise reaction: the causal constan-
cy hypothesis. Yet, experience testifies that there can be a wide variation of 
empirical impulses without the requisite variation of a message. one can 
say something rapidly, slowly, excitedly or even write it down – all consti-
tuting different causal patterns without affecting the message. is it not the 
case, rather, that message in experience is a transmission of a meaning? The 
analysis of the empirical input gives us only a bearer of the message and not 
the substance. Moreover, because the meaning signifies something, points 
to something, is attached to some object, then the message implicates, 
points to, delimits an object in the two senses just outlined: (a) it carries 
an essential structure, to which the meanings are attached, and (b) it points 
to a specific factual datum of the essential structure experienced or to be 
experienced variously by different individuals. in addition, it can carry a 
meaning of pure possibility. Yet, the meaning and the structures, indeed the 
very arrangement of the message, are not identical although correlated to 
the empirical bearer of the message. if this were not the case, then the only 
criterion for the understanding of the message would be the observation of 
the receiver’s response to the dictates of the empirical impulses. Yet, it is ob-
vious that many messages are understood; the intent of the other is noted, 
but the response does not follow. This in no way implies that the message 
was not understood; the receiver knows what the sender meant, yet, he did 
not behave as the sender of the message expected. This means that although 
the message’s meaning is understood, the meaning is not a cause of behav-
ior even when it suggests the direction that the behavior should take. The 
receiver, in brief, can decide whether to enact the meaning that he under-
stood or to reject it. Thus, he is not a mere reactor to the stimuli, but an ini-
tiator of action. on direct behavioral terms, the non-reaction of the receiver 
would simply mean miscommunication; the message was not understood. 
however, the message can obviously be understood although not acted on. 
here, the causal-behavioral method breaks down because it does not entail 
the experience of factors that are not causal. Such factors are precisely the 
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message that can be evaluated, accepted, rejected, responded to and even 
changed17. Phenomenology extends our experience to include such fac-
tors and accepts them precisely as they function in communication. in this 
sense, phenomenology prefers to talk of a field of meaning implications that 
can be followed and not a field of causalities. The meaning implications, 
constituting a field of orientations, may be enacted or refused empirically-
behaviorally, or they may be pursued purely logically, that is, discussed lin-
guistically in a dialogue without any attendant behavioral enactment. And 
both cases assume the experience of the meaning of the message. 
in order to conclude the phenomenological critique of positivistic be-
haviorism, it is essential to note that phenomenology does not reject the 
positivistic achievements; it simply extends the field of investigation into 
factors, such as meaning, essence, typology and even logic, as viable areas for 
the science of communication. These areas comprise the basis for communi-
cative understanding in all of its facets. These facets constitute a field, within 
which empirical components assume relevance and function, meaning and 
direction, and obtain sense and structurally detached comprehensibility. 
even human behavior opens a system of meaning implications that inter-
connect with other behaviors and their meaning implications. indeed, mes-
sages must be transmitted by causal means and behaviors; yet, the essence 
of the messages consists of the shared meaning and the objects they delimit. 
Without the sharing of these “extra spatiotemporal” components, communi-
cation would at best be an immediate reaction to stimuli, implying nothing 
further than such a reaction. To restrict our focus to this kind of reaction is 
obviously inadequate if we are to understand the vast theoretical constructs, 
the hypothetical questions and their drawn implications and conclusions, 
which are so prevalent in the scientific and communicative process. 
Another major theoretical position, purporting to deal with commu-
nication, specifically in its linguistic form, is structuralism. Structuralism 
has various proponents, beginning with the Prague school, moving through 
the linguistic field theorists and entering france as structural semantics. it 
is well known that husserl, the father of contemporary phenomenology, 
had an impact on the Prague school of structural linguistics. instrumental 
in this was husserl’s first major work entitled “Logical investigations”18. The 
17 Waldenfels, B. (1971). Zwischenreich des Dialogs [The in-between Region of Dialogue].
18 husserl, e. (1970). Logical investigations, p. 10, 56.
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investigation of this influence would take us too far afield from our topic. 
Suffice it to say, that husserl’s “Logical investigations” was merely an initial 
step toward phenomenology; hence, anyone, whose exposure to this ap-
proach was restricted to this work, would have stopped short of the vast 
developments of phenomenology in the later works of husserl and other 
phenomenologists19.
in our preceding discussion, we have used the term structure within 
the phenomenological context. Yet, the meaning of the term is not exactly 
the same as it is in structuralism. The difference emerges from a difference 
in theoretical positions and in the range, to which the term can be applied. 
Phenomenology claims that structuralism leaves out various important, 
indeed fundamental, aspects of experience that would be required for the 
understanding of structures. our investigation of structuralism will reveal 
the gap that phenomenology can fill. As was the case with positivism, phe-
nomenology does not reject structuralism, but only extends it by showing 
additional components that are necessary for the understanding of human 
communication and interaction. Because one of the major claims of phe-
nomenology is that human life takes its course within the context of experi-
ence, the analysis of experience may constitute an extension of communica-
tive understanding beyond structuralism.
Structuralism by definition means a manner, in which a building, an 
organism or any other complex and complete whole is constituted. This does 
not refer to the materials or stuff, of which it is composed, but the manner, 
in which these materials are arranged, that is, their relationships that form 
a coherent whole. of course, the materials play a role, yet, they are selected 
to fit the requirements of the structure. obviously, the converse is also par-
tially true: if certain materials are lacking, particular structures could not 
be constructed. This structuralist viewpoint implies a functionalism; build-
ings are constructed to serve a purpose and language is devised to serve 
the purpose of communication. even if the building has adornments that 
express no functional value or even if language has components serving no 
expressive ends, still at base the buildings are for shelter and the language is 
for communication. in this sense, the purpose determines the structure. in 
language, the purpose of communication determines its structure.
19 holenstein, e. (1974). Linguistik, Semiotic, hermeneutik [Linguistics, Semiotics, herme-
neutics]. frankfurt am Main, West Germany: Suhrkamp.
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Although structuralists engage in arguments, concerning the “loca-
tion” of the structures, that is, whether they are models constructed by the 
scientist or where they are found in the real object, the most prevalent trend 
is that they are decipherable in the object by excluding the irrelevant physi-
cal features. The object is the physical reality and the mind discovers its 
structure in this reality. The structure is, thus, derivable from the observed 
factual states, although in itself it is not observable. Some structures, for 
example, in the social sciences, may not be directly manifest; they are, thus, 
called latent and must be analyzed out of the social reality. They are discov-
erable by a scientist, who aims beyond superficial behaviors, feelings, hab-
its and attitudes and deciphers the deep relationships that rule the surface 
phenomena. hence, the structure is always in the object and must be distin-
guished from a model constructed by a scientist. The model can represent 
a structure, but only when the components of the model correspond to the 
components of the structure of a given reality.
When dealing with language, structuralists have not reached consen-
sus. Some simply deal with language as an object consisting of a sum of 
linearly distributed linguistic units, such as phonemesor terms; some in-
clude the speaker’s choices of terms for a particular purpose and some take 
language as an object of study under the assumption that the structure of 
the object can be discovered. hence, they discard the speaker and the acts 
of speech, be they conscious or unconscious. This attempt is to see language 
“as it is in itself ”, unrelated to any functions of the social subjects20.
Some structuralists claim that structures, comprising the “logic of com-
munication” and the rules of behavior, are unconsciously structured and, 
hence, strictly speaking, are not “known” by the subjects employing them. 
Through the exchange of linguistic signs and their meanings, the members 
of a society produce and maintain conceptual schemes that delimit social 
transactions. These transactions “express” the structures, although no par-
ticular expression yields the total structure. The study of these structures is 
possible because they are expressions of the human psyche that supposedly 
possesses universal characteristics. in other words, these individual psyches 
share the same structure. Given that these structures exist within the mind, 
they cannot be physically observed. They must be inferred from empirical 
20 helbig, G. (1983). Geschichte der neueren Sprachwissenschaft [history of the new Science 
of Language]. opladen, West Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
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observations, and the best place to look for these empirically observable 
structures is in language. however, it must be pointed out that the structure 
of language needs not be an expression of psychological structures, but can 
be partially based on social interaction. To study the structures of interac-
tion would consist of the investigation of relationships of communication. 
Such relationships assume priority and the rules of such relationships, that 
is, their logic, would comprise the structures that are valid for all members 
of a communicative group. Because there are various levels of communi-
cation, social roles, family relationships, economic exchange and so forth, 
the rules and structures of each need not be reduced one to the other, al-
though they can be conceived as variant expressions of one another. This 
form of structuralism goes so far as to claim that rules could be established 
for the transformation of one set of structural components into another. 
Thus, structuralism aims at a fundamental structure, within which all oth-
ers are variants. in this way, a code for the deciphering of all languages and 
communication could be developed. Such a code is suggested by Jakobson 
and seems to be accepted by Levi-Strauss, that is, the binary code or the 
dichotomous scale21. it is even claimed that this code is the primal psycho-
logical fact in that the recognition of a pair by a child precedes the recogni-
tion of individual objects. This view is based primarily on the notion that 
phonemic structures are binary, and this structure reflects the structure of 
the psyche. By extension, this structuralist trend claims that not just the 
human mind, but the entire reality is ordered by binary relationships. Re-
gardless of the complexity of the structure, its components can be analyzed 
in terms of a dichotomous scale; the latter subsumes not only linguistic and 
other forms of communication, but even natural events. Although some 
structuralists do not accept the binary set and argue for a trinary set, the 
basic assumption remains: there are primordial structures that rule all com-
municative processes at all levels of human interaction22.
There are various points of affinity between phenomenology and struc-
turalism. Structuralism does tend to accept an area of objectivity within its 
own context. in terms of language, for example, structuralism accepts the 
21 Jakobson, R. (1968). child Language, Aphasia, and General Sound Laws. The hague, 
netherlands: Mouton; Levi-Strauss, c. (1963). Structural Anthropology (c. Jacobson & B. 
Schoepf, Trans.). new York: Basic Books.
22 Geckeler, h. (1971). Strukturelle Semantik und Wortfeldtheorie [Structural Semantics 
and Word field Theory]. Munchen, West Germany: Wilhelm fink Verlag.
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“essential” components of language and attempts to discover such compo-
nents across a vast diversity of expressions. Moreover, structuralism admits 
that there is no necessity to derive one structure from another or explain one 
in terms of the other. This is, indeed, a form of non-reductionism, which is 
also accepted by phenomenology. Yet, phenomenology, without rejecting 
the achievements of structuralism, would like to add various contributions 
not touched on by structuralism and to “bracket” various ontological pre-
suppositions that belong to the speculative and not experiential dimension. 
not that speculation is an uninteresting domain of investigation; it belongs 
rather to the question of how possibilities, without experiential content, are 
constituted. 
The first problem facing structuralism, according to phenomenology, 
is the degree of abstraction involved in the basic structures. They seem to 
fit just about anything, and in this sense, they can accommodate the most 
diverse phenomena, irrespective of their generic differences. Due to such 
abstractedness, the dichotomous scale, for example, does not tell the expe-
riencer whether he is dealing with humans or atoms. Yet, if specifications 
are introduced, then relevant experiential variations must also be intro-
duced and their limits respected. The difference in the experiential mean-
ing present in the binary relationship of positive-negative electric charges 
is in no way comparable to the relationship of male-female. our experience 
of the electric charges, given, for example, in mathematical formulations, is 
radically different from our experience of male-female relationships. The 
latter is intersubjective and consists of various and highly complex levels of 
interaction, including play, eroticism, work, cultural means of communica-
tion, institutional settings, moral values and even religious meanings. The 
simple male-female dichotomy depends very much on the meaning context 
that may allow us to experience male and female without the character-
istics of such a dichotomy. in a work situation, the gender characteristics 
may be disregarded completely and the person may be seen in terms of the 
meaning of the performed or required tasks; a politician, a cab driver, a 
student, a child and so forth. hence, the meaning of the gender character-
istics may be limited to a specific biological difference that does not enter 
into the experience of that person in a work situation or in a multitude of 
other situations. Phenomenologically speaking, there is no justification for 
the notion that the basic structure should be one of dichotomy, or for that 
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matter, one of triad. This is not to say that we cannot impute such struc-
tures in a very rarified atmosphere; yet, in the lived experiential solution, 
in which direct communication takes place, such structures differentiate 
into a variety of meanings, having no necessary connection with each other. 
hence, communication, conceived phenomenologically, takes each level on 
its own terms and deciphers the experiential and communicative meanings 
appropriate to each. of course, structuralism could object and point out 
that even communication is dichotomous, because it takes place between 
two persons or between a person and a group; yet, experientially commu-
nication includes more: the persons, the objects, the linguistic tradition and 
even the social positions of the communicating parties. All of these factors 
cannot be reduced to a dichotomous structure. While communicating, we 
are involved in a language of our tradition, although at that time we do not 
face language as a dichotomous opposite to our speaking, even if we are 
not completely identical with the linguistic process. As phenomenologists, 
such as husserl, have suggested, in the direct experience of communication 
there is no sharp separation between the communicating parties; it is one 
process, in which the “i” and the “you” are not opposites. only when com-
munication breaks down are the communicating parties thrown back upon 
themselves and assume separation. The direct and immediate process of 
communication is prior to any dichotomous structure23. 
Phenomenology also questions structuralism’s two ontological assump-
tions: (a) the presence of structures in the unconscious or their unconscious 
use and (b) all reality is ordered by specific structures. With regard to both 
assumptions, phenomenology takes an ontologically neutral stance because 
the only way that we can talk about any kind of reality is in terms of experi-
ence. hence, the main question would be: what kind and level of experience 
are required for the presence of such ontological structures? 
Briefly, it can be pointed out that the level of experience is theoreti-
cal, requiring a complex process of selection, differentiation, exclusion and 
judgment. Yet, this process implies or is correlated to the experienced theo-
retical components, but not to their existence. in brief, it implies a modal-
ity of experiencing reality, but not the reality itself. in regard to the sec-
ond assumption, phenomenology points out, that structuralism borrows 
the objects of experience and the essential aspects present in experience 
23 husserl, e. (1966). Analysen Sur Passiven Synthesis. 
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and translates them into ontological reality. This is an unwarranted leap 
from experiential components to the posited reality. in reference to the 
first assumption, phenomenology suggests a distinction that abolishes the 
theoretical need for an assumed unconscious process. While experiencing 
things about us, events that come and go, we are directly aware of such 
things and events in a particular way. Yet, we are not directly aware of the 
manner, in which we structure our experiences of those things and events. 
Although we are directly living within the experiential process, we hardly 
pay attention to such a process; rather, we attend to objects and events. 
hence, this process is anonymous. Yet, the anonymity does not mean that it 
is unconscious. All we need to do is reflect on the modalities of our experi-
ence in order to discover why the thing was present in a particular way: as 
useful, as remote, as taller than and so forth. The problem with structural-
ism is that, on the one hand, having discovered the immediate components 
of experience, such as dichotomy, it assumes that this dichotomy was, in 
some way, unconscious, and on the other hand, it posits these experiential 
components as reality. Phenomenology does not deny that dichotomy is a 
mode of experience and can become an object of reflection; it simply points 
out that an object of experience is ontologically indifferent. 
indeed, structuralism can communicate its theses not because of its 
ontology, but because of the experiential dimension accessible to all. it pre-
sents an experiential system of essential structures, in terms of which we 
too can view reality; yet, such a view does not imply any existential claims. 
The object of experience, as was already stressed, is not the ontological ob-
ject called reality, although the latter can be employed as an example of the 
experienced essence. What is transmitted in the process of communication 
is the experienced and not the ontological object. in addition, the experi-
enced object is transmitted in communication within the context of an ex-
periential process, capable of ascribing a multitude of meanings constituted 
by selectivity, judgment, synthesizing, evaluating, rejecting, accepting and 
so on, a process, that structures, but that cannot be subsumed in all cases 
under a particular structure. This process is discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters. 
Phenomenology is capable of adding to structuralism various funda-
mental experiential processes and essential components without any onto-
logical assumptions and without simplification of experience to a highly se-
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lect and abstract structure. for example, structuralism can deal with language 
and its dominating rules, yet, it leaves out the language that is used in the 
communication process at the time that the rules are discussed. This process, 
the experiential and immediate observation of the linguistic rules, although 
fundamental, is at the same time not included in the rules being discussed. 
Yet, this process is precisely what attributes various meanings, values and 
judgments to the rules. Without it, the rules would be neither experienced, 
nor communicated. for communication, this phenomenological dimension 
is unavoidable and must be investigated in its own right. Although dealing 
with structures as identity, structuralism forgets the experiential variations, 
across which identities are constituted and communicated24.
Two additional, although closely related, factors of structuralism must 
be briefly discussed: (a) structures, that is, linguistic, can be discovered in 
their purity by an objective observation, that is, empirical investigation of 
a given language, and (b) the structures of language can be analyzed apart 
from speakers and users of a language. 
The first assumes that empirical observation can, in its own right, re-
veal the structures present in language. Yet, the experience of language is 
much broader than a mere observation of its empirical components. To 
investigate something is to be led by an insight into the experienced essence 
of that something. Such an experience directs empirical observation and 
selectivity. The linguist does not blindly plunge into the empirical compo-
nents; rather, he is looking for something among such components. if he 
did not know in his experience what he is looking for, he would be unable 
to arrange the empirical data properly and would be unable to select the 
“appropriate” empirical components. in brief, the linguist has an experien-
tial insight that allows an attribution of certain meanings that are proper 
to typology under investigation and exclusion of meanings that do not 
fit. hence, the empirical work presupposes a structure that one seeks and 
meanings that one can attribute to the structure. Both of these experiential 
components are not empirically given, although they are presupposed in 
the empirical investigation and in the communication of the results. This 
is not to deny that the empirical components of language are present to the 
experiencer; yet, such components are transcendent and are outside of the 
24 held, K. (1966). Lebendige Gegenwart [Living Presence]. The hague, netherlands: Martinus 
nijhoff.
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process of experiencing. The empirical components are organized and ar-
ranged in terms of the experiential process with its typologies, meanings, 
judgments and selectivities. This process is a necessary ground for under-
standing the sense and structure of language25. 
The second aspect accepts language without the speakers or the com-
municating parties. This assumes that the speakers are completely domi-
nated by the linguistic structures and have no impact on language and 
communication. if this were the case, language would remain constant and, 
once learned, it would contain no ambiguities. Yet, experience testifies that 
in the living linguistic engagement, there are no precise univocal meanings; 
the meaning of each term is contextual and situational and has a horizon 
of implications that would be absent in another context. indeed, the com-
municating parties also play a significant role in revealing the meanings 
of a term; not infrequently we hear such questions: “What do you really 
mean by this term?” from such a question can emerge a novel meaning of 
a given term that, in fact, can become a part of general vocabulary. hence, 
the participants in the communicative process have a great deal to do with 
the meaning of terms; they mean something by them. it is, therefore, inad-
equate to analyze the “dead letter” and to expect a resultant understanding 
of language and communication in their lived engagement. This is not to 
say that such an engagement cannot be understood and analyzed; rather, 
the pure observation of language and its structures is inadequate for un-
derstanding all linguistic and communicative processes. Phenomenology, 
in this sense, is not a negation of the accomplishments of structuralism, but 
an addition that is essential for the comprehension of lived communication. 
Within this context, it could be said that although language structures our 
experience, the experiencer also structures language, contextualizes it and 
ascribes specifications to it that have unique and situational implications. 
This accounts for ambiguities of expression and for the possibility of over-
coming such ambiguities. 
finally, the giveness of structures of experienced objects and states of 
affairs for phenomenology signifies neither an inherence of these structures 
in some objective or subjective reality, nor a supervening natural or social 
necessity; rather, it is a relationship between the experiencer and the world. 
one could say that structuralism ontologizes and, thus, misplaces struc-
25 husserl, e. (1968). Logische untersuchungen [Logical investigations]. Vol. i, p. 30.
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tures, whereas phenomenology regards them experientially as relational 
systems of meanings and their significations of experienced essences. 
Semiology 
 Semiology requires that we survey its basic tenets, concerns and prin-
ciples in order to note how phenomenology would complement it in terms 
of concrete experience. Semiologists are concerned with the sign systems in 
the broadest sense of the term: from language to the modes in clothing and 
the varieties of human behavior, from ethical systems through entire cul-
tural systems. it uses the language of computers, codes, models, binary op-
positions, metaphoric shifts, etc. cu1ture is seen as a sign system of infor-
mation exchange, accessible to the communication and information theory. 
Semiology talks of a secondary modeling system as a tripartite relation-
ship among the sign systems, the reality that it continuously models, and 
the sign user. central to this is the notion of a system and the relationship 
among systems. Akin to structuralism, semiologists are interested in the 
concept of binary opposition, that is, strictly defined and logically exclu-
sive relationship. This constitutes a principle of all formation. in meaning 
formation, for example, a concept is understandable only in relation to its 
opposite: “masters” make sense only where there are “slaves”; “selves” where 
there are “others.” it is the source of definitions and the analytical tool in the 
study of culture that is defined in opposition to that which escapes cultural 
regulations. oppositional pairs are the primary principles organizing hu-
man life and thought and have led the way to comparative theorizing26. 
one of the basic oppositional principles is the difference and relation-
ship between primary and secondary systems, such as natural language and 
its various specific formulations, such as literary, aesthetic, scientific and 
so forth. This leads to the concept of models that consist of a finite number 
of elements and relations among these elements. Models provide a way of 
forming a world. Modeling of the world is carried out in human society 
due to the presence of a number of semiotic systems that are mutually com-
plementary. Various semiotic modeling systems form complex hierarchical 
series of levels, in which the system on the lowest level-natural language-
serves to codify the signs that enter the system at a higher level-literary 
26 hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and Semiotics. Berkeley, cA: university of california 
Press.
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language. The most fully developed semiotic methods pertain to relation-
ships among different levels in natural languages (between structural and 
mathematical linguistics). 
in any semiotic system, the sign (the unity of the signifier and the sig-
nified), interrelating with other signs, forms a text. The signs are linked 
by syntagmatic rules. Semiology extends linguistic terminology to make it 
applicable to all sign systems. for example, Saussure’s distinction between 
Langue and parole became understood as samples of the theoretical appa-
ratus of any sign system – Langue – and of the realization or employment 
of individual signs in specific contexts – parole. Although Saussure had 
limited his understanding of semiology to a linguistic science employing 
the methods of verbal research, the contemporary semioticians recognize 
semiotics as a study, for example, of an artistic text in its complex inter-
weaving of many linguistic codes, thus, necessitating a methodology apart 
from linguistics. The text has to be tied to various cultural systems and their 
hierarchical arrangement. in these procedures, a sign is seen as an intersec-
tion of two linguistic codes (language here is no longer just the spoken lan-
guage), whereby there is a transfer of meaning or information. This transfer 
constitutes the very ways that any text could be understood because the 
text is part of a cultural whole; it must be understood in its relationship 
to the modes of life, literary norms, traditions, ideas and its relationship 
to extra-textual reality. hence, the text is only one of the cultural models; 
other models, while interacting with the text, constitute the nature of the 
signs, precisely because of the opposition to the codes of the text27. 
culture, as a whole, is also seen as a system of signs and is opposed 
to non-culture. culture is, thus, seen as human made and conventional. 
This leads semioticians to the question of the relationship between natu-
ral language and culture. There is a tendency to accept natural language as 
the basic sign system, whereas cultural phenomena are seen as secondary 
modeling systems. in this sense, natural languages can fulfill a metalinguis-
tic function. This leads semiology to stress functionalism against anything 
called essence. The functioning of natural language is seen as providing the 
members of a social group with an intuitive sense of structuredness, which 
transforms the “open” world into a “closed” world of names28. 
27 eco, u. (1979). A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, in: indiana university Press, p.23.
28 hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and Semiotics, p. 32.
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obviously, semiology extends the realm of investigation into the hu-
man world to include not only spoken or written linguistic phenomena, but 
also the non-spoken, the ritualized and the cultural phenomena. Yet, it does 
so at such an abstract methodological level and in a language of cybernet-
ics that it seems to become an exercise in formalisms without any roots in 
experience. if there are roots in experience, semiology must assume that 
experience is totally shaped by the semiologic sign systems. hence, the first 
problem facing semiology lies in the direction of the ability of a semiotician 
to survey with detached objectivity the various cultural phenomena, their 
levels of modeling and even the natural language as the basis of all culture. 
if natural language were the meta-basic sign system of all understanding, 
then it would be impossible to survey this language objectively and relate 
it to higher models of a culture, without circularity, that is, we would be 
defining natural language by itself. Such a definition is not a definition; it 
would be like saying a hand is a hand. however, experience testifies that we 
can survey the natural language, see its relationships to aesthetic language 
and to other cultural codes, and do so without any apparent impediment or 
constraint by the closed structuration of the natural language. This process, 
called by phenomenology the transcendental, constitutes an experiential 
background, from which the investigation of any sign system and its rela-
tionships to other systems is visibly experienced. it constitutes an experi-
ential condition, without which semioticians could not proceed with their 
work. At the same time, it is the level of experience, at which essential and 
typological distinctions are made. Although semiology denies any require-
ment for essence, phenomenology points out that the essences, as given in 
experience, are presupposed by semiology, which makes distinctions among 
various sign systems. To delimit what belongs to one system and what to an-
other, and specifically when they can be seen in terms of logical exclusivity, 
requires essential delimitations of such systems. for example, when semiol-
ogy makes a distinction and constitutes a binary opposition between cul-
tural and extra-cultural phenomena, it assumes an essential distinction29. 
of course, semioticians could point out that what is extra-cultural in one 
culture may be intra-cultural in another and, hence, the distinction is func-
tional within a particular social-linguistic fabric. Yet, despite the question 
concerning which factors are seen as cultural and which as extra-cultural 
29 eco, u. (1979). A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, in: indiana university Press, p.28.
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during a particular historical period or distinct geographic location, the ex-
periential fact remains that the selectivity of such factors assumes an essen-
tial insight into their difference and into what constitutes culture and what 
does not. in brief, the historical variations assume an insight into a con-
stancy that appears throughout such variations. Without such constancy, 
the variations would not provide us with any principle or even a nominal 
definition as to differences between culture and non-culture. 
Taking semiology on its own terms, the distinction between what is 
culture and what lies outside of its parameters is cultural and, hence, de-
pendent on the natural language of that culture. But in this sense, there 
is nothing extra-cultural, because a simple designation of what constitutes 
non-culture lies within the framework of a sign system. Being locked in 
such a system, we cannot specifically look at what lies outside it, when the 
entire semiotic process is based on a sign-system and the modes of its com-
munication. This means that the experiential process that differentiates be-
tween natural language as the fundamental sign system of a culture and the 
higher models must lie either in the natural language or outside of it. if it 
lies in the natural language, then it is difficult to see any reason why there 
should be any higher models, to which the natural language would have to 
be related. if such a language is to function as meta-language, all the higher 
models should be given within the distinctions of such a language. Yet, if 
there is an either/or distinction indicating the differences and relationships 
between the natural language and the higher models, then the distinction 
must come from another level, capable of objectively surveying the natural 
language and the higher models. in itself, there is nothing to indicate that 
one language is natural and others are not. We speak, we poetize and we 
formulate scientific theories very “naturally”. When we introduce distinc-
tions between these languages, we do so by ascribing to them an experien-
tial meaning from a domain of essential insight constituting criteria that 
allow us to make the distinctions. Although it may be possible to see lan-
guage in functional terms and, hence, to exclude anything called essential, 
it is not possible to reject experiential essences used to constitute typologies 
of languages and their relationships. once again, phenomenology does not 
make a claim that essences exist; it claims that they are required for the 
experience dealing with distinctions and attributions. 
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Semiotics assumes a unity between the sign and the signified and at 
the same time introduces a signifier. first, we must question whether the 
sign and the signified have such a unity. in phenomenological terms, a sign 
indeed signifies, but in a way that the signified need not be exhausted by a 
particular sign: the sign is never adequate and, hence, never in complete 
unity with the signified. The term red indeed signifies the color red, yet, the 
phenomenon that is experienced as red has more significance: it has a depth 
horizon and an expansive horizon. The red is dull, attractive and blazing; 
it is a red color of a table, a table in a room in the house, and so forth. it is 
not the sign alone that leads to continuous exploration, but the experienced 
phenomena themselves. They suggest the appropriateness and the interrela-
tionships of signs. Moreover, in the process of signifying, the experiencing 
subject, the signifier, does not so much attend to the signs and their relation-
ships, but to the phenomena themselves, and then selects the signs to signify 
the phenomena. Knowing the sign system, knowing the relationship among 
signs, is an abstraction that does not necessarily follow the structure of the 
experienced phenomena. in many cases, the signs may be deconstructed 
away from the analytically appropriate functioning of the sign system to ac-
commodate the phenomena. The condition for this is, of course, the subject, 
who experiences the phenomena and who can assign meanings to the signs 
that are not in accord with the ones required by the strict adherence to the 
sign system. Thus, the user of signs may intend the sign to mean something 
other than what the sign usually signifies. This experiential process may 
lend a meaning and, indeed, by doing so, restructure the meaning of other 
signs to correspond to the phenomena and to their horizons of implications. 
hence, the communicative process requires an inclusion of the communi-
cator capable of assigning meanings to terms required by the experienced 
phenomena, to which the communicating parties are directed.
Matter of Fact 
What is a “fact”? A fact is a state of affairs, the public description of 
which is not solely dependent upon the unique circumstances of a single in-
dividual. The occurrence and the subject-matter of this description may be 
so dependent, the description itself as an act performed may be dependent, 
thus, the description as an object, however, must be public and, as repre-
sentative of the described, must focus primarily, if not outright exclusively, 
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on these aspects of the described deemed exemplary, i.e., independent from 
the historical and psychological uniqueness of the circumstances described. 
This independence may seem ambiguous in that it involves not only 1) the 
independence of the description itself, as a new public “object”, but also 
2) the independence and transmission of some of the features described, 
chosen because of this transmission. Any “description” may be public in 
the way mentioned by virtue of 1) even when what is described is itself not 
amenable to independence in sense 2). To establish a matter of fact, how-
ever, we would maintain that independence 1) and 2) have to be achieved 
in one and the same description. The case mentioned above, where 1) is 
achieved but not 2) is the case characterized as that of “proper sense”. More 
obvious examples can be used to show the way a field or subject matter is 
delimited and matters of fact are established. An example from a legal sys-
tem ought to suffice. 
To arrive at a required description is the role lawyers and investiga-
tive officers assume as they compile and compare the accounts of diverse 
witnesses to a particular event. All factors indicating that some element in 
the description attaches solely to the unique circumstances of a single in-
dividual (drunkenness, psychological disturbances either pathological and 
prolonged or momentary, etc.) are sifted and their bearing on anyone de-
scription evaluated. critical questions of essence are answered on the basis 
of these evaluations and eventually lawyers, judge and jury come to the final 
confrontation with the “evidence” and decide whether or not the event in its 
public description essentially fits as an example of “premeditated murder”, 
“accidental homicide” or whatever, as the case may be. first, the testimony 
is sifted, then the final picture is tested to see if, on the basis of the “facts”, 
what looked like premeditated murder still fits the essential features of such 
or whether, in the sorting process some essential features have disappeared, 
the lack of which transforms the “matter of fact” into a case of (an example 
of) accidental homicide. 
“Selective description” is the process, according to which an event oc-
curring in the stream of lived experiences of a subject is made inter-subjec-
tively validated by the process outlined. This means that the subject matter 
is accessible to anyone capable of performing the activities described so 
far. it is one mark of educational process to see who can perform such ac-
tivities in correlation to a given field. Although the example chosen is the 
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cooperative effort of a criminal trial toward “matters of fact”, the example 
should not stand in the way of understanding other fields. obviously, errors 
of justice, as in any other field, are made often enough for disquiet con-
cerning the genuine independence of the matters of fact from the unique 
circumstances of some single individual. All too often what is taken as such 
is not really such in the actual case. But this only reinforces the point made 
by giving an example of a failure to fulfill the requirements specified: mis-
carriages of justice occur, when (unknown to judge and jury (one would 
hope!)) some single individual succeeds in presenting as independent from 
his volition a description intimately subservient to it. nor should the illus-
tration given suggest that only in this kind of cooperative effort are “mat-
ters of fact” properly described. A closer look at the procedures of such a 
trial reveal that each individual participant (witnesses, lawyers, jury, judge 
and defendant alike) are asked by the situation to test for themse1ves each 
individually the descriptions they hear against previous descriptions and, 
for the witness and possibly the defendant too, against their rememorated 
lived-experience of the event. 
hence, everyone must sift, test and attempt to fulfill the overall aim 
of making the description itself independent of private circumstances. 
eventually, each juror will have to pit unaided his own “model description” 
against those of his jurors not (ideally) on the basis of pride of authorship, 
but on the basis of its independence from himself. That is why prospec-
tive jurors, whose beliefs would render them unable to fulfill this ideal, are 
sorted out and disqualified or should be. A better analysis of this example 
shows each individual singly, in the privacy of his own subjectivity, per-
forming for himself the “selective description”. 
A further comment to be made here concerns the next step to be taken 
by each juror in exclusive communion with himself: “exemplary general-
ity”. once the “matters of fact” have been established to his satisfaction, the 
juror must look upon the individual and particular case, thus, pinpointed 
as a member of a well-defined, open group comprising all lived-events, 
which differ from one another only in the specificity of the circumstances 
of their occurrence and not at all in some basic features deemed essential. 
The case is tested for such basic features and is looked upon as a purported 
example of “premeditated murder” or “accidental homicide” and as such it 
resents itself as fulfilling or not fulfilling in whole or in parts the require-
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ments prescribed by such a role. “Taking something as an example” and 
“selecting essential features” are synonymous expressions, describing the 
act of “selective generalization” or “exemplary generalization”, two nearly 
synonymous expressions. “Selective generalization” points to the removal 
of the unique and private circumstances or features from the matter of fact; 
thus, described as the representative of a complete group. it is to be noted 
that a particular juridical system also lurks in the background and can be 
investigated in its own right. 
At this point, some may feel tempted to reinforce the “objectivity” of 
exemplary generalization by some sort of statistical corroboration or some 
other form of quantitative inductive generalization. The problem is that 
there can be no quantitative inductive generalization, except on the basis 
of all three moves described above. one has first to achieve the public de-
scription of a state of affairs in order to have the latter of fact with which to 
begin a collection of instances. Before one can collect any kind of sample 
grouping, or even specify the conditions ruling such a collection as well as 
the recognition of control groups, all three techniques – selective descrip-
tion, abstractive generalization and exemplary generalization – will have to 
have been performed. They will confer on the statistical sampling and the 
quantitative induction, the frame of which gives them continuity. 
The “object” obtained by public or independent description, generali-
zation and exemplary generalization “transcends” by essence the concrete 
individual circumstances, within which it is presented. The lived occur-
rence: a car almost ran over me becomes the sentence “a car almost ran 
over me”, which fits but does not belong to the particular event it describes, 
since this event and the sentence could serve as well for your event as for 
anyone else’s, exhibiting the same essential features. hence, the sentence “a 
car almost ran over me” has a presence other than (1) that of the event it de-
scribes, (2) that of the instance of its being uttered, or written, i or read, or 
heard, (3) its local occurrence in any of those forms or streams of lived ex-
periences – by being independent from anyone stream of lived experiences. 
This realm may indeed have traces in specific stream of lived experi-
ences (in this case, the actual marks on paper or sound waves), but it is not 
in them; rather, they point to it as other than they. This realm transcends 
its traces. it is ideal rather than real: it is the transcendental level, the level 
properly reached by formal generalization. To reach this level is the Sin qua 
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non for a field and although fields may differ in subject matter, principles 
and heuristic methods, they all have at least this in common, that the mat-
ters of fact, on which they base their findings, have all undergone at least 
the full formal generalizations detected here. 
Specific fields, such as classical Physics, require that all its “facts” be de-
scribed in terms of magnitude alone. This requirement is over and above the 
more fundamental one requiring only an independent description. There 
is no essential move from the initial fundamental requirement to the more 
specific one, limiting the tools of description to “magnitude” only. The de-
scriptions given here did not involve magnitude, yet, they did involve “mat-
ters of facts” as well as generality. We were able to arrive at descriptions inde-
pendent of any single individual, ranging generally and unequivocally, over 
all possible similar instances, and providing as well the definite conditions, 
under which they would not apply in any single case. These are the basic 
requirements of any field. These requirements are fulfilled by the limitation 
to magnitude, but it is wrong to assert that only the description of magnitude 
can guarantee their fulfillment. hence, there can be science, when the fun-
damental demand for independent description and formal generalization is 
met, whether or not it is met by the description of magnitudes. 
Phenomenology, in this sense, is an attempt to establish just such a fun-
damental conception, in some cases called transcendental – this holds even 
when the subject-matter of the description is not itself eidetic or transcen-
dental in nature. Take, for example, the above discussion on the sentence 
“a car almost ran over me”: there is nothing transcendental about being 
“almost run over”, yet, this sentence is generally representative for any and 
all specific such instances, no matter what the actual circumstances might 
be. The lived event the sentence denotes furnishes the essential features the 
sentence expresses; these essential features are lifted out of the particular 
experience by a selective generalization. An independent, but not selective 
description would include many particular details, which would prevent 
the paragraphs expressing them from being representative of anything, but 
this one uniquely lived instance. This would not be a transcendental phe-
nomenological description in the sense used here. on the other hand, a far 
richer description that the one obtained with the sentence “a car almost 
ran over me” could be given, involving as many of the essential features, 
such an experience possesses “for anyone”: such a description, although its 
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“lived” subject-matter would be neither “eidetic”, nor “transcendental”, does 
not prevent us from raising “questions concerning its essence” and, hence, 
would place itself and the object it expresses – the essence sought – at the 
eidetic or transcendental level. Such a description would be the eidetic de-
scription of the essence or eidos of a non-eidetic object. 
if we take up again the example of the use of the sentence “a car almost 
ran over me” given above, we find that there are very many situations, in 
which it could conceivably be properly applied. We find also that each of 
these situations could be described in itself in such a manner, that it would 
be exemplary (i.e., define an open group of such possible instances]. That is 
to say, the factors closing the group have nothing to do with the particular 
structure of the group itself, but depend rather upon essential laws govern-
ing the group, in which this group may fit. The group “i was almost run 
over by a cadillac” will appear as a closed group on the empirical basis of 
what we know about cadillacs and cadillac-making. This has nothing to 
do about the actual structure of the example, which says nothing concern-
ing empirical limitations. ‘i’ can be almost run over by countless imaginary 
cadillacs countless times: the group defined, thus, is open solely because its 
essential structure says nothing as to number. 
if i were to talk about the fingers on the hand of a five-fingered animal, 
although the number of such animals is left open, the number of fingers 
per hand is not (adjective is missing) and any hand could produce only five 
exemplars of such a group member, the group of which would then close 
itself. That is why six fingered animals belong to either a different species or 
are construed as “monsters”, which odd hand-configuration has to be “ex-
plained” by an appeal to a different grouping: the group of genetically dam-
aged five-fingered animals, i.e. group so-defined that the number of fingers 
it might exhibit ideally is unlimited in the structure of the group either in 
less or in more. or, to put this in a different way, we have removed from 
the example an essential feature, without which the example is no longer 
an example of what it was supposed to represent. other respects have re-
mained equal, obviously, add so we still want to talk about five-fingered 
animals, but we have to do so in a negative or a limited way. The “monster” 
is a five-fingered animal, which does not fit the example in the one specific 
instance, in which he is meant to fit, i.e. five fingeredness, but which should, 
according to other indices. And i know that he should on the basis of the 
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closed-group of fingers deemed exemplary. hence, the exemplary group of 
fingers is limited as to number in its essential structure, although this in no 
way limits the group of five-fingered animals, the structure of which con-
tains no specification as to number at all. 
The distinction between groups, the essential structure of which is 
limiting as to number and groups the essential structure of which has no 
such explicit limit, is fundamental to all we have to say here. The distinc-
tion between the eidetic level and the empirical, formal generalization and 
quantitative generalization, is based on it. Quantitative generalization goes 
beyond the finite group of samples quantified only by statistical projection. 
it is, therefore, at the mercy of the specific state of affairs in any single case 
not yet collected, or any wider group of cases not yet collected, which may 
cause the statistical projection to be revised. This is both its defect and its 
strength: quantitative generalization presents itself as tentative and open to 
revisions according to specific empirical procedures usually grouped under 
the heading “scientific” or “empirical” methods. 
Yet, the essential delimitation is different, as noted in the example with a 
car. Most people would take it for granted that all i wanted to do here was to 
recount one particular incident of my personal history, according to the fact 
that i might accent my tale, my account might take on different meanings, 
when located in different horizons of awareness available to me from others. 
it might be an instance of carelessness. it might be an example of independ-
ent lines of causation relevant to another, e.g., scientific or theological. if all i 
am asked is what is needed for a police report, mentions of “the Lord” or of 
“determinism” will not be retained by the traffic cop. The incident itself may 
have, for example, the philosophic use i am making of it right now. 
Any “matter of fact” can be the objective referent of any number of 
radiating intentions, each offering a different perspective upon the particu-
lar matter of fact, each with meaning in its own different way (here, one is 
reminded of the old “Winner at Jena and Vanquished at Waterloo” textbook 
examples), therefore, each presenting its own aspect of that matter of fact, 
each doing so more or less felicitously on its own terms. Between the sig-
nification, the meaning and the objective referent or matter of fact, which 
“fulfills” or “supports” it, a distinction, which is different from the distinc-
tion between the actual state of affairs and the essential features of the mat-
ter of fact, has to be made,. here, there are four terms: the intention of 
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signification, that signification, the actual state of affairs, and the essential 
features of that state of affairs publicly described or as a matter of fact. The 
essential features of the “matter of fact” are the “reason” of the series of pos-
sible significations the matter of fact supports: they “appear” through every 
member of the series and this is how a member of the series is recognized 
but, they are not anyone particular series-member – if they were this one 
member, there would be no series because what binds the series together 
is the ghostly presence of its ratio of the series itself; its specific differences 
from every other purported member would become essential (exemplary 
or defining) distinctions, which would prevent us from assimilating them 
with the others. The imaginary variations, which enable us to recognize 
similitude among purported series-members, do so because they aim at an 
ideal identity of essential structures apprehensible, when specific features 
of each series-member are imaginatively removed though in reality they 
remain untouched and by their removal lead from one member to the next. 
Thus, the convert, the policeman, the indeterminist and the philoso-
pher may all agree that they are talking about a traffic incident when each 
is willing to remove from his view of the event those features, which the 
others do not share; this does not make this particular view privileged over 
others: it is only what they have in common, i.e. what is visible through 
each, but belongs exclusively to none in particular (bear in mind that for 
the policeman or the insurance man, a traffic incident comprises features, 
to which neither the convert, nor the indeterminist, nor the philosopher 
needs to be sensitive: it is apprehended through each, embodied in none). 
The ratio is not itself a series-member and requires a particular view (for-
mal generalization) of a series-member for its apprehension: a particular 
view, i.e., a particular intention, one, whose object is an essence, an eidetic 
intuition. The series-member then appear as one possibility among many; 
some of its features appear removable not simply because they are mired 
in particularity, but because they are dependent upon an intention of sig-
nification other than the one intuiting essences. The ordinary intention of 
signification fulfilled (or answered) by a particular series-member must 
be replaced by another intention, which tests both the previous intention 
of signification and the object fulfilling it, together for features dependent 
upon the previous intention specifically and not transposable to the object 
of any other intention. 
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from what has been said it is clear that the presumed “empirical per-
son” cannot be posted as a standard, by which to decide the human ques-
tion. What was noted with regard to the self and ego, leading to policentric 
field and history, the self is always more than an ego. This more is a con-
stantly lived and assumed set of phenomena, pertaining to this subject mat-
ter: the human is more than what is given at present. Various terms have 
been used to express this “more”, ranging from potentiality to possibility, 
impossibility and even infinity. This suggests a common recognition that 
this “more” has to be disclosed, revealed, actualized or realized. it can be 
claimed that even philosophical anthropologies belong in this framework, 
when they proclaim the human as an “unfinished” being, or when the glo-
balizers on various continents demand for all sorts of technologies, assis-
tances and expertise to help “develop” the indigenous populations. All such 
notions suggest that there is a human dimension that has to be brought out, 
educed, educated and, thus, fully actualized. even all the furious revolu-




Perhaps there is no other question that could equal the preoccupa-
tion of the 20th century’s thought than language. if we survey the major 
trends of philosophy, we find that despite the vast diversities in orientation, 
ontological principles and theoretical postulates, they all converge in the 
claim that language is the mode of being human, without which at least 
our human world would be incomprehensible. from positivistic search of 
universal calculus through ordinary language philosophy, hermeneutics, 
semiology, structuralism, to phenomenology and field linguistics, the as-
sumption is that a proper understanding of language is a key to the secret of 
demystification of the world and even the revelation of the ultimate being. 
of course, phenomenology is no exception to this preoccupation. it is quite 
remarkable that although husserl was still remote from the question of lan-
guage, even if his “Logical investigations” comprise an excellent treatise on 
the analysis of a multitude of linguistic forms and their distinctions, later 
phenomenologists, beginning with heidegger and going through Merleau-
Ponty, take language to be as the sine qua none of all thought and being. 
This chapter will give a summary exposition of language in phenomeno-
logical thought and show its direct functioning in the dialogical process 
and experience. The phenomenological discussion of language can be sub-
sumed under three major phases: (a) the husserlian phase that is preoccu-
pied with language as an expression of the phenomena of consciousness; it 
is an external garment of thought, (b) the heideggerian notion of language 
as a house of learning, and (c) the orientation of Merleau-Ponty toward lan-
guage as the basis for the structuration of experience and the phenomena. 
The husserlian phase 
Although husserl has not written an explicit work on language, on the 
nature of speaking his opus is replete with references to language and spe-
cifically its relationship to logic and science. in this sense, language is to be 
determined by thought and logic. husserl’s first concern with language is 
its capacity to express meaning. Because the basic experiential dimension 
is concerned with meaning that stems from conscious intentionality, then 
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language is a means to express the intentionality. This basic process of ex-
pression and meaning appears in the dialogical process with the question 
“What do you mean by this term?” This question suggests that the term does 
not have an independent meaning, but must acquire its meaning from the 
speaker, who “means” the term in a particular way. This led husserl to the 
notion that speaking is definitory and predicative. By giving meaning, we 
define terms and use them in a predicative sense. furthermore, husserl’s 
linguistic understanding follows his basic conception of consciousness as 
an intentional process of meaning something other than itself of being re-
lated to something. The ego thinks, perceives and wonders about something: 
Ego-cogito-cogitatum. Language follows this outline in the form of ego-dicto-
dictum. hence, in the analysis of intentional experience, there is a correlative 
analysis of language; the explication of language is, in turn, the explication 
of experience. from what has been said in chapter 1, it should be clear that 
experience does not point and is not bound to the world of things. Things 
for us are as they are meant. Things may vary without any change in the 
meaning attributed to them and meanings may vary without any change in 
the things. Thus, things are given within the web of conscious experience of 
meaning. if language is the vehicle of meaning and the way it intends things, 
then language, as an expression of intended meaning, is also the web, within 
which things make sense and appear in experience. Whenever we speak, we 
intend the terms to function with the meaning that we give them. in this 
sense, we cannot find meaningless terms because any terms, whenever cho-
sen for communication, are already intended to mean something. An analy-
sis of language in husserlian phenomenology is an analysis of experience 
that the terms embody. There is no “language in itself ”. it is only language 
because it traces and articulates experience. Meaning that stems from inten-
tional experience is completely intertwined with language, even if different 
terms can be used to express the same meaning or one term can carry vari-
ous meanings. in either case, language is inhabited by the intended meaning. 
But the meaning is directed, it means something. intentional orienta-
tion, which constitutes a meaning, is directed toward something and means 
that something. hence, i speak words about something. Through inten-
tional meaning expressed by words, i am open to the world and to others, 
who hear me. Language is generated in the expressed meaning that is ori-
ented toward the world and addressed to others. Language is, in this sense, 
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a mediation between the subject’s intentions and the world, and between 
subject and subject. it could be said that the intentional consciousness de-
ploys itself into a concrete experiential, audible and visible field through 
spoken or written language. But for husserl, language has another specific 
characteristic. Although language is pre-given, found in our natural world 
and the culture, in which we are born, it is at the same time set into move-
ment from its habitual meaning toward a critical meaning, precision. Al-
though a habitual word may have many associations and related meanings 
in the process of speaking, we sharpen the word and move it toward critical 
precision. We consciously extricate it from its moras, so to speak, and lend 
it clarity and univocity. This movement from natural ambiguity, naive us-
age of terms toward their clarity is a movement from what husserl called 
the natural attitude of language toward its use as a medium of an expres-
sion of univocal meaning and the univocal way of meaning and expressing 
something. in this sense, husserl dynamizes language, sets it into motion 
by lending it precision and univocal direction. it could be said that for hus-
serl, in the process of communication, language is this transition from eve-
rydayness, from naive position to critical meaning. in speaking and com-
municating, this transition is ceaseless. We take the pre-given words and 
constantly move them toward an articulated expression of meaning and 
designation30. in the dialogical encounter, we always shift among the pre-
given terms, combine them and recombine them in various ways and sweep 
them up toward an appropriate expression of a meaning and the meant 
states of affairs. Language in dialogue is this constant movement from naive 
to reflectively purified and critical meaning. Due to the dialogical encoun-
ter, language is sharpened and clarified. one’s expression is always silently 
contested by the other, interrogated and moved toward precision. As hein-
tel suggested, for husserl, language becomes processual and not a sum of 
pre-given terms of natural and naive speaking. in this movement, language 
becomes the mediating domain, trans-significative, such that the dialogical 
partners encounter in it each other and the world. of course, for husserl, 
the experiential consciousness, the consciousness that intends something 
in a particular meaning, is broader than language31. 
30 Waldenfels, B. (1980). Der Spielraum des Verhaltens [The Scope of Behavior], p. 133.
31 heintel, e. (1972). einfuhrung in die Sprachphilosophie [introduction to the Philosophy 
of Language]. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 40.
66
The Science of communicaTion 
in case of a novel insight words may fail and we cannot express what we 
mean. Yet, even in these situations, the meaning is not absolutely alien and 
can be slowly explicated in terms of other meanings and their verbal expres-
sions until finally the novel meaning comes to the fore. This suggests that lan-
guage and its meaning can be restructured in terms of the intended meaning 
and the states of affairs. What keeps language open and pliable, according to 
husserl, is our ability to mean something in novel, although not in alien ways. 
Although we have finite empirical means of expression, such means, in their 
movement toward spoken articulation of meaning, are indefinitely pliable. 
Although the movement of language toward selectivity and articula-
tion allows us to employ it with full awareness of its meaning, a language of 
a tradition has an ontological dimension that is never questioned.
heidegger called this dimension “hermeneutics”, which is an inter-
pretation of the meaning of being. The Western tradition, expressed in 
language, interprets being as substantive, consisting of a permanent and 
stable structure possessing specific attributes, some of which are essential 
and some accidental. According to heidegger, such an interpretation leads 
to a static language. Linguistic terms refer to permanent substances and, 
hence, have a permanence of their own. Substantives are characterized by 
attributes and verbs that reveal the qualifications and movements of the 
permanent entities. The language is, in this sense, “significative”. it points to 
things, their characteristics and their actions. 
Western thought is completely imbedded in this ontology expressed in 
language. in this sense, our thought cannot escape the constraints of lan-
guage. our thinking is coextensive with our language, and we think solely 
in words. But this does not mean that the speaker is in charge of language, 
that he has language objectively. Any kind of objective analysis of language 
is inadequate. if being is given to experience in terms of hermeneutics and 
in terms of interpretation that is linguistic, then all being claiming objectiv-
ity must be present within the context of language. The linguistic context is 
the milieu, in which being plays out its destiny in our experience. 
in light of this, heidegger was compelled to abandon any kind of objec-
tive and analytical approach to language. one reason that heidegger rejected 
the objective stance toward language and, indeed, metalanguage, is because 
apart from having ontological prejudgments, it is metaphysical. it is correla-
tive with the Western metaphysical conceptuality that is founded on the logic 
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of identity, of A is A. The notion of identity underlies both the Western meta-
physics and the Western logic as a foundation of language. one of its short-
comings is its exclusion of time as a fundamental aspect of the experienced 
world. Although our languages may possess temporal terms, they do not 
change the basic identity or the substantiality of the basic terms, that is, the 
nominative significations. The temporal terms merely transpose the identical 
entity into a different time slot, which is accidental, inessential or fortuitous. 
The movement toward metalinguistics is a movement toward the 
technologized metaphysics. it is the metaphysics of technologization of 
language into a functional instrument of information. This metalanguage 
becomes the new metaphysical world that supposedly dominates all human 
interaction. Yet, this metalinguistic movement obfuscates the language that 
we speak, namely, the language, in which we say something about the meta-
language, the language that is not subsumable into any kind of metalan-
guage. if language fails in this sense, this failure belongs to language itself. 
it is ultimately impossible to make language into an object, because in do-
ing so, we still remain in speaking, which is not an object of our linguistic 
reflection. This creates the hermeneutical circle: in order to speak about 
language, we must be in language that encompasses more than the language 
being spoken about. This leads us to the point in which the last interpreter 
must be sought. is the last interpreter the speaker, as would be the case 
with husserl, or is it the language, into which we are born and which is 
more than any speaker could encompass? Phenomenological understand-
ing of language is a resolution between these two dimensions. is language 
based on “timeless” conceptual structures, or is it historically transmitted 
embodying the interpretation of being, an interpretation from which we 
cannot escape? After all, any time we wish to make language into an object, 
we maintain a more fundamental language of our tradition, within which 
the objectified language functions. 
These problems shall re-emerge in our discussion of the concrete role 
of language in communication. What is essential at present is the manner, 
in which language functions directly in experience. it is hoped that our ex-
position of language will not attempt to make the linguistic process into a 
“metalanguage” or into an objectified system of analytic components of some 
would-be logic, constructed a priori, to validate our speaking. Rather, we shall 
attempt to capture the linguistic process as it takes place without prejudice. 
68
The Science of communicaTion 
Although thinking of language as a mode of being-in-the-world, hei-
degger was keenly aware of language as “anonymity”. in speaking we do not 
have language facing us as a system of grammar or semiotic signs: what 
we confront in speaking is the other and the things, the implements, their 
characteristics and relationships. We do not pay attention to the words, but 
to the world. it could be said that language is “intentional” insofar as to 
speak means to speak about something with someone. in exhausting itself 
by deploying the world, language is the very manner, in which the world is 
present to us. it is the very articulation without which the world would be 
mute. This is not to say that language is “creative” of the world; rather, it is 
a way that the world is manifest through language, a way that it is present 
to the variety of linguistic expression and modes of articulating does not 
mean that speaking is an attempt to express a subjective mode of relating 
to the world; as if a different modality of speaking were a different modality 
of subjective projection of the world. on the contrary, it is an indication 
that the world is not a one-dimensional sum of things; it is neither monistic 
nor pluralistic; it is a multidimensional articulation of things and events, a 
multidimensional unfolding and interacting process, and language catches 
the various aspects of the world in speaking. Above all, the variety of expe-
riences of the world is what language manifests. But in this sense, language 
does not manifest itself; it is always other oriented. 
This is not to say that the “other orientation” is a “copy” of things or 
events. All phenomenologists are in agreement that there is no paradisical 
state, in which God told the names of all things. Although pointing away 
from itself, language at the same time establishes relationships and a con-
text for our experience of things and events. At the same time, language 
reveals our own positions, attitudes and perspectives to the world. This is 
not a revelation of mere subjective states, but of modalities, in which hu-
mans relate to events and each other. in brief, the modalities are relational, 
through which there is a mutual structuring of the world and the subject. 
it is an in-between-region. in this relationship, language is an event, where 
truth happens, not in a formalistic and absolute sense, but in a finite and 
always provisional sense. By revealing events and ourselves in one way, we 
hide them in another way, by dealing with things in one possible way, we 
neglect and forego other possible ways. The concept of possibility is cru-
cial for the understanding of language. While revealing the modalities of 
69
Chapter III. Phenomenology and Language
experience of things, language also provides a horizon of possibilities that 
constitute the temporal context for such an experience. it is by virtue of 
language that we transcend the immediacy of the situation and open up 
a horizon, within which events and things assume their experienced tem-
poral orientations. When we say that “this is a rain cloud” before the rain, 
we open the possibility of the cloud toward rain. Without this linguistic 
transcendence, we would be closed to the immediacy of things and func-
tion only as a mechanical reaction to them. Language is projective and tran-
scends the immediately given toward the possible and the temporal. in this 
sense, language reveals the temporal being of things as they unfold toward 
their future, and it also includes their past. it is precisely because of the 
temporality of language, and not its formal eternity, that truth is finite. Be-
ing temporal, language can reveal only partial modalities of the ways that 
things are, were or will be manifested. 
The temporal transcendence of language constitutes a meaningful con-
text, as well: hence, our experienced world is a system of meaningful inter-
relationships that are not only expressed through language, but are articu-
lated linguistically. each event speaks to the extent that it belongs within 
a linguistic context of a particular tradition. When a policeman’s flashing 
signal appears in your rear view mirror, it is not a stimulus, to which we 
react, but it primarily “speaks” of the system of rules, laws, lawyers, judges, 
fines and authority. it has a horizon of interconnected meanings that allow 
us to make sense of the flashing light. Because language in its anonymity is 
identical with the meaningful interrelationships of the world and its tem-
poral horizons, then it can be said that the world we live in is a medium of 
dialogical communication with others. The problem of intersubjectivity is 
solved by the fact that we are born into a linguistic tradition that is not cre-
ated by us; in this sense, we are already in a human-intersubjective world 
established by language and not only language. The world of equipment 
has the same communicative and intersubjective structure. The hammer i 
use points to the nail, the nail to the board, the board to the wall, the wall 
to the house, to new homes, to families and the entire system of establish-
ing a situation for living. The hammer is present with the hammer maker, 
who fashioned the hammer for your hand; the maker is present to you in 
the service he provided. if the hammer does not have the balance required, 
you get angry at the makers of the hammer, you are intersubjective. The 
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hammer has a meaning in a context of interrelated meanings. it belongs to 
the meaningful world of interconnections. once again, the world is com-
municative, it is linguistic at all levels; or to speak in terms of our theme, it is 
dialogical, because it involves the others and the world, in which we and the 
others find themselves. At the same time, the communicative dimension 
of the world is temporal in its fundamental outline. The hammer does not 
only point to the nail and the nail to the board, but also to the total house 
to be completed and to the future as part and context of the meaning of the 
present functioning of the implements. The same can be said of language. 
The terms draw their meaning not only from the present functioning in 
the propositions, but also and primarily from the temporal context that the 
words deploy and by which the words are deployed. 
The dialogical understanding of language that includes the tacit pres-
ence of the others of our tradition and the practical and cultural world of 
implements and customs is a system of meaning implications, in medium 
of which we live. This medium is prior to the distinctions of the world into 
subjective and objective, into inner and outer. Such distinctions are estab-
lished linguistically as our modality of being in the world and of having the 
world. in terms of this linguistic understanding of the world, the subject 
encounter is dialogical in the sense that during the process of dialogue the 
subjects do not see themselves as separated individuals, but as participants 
in one process. As mentioned earlier, the specific emergence of individuals 
as being distinct appears when the dialogue breaks down; with the break-
down of dialogue, there is a momentary break-down of the world. The sys-
tem of meaningful interconnections collapse and the dialogical partners 
and the things of the world appear disconnected and individuate.
Take, for example, the case of instrumental interconnection. As long as 
the hammer holds, it points to an entire system of interconnections. if the 
hammer breaks, the system collapses, and the user of the hammer is thrown 
back upon himself, while the other materials stand there disconnected from 
the system. As soon as we reestablish our orientation and subsume the ham-
mer under the process of fixing it, the world resumes its interconnective sys-
tem, although now in a different context. The previous system may remain 
latent or may be subsumed under the new meaningful interconnections. 
All communication, all intentionality that means something or other 
must appear in a physical medium, in sound or mark of some kind. for 
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communication, such media are language, institutions and implements that 
mediate the subject to the other and the world. in dialogue, they concretize 
and situate the dialogical partners and the objectivities of discourse. in this 
sense, the concrete world in which we live is always meaningfully articu-
lated. in all that we do we are bound on the commonality of this world and 
its sense articulation. 
in the objective sense, language, for example, is a realization of the 
objective intentions, without becoming an object of intention. in the dia-
logical function, language appears in its triadic structure: something is me-
diated to the other in linguistic announcement and receptivity of the an-
nouncement, although the fundamental moment is the “objective function” 
of language. it changes a mere sound into a meaningful sign, through which 
someone means something or signifies a state of affairs. By using words, 
we do not ask what they are, but what they mean to point to. Through the 
sense that the words carry, a communicative community is founded. To 
speak of something in conversation implies also the expression of oneself 
in objective function of meaning that also retains the subjective function 
of expression. This does not mean that language reveals an act of decision 
to speak, but shows that the act is articulated in speaking. We understand 
ourselves better when we articulate ourselves linguistically; and a non-
prefabricated conversation may hold surprises for the speakers. Through 
articulation, the meaning acquires a transitory, yet enduring “documenta-
tion”, a lasting existence in the world that becomes accessible to all. each 
expression becomes a possible expression for everyone, as a possible com-
munication within a community. The communication of states of affairs is 
also communication of oneself; the self-communication is not a contingent 
aspect of language, but belongs to language in its essence. even when i at-
tempt to speak of myself, i split myself into the object of communication 
and the communicating subject. This sets limits to solipsistic idiosyncracity. 
The linguistic function of announcement is also essential because the full 
structure of language as dialogical consists of the unity of addressing, self-
expression and signification related to the addressee, requiring a linguistic 
announcement and acceptance of the announcement. The latter two mo-
ments can be designated as essential aspects of communicative function. 
An intersubjective mediation requires the linguistic unity of meaning and 
physical means. Language belongs to the comprehensive unity of meaning 
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and bodily expressivity of the expressed and the expression. it is possible to 
logically differentiate this unity by showing that the word is not the thing 
or states of affairs; yet, in direct speaking, language is the way that things 
are present, the way that they are “adumbrated”. Moreover, the separation 
is possible only through subsequent reflection. While speaking and listen-
ing, we live “in” language as we live in intentionality, and not toward them. 
obviously, when we read, we do not thematize the marks on the paper; the 
marks appear, yet, we “live” in the enactment of their meaning. The marks, 
or the sounds, function properly only when the communicative act does 
not aim at them, but goes through them. The unity between the meaning 
and the verbal sound or mark comprises an insoluble unity that is prior to 
their separation. This unity appears prior to any analysis: it is not a reality 
that synthesizes two elements, but a complete intermixture of the elements. 
As Wandelfels pointed out, the intertwining is very specific; the meaning 
“tends” toward expression and is not given without it. Yet, this tendency 
needs not be expressed through a precisely specified means; after all, we 
say that “i chose the wrong words for what i wanted to say”, or when we 
translate we select and reselect terminology for a closer approximation to 
the original meaning of the language that we are translating32. This is not to 
say that language is completely transcended; rather, there appears an expe-
rience of linguisticality as such, which is a condition for translatability. This 
experience is of a unique kind; it recognizes that the two languages that are 
given are sense materials carrying meaning and that the shift from one to 
the other leads to comparisons that have a range of options within the two 
languages. it is an experience that is premised on the recognition of univer-
sal linguisticality of the human experience and communication. What aids 
in this experience is the fact that linguistic process is intentional and that it 
is oriented toward things, objects and states of affairs that have a moment of 
sense experience. Yet, there is no guarantee that the translation will be com-
pletely successful, because there is a constant unification of meaning and 
sensibility and a constant intertwining that is in constant transformation 
and is always exposed to hazard, to dialogical shifts in face of the changing 
perspectives, and to adumbrations of the partners. This suggests that the 
expressive unity is a living unification. 
32 Waldenfels, B. (1980). Der Spielraum des Verhaltens [The Scope of Behavior].
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in direct dialogue, we seldom pay attention to terms. We live in a lin-
guistic unconsciousness, as Gadamer had argued from a hermeneutical 
standpoint33. of course, as with all corporeal activity, there is a pre-reflec-
tive process occurring anonymously. Difficulties in understanding, blurred 
speech or marred writing direct our attention to the sense medium. in this 
case, the question is not “what one is saying”, but “how it is being said”. 
finally, what are the rules and laws of this language that either enhance 
or limit expressibility? Yet, all such questions presuppose, but do not en-
compass the living process of language in dialogue. And in this case, the 
linguistic intentions are not individual, but belong to a common theme. 
Yet, the commonality is “occasional”, consisting of situated expressions and 
statements. We share the situation only in language, a situation, sense of 
which is not pre-given, but is built up through speaking. The situation ap-
pears in language as meaning, a laden phonetic event, which sense is not 
found in one or the other or in both partners, but in the expressive interplay 
occurring between them. 
Language is not a closed system of rules and logic; it remains open and 
flexible. Although language has structural moments worthy of analysis, we 
shall limit ourselves to the dialogical openness of linguistic process. Seen 
structurally, the various linguistic components are related in a whole, in a 
way that allows transformations and substitutions of terms. These are not 
necessarily dependent on external influences, but are regulated originally 
within a language. The notion of structure subtends any kind of dualism 
into subjective-objective or internal-external; it is rather between them and 
is founded on ambiguity. This ambiguity is one of the conditions for the 
ability of language not to be locked into the present; it can have projects that 
transcend the present. 
Structure and meaning are not external to each other as if one was an 
objective constellation, while the other was a subjective orientation. What is 
being structured is precisely human activity and experience in their mean-
ing; at the same time, meaning is not a detached ideality, but is a structur-
ally articulated field of activity and experience. in this sense, what is expe-
rienced, i.e., the experience and activity, cannot be submitted to external 
structural regulations. Structures that are neither a thing nor an idea do not 
33 Gadamer, h. G. (1975). Truth and Method. (G. Barden & J. cumming, Trans.). new York: 
Seaberg Press.
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correspond to activity that is merely a bodily mechanism or a conscious-
ness activity. Being bound to a sense-oriented activity and experience, the 
structures must remain dynamic, because they include both significations 
and the essences to which meanings point. Without signifying, without be-
ing meant in some way, the essential structures would not be apparent. 
Such an intimate connection between structure and meaning is not 
dependent on one-to-one correlation to individual acts or whether they 
are arranged combinatorially or comprise a temporal succession; rather, 
they too function as variables in a system of significations. This is to say, as 
performances, they have a meaning and the latter depends on a system of 
meanings transmitted in language and institutions. The essential moments 
for the understanding of language experientially comprise a careful balance 
between the individual and the linguistic systems of a tradition. 
first, the individual activities have a meaning only in a system of in-
terrelated meanings, wherein each act is submitted to the structures of lan-
guage and the cultural norms. Some pointed examples would be a christian 
making a sign of the cross, or a Muslim suddenly prostrating toward Mec-
ca. These activities internally communicate articulated systems. Language 
ceases to be a substantive process, with positive components having their 
own function and meaning. The latter appears in the differential articula-
tion. hence, no particular sound and no specific mark mean anything by 
themselves; their meaning is constituted by their differences. in principle, 
this differential process allows language to be open. 
Second, the experiencing subject, with open temporal horizons, lives 
in the language and institutions of the present and interprets historical de-
velopment in terms of contemporary understanding. if there is a difference 
between the present and other historical periods, the difference appears on 
the basis of a domain, the transcendental, which, at least for a moment, 
must be able to encompass the present and the historical dimensions in or-
der to shift between them. This is the moment of the subject, the individual 
revealing the impossibility of a complete domination of the individual by 
contemporary linguistic and institutional systems. in essence, this moment 
reveals the limits of contemporaneity and allows the interrogative mood to 
appear in the dialogue between the present and the past. 
Third, language is not a naturalistic-mundane event, as if it were some 
sort of empirical data, but it is a way of designating mundane events and 
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objects in order to make sense of them. it parallels the previously discussed 
transcendental domain, comprising a tension between the individual con-
sciousness and a tradition of dialogical rules and linguistic norms. it is sig-
nificant for dialogical understanding that the transcendental domain should 
be noted. it is “language” from “elsewhere”. While the dialogical partners are 
engaged in active-passive phases, each partner takes a tacit position in both 
phases in a moment of reflexivity that is unnoticed, although constantly in 
force. it is a moment that intertwines the sense of and the difference between 
question and answer, and ranges across selectivities of linguistic options of 
both dialogical partners. Although we are calling this moment the “individ-
ual”, it must be clear that it is not a substantive concept of individuality, but 
is active, dynamic, transformative and a field. in this sense, the very meaning 
of being determined by the institutionalized language and a tradition cannot 
be equated with a causal conception. Rather, the very activity is the initiating 
of the meaning and at the same time decentered toward the linguistic re-
quirements. Yet, the latter are vectors suggestive of meaningful options and 
verbal arrangements, even if such options might create an appearance that 
the individual is a function in a system of significations34.
The “i speak” and the “i speak with others” cannot be reduced to factual 
linguistic processes or to consciousness processes. Words have a sense and 
we think and understand ourselves and others through them. Words are 
not objects of conception, but are at the disposition of a corporeal subject, 
who is engaged in a linguistic world. Language requires an inner organiza-
tion that is basically a differentiation and not a conglomerate of phonomat-
ic, lexical and syntactic forms that cannot be traced arbitrarily. At the same 
time, there is the moment of language, the perceptual moment. it is similar 
to the individuating, transcendental moment that provides a shift between 
language and the perceived mundane objects. There is a basic affinity be-
tween perception and language; both belong in the “in-between domain”. in 
one sense, the belonging constitutes a complete intertwining, such that the 
perceptual is the spoken, and the spoken is the perceptual. Yet, in another 
sense, the perceived provides a tacit depth that differentiates between what 
is spoken and what is more and what calls the speaking to extend its forma-
tive power. The perceptual field is a linguistic field and more. This more is 
precisely expressed in the diacritical characteristic of language. When we 
34 Waldentels, B. (1980). Der Spielraum des Verhaltens [The Scope of Behavior], p. 148.
76
The Science of communicaTion 
say that language is different from anything natural and even perceptual, 
we institute a perceptual domain that reveals the difference. Thus, at the 
perceptual level, there appears a condition for dialogical extension outside 
the given linguistic parameters, although the latter are immediately called 
upon to articulate the perceptual moment. This condition is a perceptual 
figure that is not detachable from its background and cannot be extricated 
from its context, because it is the differentiation of the field, revealing a 
possible linguistic meaning. Although the latter cannot be extricated from 
the sign system, because it is a differentiation of the linguistic field, it marks 
a novel difference in the field. A sign means something in differentiation 
from other signs, and the perceptual moment offers an extension and a re-
combination of linguistic terms. hence, the meaning lies not only between 
words, but also between words and perceptions, and between perceptions 
that extend the meanings of words. if a sign means something only in rela-
tionship to other signs, then meaning is bound to a particular language. A 
particular speech is an extrication from the total language, which in turn 
allows the sense making of the particular speech. This abolishes the inno-
cence that particular meanings of words can be coordinated to particular 
facts, or as if one could use indifferent signs to coordinate pre-linguistic or 
supra-linguistic facts or meanings. The affirmation of the diacritical un-
derstanding of language and perception abolishes the need for ontological 
explanations and metaphysical postulates as sources of meaning. 
There are other advantages in the phenomenological analysis of lan-
guage and experience. The presumption of pure thought that somehow ra-
tionally organizes empirical data and then clothes such an organization in 
language becomes redundant. if experience is intentional, and if the latter 
is interrelated in a system of linguistic significations, then intentions are 
coextensive with linguistic meanings. Any so-called pure thought or for-
mal matrix is derailed in its meaning toward linguistic complexities and as-
sumes a role in a field of concrete perceptions and verbal expressions. What 
allows us to think that language is a mere clothing of intention or thought is 
the phenomenon of linguistic self-effacement. A successful speaking effaces 
itself in the presence of what it signifies; and this is what had led some to 
conceive of thought and intention as being prior to language. for example, 
if i try to recall a story, i tend to recall it as a totality and not as a group of 
signs or words. i tend to recall it as a whole, even if not too clearly. Lan-
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guage tends to direct us to things it signifies and effaces itself precisely to 
the extent that its meaning comes across in communication. it hides itself 
at the moment of its success and makes us feel that we meet another person 
or our intentions, in themselves, wordlessly, when actually we meet them 
through the background of linguistic articulation. But, in this case, a suc-
cessful thought is also a successful linguistic articulation. 
it could be objected that algorithmic symbolisms are univocal and give 
us direct access to the symbolized. Such a symbolic access is possible at a 
very primitive pictorial level. We can draw a triangle, a square or a house 
as direct images of experienced structures; yet, when we place such images 
into perceptual-linguistic field, we discover systems of meaningful intercon-
nections, sweeping up styles of life of particular peoples, their instrumen-
tal capacities, their logical accuity, their architecturally constituted social 
space and time. The simplicity and inadequacy of the immediate represent-
ative images as modes of speaking and experiencing have been adequately 
demonstrated by the work of elisabeth Straker. her work also exposes the 
inadequacies of algorithmic languages35. in their assumed ideality and all 
encompassment, they are dead, without contexts, and have no concrete sig-
nificance for dialogue and communication. We are also aware by now that 
even pure geometries are not free from the broader contexts of their pro-
duction and their problematic and possible ways of interpreting them. one 
can justifiably say that although language is anonymous and that it effaces 
itself before the meaning, it is a background structuring of the experienced 
world. Although it moves from the signifier to the signified, it structures 
the signified indefinitely and in novel ways. hence, besides the four aspects 
we just discussed, language can be refined in terms of the following points: 
language is situated because it is produced and used by situated-corporeal 
humans and is intertwined with perception. The situatedness already ap-
pears at the level of phonemes, which are diacritical elements of terms 
and provides stresses and nuances within terms; hence, they do not have 
a direct significative aspect, although they shade the manner in which the 
meaning will be understood, at least in its effective dimension. They are the 
sonorous elements that have the dimension of expressivity. one of the most 
fundamental roles of phonemes is diacritical, aiding in the discrimination 
35 Stroker, e. (1987). investigations in Philosophy of Space. (A. Mickunas, Trans.). Athens, 
oh: ohio university Press, p. 296.
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among words and similar terms. The same is valid of words; they are marks 
of difference from other words. They present signification only in relation-
ship to other words, through a situation, as unities cohering and differing 
from other unities. in the act of speech, the words suggest each other and 
arouse other words. This leads to a certain spontaneity of language that 
accounts for the way that language can have us, instead of being a mere 
possession as a tool for expression. At the same time, the linguistic involve-
ment allows for transcendence of the here and now insofar, as meaning 
is not pre-given, but is born in speaking “between words”36. hence, it is a 
movement, surpassing of signs toward signification and the total linguistic 
field, suggesting what has been said and what is to come. This spontaneity 
of language accounts for the conquering of new perceptions, of expressing 
novelties and teaching the subject about his/her own thought. in this sense, 
risk and ambiguity are essential aspects of language as a “conquering” pro-
cess capable of intertwining with and opening experiences and perceptions 
that once were foreign to us. hence, 20th century writers, such as claudel, 
and the surrealists were capable of freeing language from obvious control of 
facts and trusted it to invent new relationships of meaning, while dwelling 
in it, using it, but never becoming sole masters of it. The spontaneity of lan-
guage also means that language is never completely acquired and it always 
remains a possibility and an institution, or that it is a living institution. This 
life is also the reason why language is never completely transparent in its 
meaning. Although we tend to capture it, it offers more than we expected 
and implies options that we can never fully pursue. 
Although language makes ideal meaning possible, it does not reveal it 
in its totality. it never delivers things or meanings in their purity, without 
experiential contexts, against which background and depth it profiles fig-
ures. Because it is never totally objective and because it always functions 
against this background of perception and the multitude of processes of 
signifying, language remains open. To be precise, language can never be 
pure because it always exists in a situation and in time. This is important for 
the understanding of language as a finite, situated, and yet transcending sig-
nifying. Language does not move to signify something in one-to-one cor-
relation, but does so laterally by articulating differences in perceptual and 
linguistic fields. it crystalizes significative intentions in the spread between 
36 Waldenfels, B. (1980). Spielraum des Verhaltens [The Scope of Behavior], p. 163.
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words. hence, things are not meant directly, but in terms of differentiation 
of their meanings. Thus, language is not a pure representation, but an ex-
pressive communication and signifying of the perceptual context of things 
at the same time. it is equally an appeal to others. in this sense, language is 
a will to understand and to be understood by others. Language, at this level, 
is a factual intersubjectivity. 
The fluidity of language also depends on our activity. This means that 
we do not take things and meanings as being complete apart from our 
speaking. What we mean in language can be grasped only as a process of 
structuration. once again, this relationship between language and linguis-
tic performance can be seen as lateral meaning. We do not go simply to 
things; rather, our access is disrupted by language so that through speech 
we fill out and flush out things in terms of linguistic differentiations. The 
speaking breaks up the latency of language into a structuration without be-
ing able to encompass total language. 
The linguistic act and language are not opposed; yet, speaking is not a 
pure activity of an individual, but is immersed into a socially formed his-
tory. in this sense, speaking is a mediation between the present and the 
past; it is constituting and a constituting process. in this sense, language is 
a sedimented pool and we reach toward it in our speech acts when we wish 
to say something new. here, the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of 
language are completely interrelated. Moreover, the language of the past is 
not a sum of designated facts, but an articulated system and the contingen-
cies of this language emerge in the present speaking, and the latter does not 
crystalize itself into a completed system of pure actuality and transparency. 
it is rather an incarnated logic, in which contingency, reason and fortuities 
comprise a moving equilibrium. What maintains it in motion are the re-
quirements of communication, in which the aim at novelty combines with 
a certain compulsion with the old. The new is diacritical and is understood 
only in terms of the old comprising a coherent transformation. 
The regularity and lawfulness of language is more than a habit, but 
depends on social communication, convention and sanction. There is a 
“dialogue” between individuality and society. The social, imprinted in lin-
guistic rules, is not a massive, substantial reality, but a system of symboliza-
tions that pervades, but does not suppress the individual. Structured lan-
guage leads to the circularity between the individual and the sociohistorical 
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world; the individual is eccentric and the social world finds its center in 
the individual. The line between the individual and the social has no preci-
sion, because the individual in his corporeity and linguisticality belongs to 
a domain of anonymity, which he can never completely surpass. Yet, the 
individual is not completely closed by precise prescripts; he always finds 
latent meanings that he can explore. 
The relationship between linguistic acts and a given language is vari-
able. There is always a possibility for creative speech that elicits something 
novel from the given language. here, the new meaning is not given, but 
achieved and the author creates a public and the communicative language 
reaches here its limit, a limit that is in constant flux. But a question can 
be raised whether, even in common practice, there might not be a crea-
tive aspect. This is precisely the case because language is diacritical; any 
shift of linguistic relationships is also a shift of meaning that appears in the 
relationships. This notion can be expanded in another way: linguistic sur-
pass of itself. This question could not be raised if we could step outside of 
language into mere facts or into precise and univocal meaning that would 
subsequently be designated by language. This question could not arise, 
also, if language were a closed system. it only appears when we concern 
ourselves with language as it functions in mutual communication. here, we 
introduce in language something that transcends the language. This occurs 
not merely because in its eminence language contains the difference of the 
signified and the signifier constitutive of a sign, but because of a language-
transcending difference constitutive of the use of signs, the designated 
surpasses the designation. The intention of meaning is not pure meaning 
and confronting us with pure meaning, but it is a will to speak, inherent 
in language itself. it is the superfluity of what i want to say and experience 
in contrast to what is to be said and is already said. And here, the world of 
“silent things” announces itself, because they too want to say something by 
confronting our initiatives. This transcendence of the meant in contrast to 
the said does not delimit a boundary of language, but corresponds to its 
organization. Precisely because meaning appears only among signs, i am 
never definitely beyond language and never definitely closed in language. 
Deviation and inner differentiation of a sign system are interrelated. What 
permits the understanding of dialogical novelties is the conjunction of lan-
guage and experience. Although being addressed in a novel mode, we are 
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opened to the possibilities of experience that become our own and at the 
same time we are opened to linguistic shifts that are comprehensible on 
the basis of the poli-centrically acquired linguistic meanings that have op-
tions unexplored by our own habitual uses of languages. in this sense, there 
is a comprehensibility of novelty, a novelty that is never absolutely radical 
because it is expressed within a language, horizons of which are our own. 
Although there may be languages constituted for theoretical purposes, 
they are comprehensible in two ways: (a) the scientific community, accus-
tomed with the structuration of this language, communicates within this 
language and (b) the communication of theoretical understanding outside 
of the scientific community shifts to the everyday language and translates 
the theoretical terms into the language of the lived world. in this sense, the 
language of the lived world may be “rearranged” for the purpose of elicit-
ing appropriate meanings; yet, being in the language of the lived world, 
such meanings are accessible to the uninitiated in the theoretical structura-
tion of a language. As Gadamer would say, theoretical-scientific language 
requires a journalism that would “interpret” the theoretical-scientific lan-
guage in terms of the historically transmitted language of the lived world37. 
for example, a psychiatrist has a scientific-theoretical language, yet he/she 
translates the language to the patient into a daily language. Although the 
doctor knows the scientific terms, such as repression, syndrome formation, 
etc., he addresses the patient in a directly comprehensible speaking about 
the relationship of the patient to his/her parents and their behavior toward 
the patient in his/her lived situation. The doctor may indeed bring out the 
novel meaning of the relationship; yet, the novelty is expressed in the lan-
guage of the lived world, assumed both by the patient and the doctor. After 
all, prior to being a scientist, the doctor already lives in the medium of a 
poli-centrical language. in dialogue, the linguistic process plays a complex 
role. The first presupposition is the communicative community described 
in the first chapter in terms of poli-centrically oriented field and histori-
cally institutionalized meaning. This institutionalization includes language. 
The second requirement is that the dialogical partners belong to the same 
linguistic community or the same linguistic modality, such as scientific or 
theoretical. The third requirement is that the exchange of experiences in the 
dialogical process is now complicated by language that shapes the percep-
37 Gadamer, h. G. (1975). Truth and Method, p. 311.
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tions of both speakers in a way that what is said by one embodies the per-
ceptions and thoughts that are relevant to the situation. Yet, in his speaking, 
there is a residium of unexpressed perceptions that imply more than the 
present speaking can encompass. At the same time, he says more than he 
intends to due to the fact that language is also an embodiment of percep-
tions of generations past. The recipient of the address follows the outlines 
of the language and incorporates them into his/her own perceptions, which 
are more than the address can encompass; at the same time, the address 
carries more than the recipient can master due to the superfluity of mean-
ing embodied in language. The conjunction of his/her perceptions and the 
language that he/she hears opens a field of options for an answer that is 
never complete and that can and does shift with the continuation of the 
dialogue. Dialogue as linguistic is open. 
communication is more than a transmission and exchange of concep-
tions, information, views and feelings, and it is oriented toward a constitu-
tion of a common sense and meaning. husserl had pointed out that linguis-
tic communication participates in the constitution of an experiential sense 
of the world and the act of communication is constitutive of community 
and in community. communication plays a fundamental role only when 
it is constitutive for the sense of experience and activity and not a mere 
mediation of what is already pre-given and complete, because in that sense 
communication would become redundant. 
common constitution of sense is possible when singular acts of com-
munication not only go through signs, but, above all, when communication 
is a conjunction of acts that reside in the contingent materiality of signs 
and unfold their productivity among the signs. This view is broader than 
husserl’s and Schutz’s conceptions. They locate communication at a me-
diating level inserted between constituting consciousness and the consti-
tuted society. here, the medium appears as a mere transition of a one-sided 
constitutive process. communication would be like either an inescapable 
society or a conjunction of singular consciousnesses. This preeminence of 
consciousness is just as one-sided as the preeminence of society. in the first 
case, the signs would be constituted by individual intentionality and in the 
second one by a supra-individual system of rules. in the first case, com-
munication would be a transmission of meaning and in the second one an 
application of rules. in either case, no productivity of sign system is per-
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mitted. The task of phenomenological theory of communicative language 
is to surpass these alternatives. 
Although the problems of communication based on the individual 
intentions expressed in signs are obvious, the problems with the opposite 
view must be briefly mentioned. This view claims that communication is 
possible when we possess a common system of signs that is structured by 
linguistic rules. our intentions coincide, because they are submitted to the 
modes of expression directed by rules of a sign system. The constitution of 
common meaning means an application of common rules. The linguistic 
signs that are constructed in terms of common rules have a primordial rela-
tionship to objects and states of affairs to the speaker and the hearer, and by 
virtue of this three-fold relationship, the sign is a symbol, signification and 
a sign; it serves for the presentation of expression and appellation to others. 
A specification of linguistic acts occurs through the irreducible functions of 
hierarchically differentiated order. 
in communication, the hearer deciphers the intentions of the speak-
er in terms of common rules that he/she applies to the expressions of the 
other. The retort to other’s appellation does not go through the perception 
of alien expressions. hence, the activity of the individual is always social; 
there is always a common fund that cannot be completely appropriated by 
the individual, because the individual owes all that he/she is to this sphere, 
in which communication takes place. Yet, in this thesis, the accentuation 
of rules reduces speech acts to application of rules and to combinatorial 
variables. if we were to speak of a building of meaning, then we can only 
conceive of a mere applicative building of meaning, in which the differences 
between the speaker and the hearer are abolished, and if not, then one of 
the speakers has not yet learned the application of the rules. Yet, ultimately, 
there is the fundamental assumption of the propriety of the rules and acts 
of their application. This is Wittgensteinian and, in a way, de Saussurean38. 
The one-sidedness of the two positions appears to be inadequate for 
the understanding of communication. if we take the rules of language, we 
find that they apply to sentence units; yet, there are no rules that state how 
sentences are to be connected. This suggests that we do not select sentences 
on a basis of fixed rules, but build a communication from sentences. The 
sentences are connected by an actor situated in a field. for example, such a 
38 Gadamer, h. G. (1975). Truth and Method, p. 174.
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string of sentences as “how are you? it is a fine day. Are you playing tennis 
today?” has no pre-established rule. Moreover, one sentence does not imply 
another. And it is even hard to say whether the sentence “it is a fine day” is a 
question or a statement of fact, or whether another question is to follow. And 
even to claim that practical rules would combine such sentences fails be-
cause the just mentioned sentence does not imply any practical question that 
would follow from the sentence. What of the communicative partners, the 
speaker and the listener? if the dialogue were to be understood on the basis 
of agreed, effective and established expressions, then it would be sufficient 
to analyze the rules, in terms of which such expressions are produced and 
understood, where response, agreement or rejection would be experienced. 
in this sense, the succession of sentences would be understood as an exten-
sion of sentences. The address and the response would be merely a change of 
roles, wherein no new structural relationships would be brought to the fore. 
The attempts to found communication on these grounds escape the 
possibility of common activity; the activity remains incapsulated in indi-
vidual sentences, and the commonality is reducible to the relationship of 
production and reproduction, without reaching coproduction. in this con-
nection, it is no accident that various authors, such as Buhler and even Ja-
kobson, replace the addressor and the hearer to a sender and a receiver of 
messages and, thus, speak of encoding and decoding, leading to a model of 
communicative39. Yet, here the question of the continuation of communi-
cative process cannot be answered: how information is to be continuously 
transmitted in a mutual process. We could also suggest that habermas es-
tablishes a communicative ethics and reduces language to individual acts of 
speech that are called elementary units of speech40. he deliberately refuses 
to note that speech acts appear as a rule in pairs. This, for him, is related to 
communicative activity; the communicative activity takes place in accus-
tomed and normatively guaranteed linguistic games. here, one exchanges 
information and the validity of signification interconnections is assumed. 
The constitution of the world is located in a pre-communicative activity 
based on instrumental praxis. in this sense, communication is not produc-
39 Buhler, K. (1976). Die Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaft [Axiomatics of Linguistic Sci-
ence]. frankfurt, West Germany: Vittorio Klostermann; Jakobson, R. (1968). child Lan-
guage, Aphasia, and General Sound Laws.
40 habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of communicative Action. Vol. i. (T. Mccarthy, Trans.). 
Boston: Beacon Press.
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tive; it only exchanges products. This occurs in terms of universal rules that 
prescribe a principle exchangeability of dialogical roles.
The question that must be raised is: what is communication if not mere-
ly a transitional process of individually founded transmission of meaning, 
or of a socially regulated exchange, that is, a locus of social productivity and 
productive sociality? if communication plays a role within a system of signs, 
then the commonality must be read directly from the signs in a way that var-
ious activities do not only come in contact through them, but are completely 
intertwined with them. To grasp this, it is essential to discuss the concept of 
context. The constitution of meaning is more than a lending of meaning or 
an application of rules, but also a progressive constitution of a context. 
context is a field of meaningful acts of relating, whether such acts are 
one’s own or those of the other, whether they are successive or simultaneous; 
these acts relate to the field and organize it in a particular way. This requires 
the notion that language consists of two strata; the syntagmatic axis, which 
obeys the principle of succession and simultaneity, and the paradigmatic 
axis dominated by the principle of exchangeability. in this sense, every lin-
guistic activity unifies an operation of combinations that builds the context 
and an operation of selection that allows substitutions. This is valid for the 
domains of phonetics for word-building, that is, construction of sentences 
and their continuation by other sentences. from plane to plane, the possi-
bilities of combination increase and the freedom of selectivity grows to the 
final step of succession of sentences, where the obligatory syntactical rules 
forfeit their power. Let us look at the last step. A question opens a play-space. 
An answer emerges that is selected within the opened play-space. Generally 
speaking, relationship is attached to a real relationship insofar, as it selects 
modes of relationship within the possibilities of the context. combination 
and selection are strictly related here; if one is weakened, linguistic and com-
municative process is disturbed and finally abolished. combination without 
selection leads to a compulsive relationship (closed context), selection with-
out combination leads to an arbitrary and disconnected relationship. in all 
normal cases, the context is open, but limited. 
With regard to the connection among sentences, we have here open 
rules that exclude certain possibilities of contextual constitution without 
prescribing determined possibilities. The answer “fits” the question and 
continues among coherent options. Yet, we must take a further step, which 
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would take us away from a mere linear succession of the dialogical pro-
cess. for this, we must distinguish between three expressive dimensions: 
linguistic expressions, corporeal expressions and activities; these are related 
to each other in various ways. They intertwine in a successive intercon-
nection: i can react to an expression of pain with a question or with an act 
of help. Yet, the different modes of expression intertwine simultaneously. i 
comment on my action, and i promise something with my expression and 
intonation. hence, the context is constituted not only temporally, but it also 
assumes an “environmental” thickness, a depth41. 
This may seem to be trivial. Yet, this triviality appears only because one 
sees the transition from one form of expression to the other as occurring 
in a heterogeneous sphere, for example, as a transition from conventional 
linguistic activity to real consequences; and the simultaneous intersection of 
linguistic activity with other expressive forms are all too hastily explained in 
terms of real accompanying phenomena, as a background in which speaking 
is imbedded. Yet, this notion contradicts the possible coherence and incoher-
ence between the representatives of different expressive classes. Mere factual 
consequences and accompanying phenomena can cohere in certain regular-
ity or fail to cohere and can correspond to what is being said or contradict 
the speech, empower it or disempower it. here, any theory of language that 
regards linguistic signs as a mere representation of autonomous thought and 
intentions of feelings break down. The various forms of expression are simi-
lar to corporeal synaesthesis and synergy; they constitute a structural inter-
connection containing interferences, substitutions, separations, interferences 
and dominant strands, where one can speak of primary spoken, expressive or 
active relationship, but not purely of linguistic, expressive or active. 
All this has clear consequences only for a theory of communication 
that interlocks and fuses the dialogical partners, where the constitution of 
common meaning takes place in a mutual context. here, the schema of 
speaking and hearing is no longer adequate. A retort consists not only in 
that one speaks because one has heard something and, thus, initiates a new 
speak, but rather one corresponds, answers and attaches oneself to a pre-
given expression and, thus, continues it. The exchange of roles is a figure of 
change, where an exchange of foreground and background takes place; this 
means more than a repetition under another sign, that is, a transformation 
41 Waldenfels, B. (1980). Spielraum des Verhaltens [The Scope of Behavior], p. 179.
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subsumed under rules. That the continuation of a theme is the constitution 
of meaning is neither a production nor reproduction, but a co-production 
that cannot incorporate its presuppositions. it is a “transitional-phenome-
non”, which subtends the differentiation of the dialogical partners. Between 
them a common ground, a unitary plot, is constituted, and this is the con-
dition for novelty in communication and not a mere transmission of what 
is already complete and given. The commonality does not merely depend 
on a common meaning or a transmission of similar experiences, but, in 
addition, it depends on a multifarious process of coherent or discordant 
constitution of sense. After all, discrepancies and even antagonisms are 
forms of commonality. We must add a brief discussion of the simultane-
ous intermixing of various forms of expression in the relationships between 
the dialogical partners. Although we cannot both speak simultaneously, we 
can express ourselves simultaneously. The speaker is not a pure speaker, 
who is productive of effects; he maintains all-sided control and modulates 
his speaking in terms of the actions and expressions of the other. And the 
hearer is not a pure recipient of sounds, but modulates his hearing by being 
inquisitive, by nodding his head, etc.42 There is a peculiar inspiration for the 
speaker appearing in the face of the dialogical partner, who expresses that 
he has already grasped our half-finished articulation; the other is, thus, half 
of my own speaking. in this sense, communication includes all the forms of 
expression, from language through corporeal expression and activity, even 
if one or the other may predominate in a particular context. in this sense, 
we can no longer speak of the “first word” in communication, because such 
a word is always in a context, and the context is a limited openness that can 
never be closed, unless one considers pathological cases. 
The system of signs and their rules is in a context of activities and it en-
counters corporeal expressions that intertwine and reveal more in commu-
nicative process than just words. The meaning that emerges appears only 
between these forms and between the partners in dialogue. in this sense, 
semiotics is beginning to think in terms of multi-dimensioned process of 
symbolization and both in terms of singular terms and the rules of their 
relationship. Thus, a system of linguistic signs can be seen diacritically as 
marking the difference between itself and other forms of expression and 
between the dialogical partners. 




Although institutions and the modes of communication transmitted 
through them play a basic role in our understanding of human interac-
tion and mutual influence, they are nonetheless founded on a direct hu-
man interaction that is basically dialogical. Phenomenologically speaking, 
dialogue is a process, in which the individuals not only participate, but also 
structure their perceptions, conceptions, values and, indeed, their very self-
understanding. During the dialogical process, the individuals do not see 
themselves as separated egos attempting to project external signs about in-
ternal psychological and mental states, concepts or experiences. As already 
shown, the experiences are not subjective states, closed upon themselves in 
the internal process. They are accessible to all, specifically when there is no 
human behavior, no movement, posture or gesture that does not signify or 
mean something. During the late hours, when one sinks into the couch and 
begins to nod, he signifies that he is no longer interested in conversing; he 
is tired or bored. All the participants can directly read this gesture without 
first wondering what this gesture signifies. As already noted and as will be 
subsequently developed in greater detail, expression is read directly, im-
mediately and without any intervention by the “readers” of the expression. 
interpretation takes for granted direct experience of expression. 
The discussion of dialogue is inseparable from the question of inter-
subjectivity. in early phenomenological literature, the term intersubjectivity 
meant a capacity to (a) experience the other person directly as having con-
sciousness “like one’s own” and (b) to be able to have common experience. 
husserl’s work Cartesian Meditations is concerned with the question of “how 
the other, the alter-ego, is given in experience”. one point of this work was 
to show that all experience is intersubjective; the world is given primarily 
to a community of subjects, and the alter-ego is implicitly involved in all 
experiences of each individual43. Subsequent developments in phenomenol-
ogy have demonstrated that intersubjectivity is always presupposed in the 
understanding of objectivity. With heidegger’s work Being and Time, we 
are moved into a historical world into which we are born, with ready-made 
43 husserl, e. (1970). carthesian Meditations (D. cairns, Trans.). The hague: Martinus nijhoff.
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implements, language, institutions and traditions, embodying the contribu-
tions and the presence of others. even if the other is not personally or physi-
cally present, the presence is always there in all the signs of our world, in the 
morality we follow, in the gods we worship, in the language we use and in the 
implements we employ44. And with Merleau-Ponty’s work Phenomenology 
of Perception, we are “intercorporeal”45. The meaning of the latter term has 
various aspects. it is a silent, anonymous background, on which our individ-
ual corporeal gestures emerge and, hence, transmit a common signification; 
it is a historically accumulated process of sedimentations of acting, behaving 
and, thus, suggesting that each corporeal gesture has a depth of meanings 
that at the same time lend openness and ambiguity to each gesture. it is also 
a basis for transcendence, which, although going beyond the present field 
of perception, does not extricate itself from its immediate environment. in 
general, it is a perceptual dimension constituting a ground for direct com-
munication of meaning that is never complete and requires continuous ar-
ticulation; it is always open. At this level, the dialogue is preverbal; meaning 
is read silently, and each corporeal gesture, although exhausting itself in its 
signifying power of a situation, carries more meaning than the present situa-
tion requires. hence, two persons could read the gesture differently, depend-
ing on their situations. for example, a gesture of impatience in a dangerous 
situation means one thing, whereas in a loving situation it means something 
else. This is the reason why a gesture, while being in a situation, transcends 
the situation and can have more meanings than one.
Individual and Community 
The question concerning the priority either of the individual or of the 
community (the social) is as old as philosophy. The Greeks in general, and 
Aristotle in particular, lent priority to the polis, the whole of society; in or-
der to be human, one must be a member of a human society. The society has 
its own nature and the individuals are parts of such a nature. At the other 
end of Western tradition, there are theories, such as utilitarianism, which 
claim that the individual is the only reality and society consists of a sum 
of individuals. in the first case, the problem is how do individuals become 
individuals if they are subsumed under the compelling power of society; in 
44 heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie, Trans.). new York: harper.
45 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception.
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the second case, the question is how do individuals, separated and unique, 
manage to form a society? 
Phenomenology attempts to resolve this problem by avoiding social 
holism and social atomism. This means that phenomenology must show, on 
the one hand, that society is not merely an atomistic plurality of externally 
related subjects without any internal impact on each other and, on the other, 
that society is not a holistic unity, under the guise of a universal spirit, social 
conditions, historical necessity, and so forth, lacking any basis in the par-
ticular individuals, who comprise it. The social person may be distinguished 
from the individual person, who is composed of individual acts, aims, and 
directions. in this activity, the individual person founds his social behavior 
constituting a relationship to others. This relationship is an activity of higher 
order and establishes a social personality; the latter may be characterized in 
various ways: its personality is higher than that of the individual because its 
experiences are built not only of one individual’s activities, but also of the 
activities of others. Thus, when two individuals communicate, they mediate 
each other’s views and experiences and together they comprise a basis for a 
communication to an indefinite number of individuals. The social personality 
is of a higher order because it embraces not just the activity of an individual, 
but also the activities of various individuals, whereby the interrelationship of 
the activities constitute something more than the sum of the individual acts; 
they influence and change one another. in the process of communicative 
interaction, the individual persons influence and change one another, thus, 
yielding a more encompassing awareness that belongs to more individuals. 
The relationship between the founding individual and the social, higher or-
der individual can be depicted through an analogy with musical notes and 
melody. The sounds are the foundation of melody; but in forming the melody, 
the sounds create a higher order that is not identical with the sum of sounds. 
This is not to suggest that the sounds lose their individuality; the contri-
bution of each is recognizable. Yet, their internal communication forming 
a melody creates an order that can be perpetuated even if the individual 
notes are changed. Analogously this constitutes a continuity of the social 
order, yet, in such a way that the individual and his contributions are always 
presupposed. The individual and the social are in the founding-founded 
relationship. The founded, the social-communal, comprises the “we” con-
sisting of the accumulated relationships and mutual influences of activities 
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sedimented through history, where the very names of the actors have been 
forgotten. And yet, the bearers of the names were the founders of the social 
dimension; in turn, the contemporaries are also founders and at the same 
time carriers of that dimension. here, the function of carrier is not identical 
to a mere transmission of a tradition; rather, it adds an experiential perspec-
tive or a shift of meaning to the whole fabric of society. The reason for this 
addition lies in the experience of the fact that while being in society we are 
also capable of facing society. While being influenced by, we, in turn, influ-
ence society. We not only accept and follow what is socially common, we 
also question and interrogate the communal spirit and we either accept it 
or reject it. in brief, there is an interaction not only among individuals, who 
form the foundation for society, but also between the individual and the 
society46. 
The solution to the problem of individual-community is also offered 
by phenomenology at another level. While being engaged in the world 
as individuals, aware of our individuality and its various attitudes, habits 
and conceptions about the world, we at the same time confront the world, 
which is humanized. every institution, implement, street sign, utterance 
and book has a presence pervaded by human experience; not our own, and 
yet accessible to us, because as was already shown, experience purified from 
all explanatory impositions is accessible to all. The constitution of society 
and the accessibility of any experience to everyone comprise the foundation 
of human communication, and communication, in its stead, enhances the 
development of the individual as a social being. 
The World of Dialogue 
our age has been designated in various ways: the age of alienation, 
the age of schizophrenia, the technological age, the postindustrial age, etc. 
it seems that another designation could be added to this list: the age of en-
counter and dialogue.  
We shall attempt to extricate the dialogical notion from other notions 
and present the conception that “being with” others is one of the most ba-
sic and fundamental philosophical and perhaps scientific questions of our 
tradition. Moreover, the question of dialogue and its foundation is not only 
46 Landgrebe, L. (1968). Phaenomenologie und Geschichte [Phenomenology and history]. 
Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
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of philosophical-theoretical interest, but also includes the most concrete en-
counters ranging from play to medicine and the highest theoretical sciences. 
As already mentioned, the Greeks considered human life to be politi-
cal. The polis, having a nature of its own, provides the foundation of dia-
logue. Moreover, the humans participate in the all-encompassing logos, a 
universal reason that rules heaven and earth. This assumed commonality 
guarantees the dialogical correctness among individuals. The Greeks did 
not maintain the concept of a private consciousness in the sense of indi-
vidual self-sufficiency. The self-realization of the human is always through 
the others and through divinity. even in Plato’s Symposium we find that a 
man or a woman are not singular, separated entities; rather, they are parts 
of a higher unity and both are driven by eros to achieve this unity. The sin-
gular, that is, the separated being, cannot be addressed as human; only in 
an erotic relationship to the other does the human become complete. That 
eros pervades not only the body, but also the soul and the spirit is almost a 
self-evident truth for the Greeks. The completion of one through the other 
is a condition, a dialogical ground, for being human47.
This is valid even for the Stoics. it is reflected in the notions of Oikeio-
sis, meaning a turning to oneself, to one’s own essence, as a way of relating 
to others. The very rational nature of being human requires that this turn-
ing to oneself is not to be understood purely individualistically; rather, the 
turning must discover the very structure of reason in all events, a reason, 
to which the very individual is bound. in hellenic times, of course, it is no 
longer the polis that is all-encompassing, but the world and humanity. Thus, 
the Stoa extends the notion of zoon politikon to the notion of zoon choinon-
ikon, where the human is ecumenical. hence, the dialogical dimension is 
extended beyond one’s human environment toward the entire human kind.
even in christianity, “being-with” is essential to the concept of philo-
sophical anthropology. The simple demand of neighborly love is a condi-
tion for being human. obedience to the divine can only be expressed in 
relationship to the other. As Bultmann pointed out, the christian demand 
to love the neighbor, which is primarily discovered in love and, thus, not 
understood before, is the transformation of the direction of life of the natu-
ral human order, because the latter is exposed to the danger of subjugation 
47 Krueger, G. (1978). eros und Mythos bei Plato [eros and Mythos in Plato]. frankfurt am 
Main, West Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.
93
Chapter IV. The Dialogical Domain
of the other through the self48. Dialogical thought would be hindered with-
out this dimension. 
The fulfillment of self through the other, or the co-humanity, allow-
ing the other to be through the self, are the two alternatives, one offered by 
Greek thought, the other by christianity. Augustine attempts to unite the 
two, the Greek eros-motif and the christian Agape-motif in the notion 
of Caritas and interprets loving the other as oneself as an equilibrium of 
both notions of love. Dialogue can occur only when neighbor love takes 
its measure from self-love, where both become not exclusive, but assume a 
justifiable form of human interaction. 
of course, this dialogical move, based on Caritas, has some dire conse-
quences in medieval mysticism; the human person wanted to have a direct 
experience of divine love and, hence, began to neglect the neighbor. The 
modern rationalism has intensified this direction insofar, as the essence of 
being human was transferred to reason as a self-sufficient process, requir-
ing no complementarity of the other. This is the radical move of carte-
sianism with the notions of innate ideas. This anthropological theory, in 
its epistemological formulation, claims that the human is at the outset “by 
itself ” requiring no experience and encounter of the other. 
in empiricism, we discover a different base for dialogue. in hobbes, 
for example, the human relations are based on power driven by selfishness, 
related, of course, to reason as a base of social contract. We agree in brief 
to have a dialogue for our own selfish interests, but not for our encounter 
of one another in a free space without external infringements. Locke devi-
ates from this stance by positing a nature of freedom, wherein convention 
and dialogue is there to maintain that freedom. hence, the very essence of 
state is to maintain an open dialogical dimension. indeed, self-love here 
plays a fundamental role, yet such a love is mediated by reason, by rational 
self-interest. Still, another way that the ground of dialogue was conceived is 
given in the writings of various theorists, such as hume and Schaftesbury, 
who posited sympathy as a common bond among humans. it is another 
question whether sympathy is adequate for dialogue. others, such as Rous-
seau, would claim that dialogues impossible in the state of modern society. 
originally, the human is dominated by self-love (amour propre), which is a 
48 Schrey, h. h. (1970). Dialogisches Denken [Dialogical Thinking]. Darmstadt, West Ger-
many: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 3.
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socially innocent relationship to things; this relationship is transformed in 
modern society to exclusive love of oneself and to self-seeking (amour de 
soi), which intensifies the already existing inequality. Master and slave, poor 
and rich, and inequality are the results. in German idealism, there is a con-
ception of the human as an autocrat, designated as reason, consciousness 
or an ego, requiring no other for its realization. The only way that dialogue 
is possible is that this rationality is the inner conformity of all humanity. 
This is culturally and historically untenable, specifically when Kant desig-
nates this rationality in purely euclidean terms. At any rate, even here, to 
account for the human dialogue, Kant would have to introduce a common 
element, an identity that ranges across the entire humanity. And even he-
gel, the master dialectician, could find no other recourse to yield the grand 
synthesis of subject-subject than an overarching love. in love, he says, the 
singular is still present but no longer as separated; as a singular, the living 
feels the living in love. it could be said that the entire hegelian system, the 
synthesis of the opposites, the divine movement across historical phases 
is based on this unity in love. As Schrey pointed out, hegel’s later logical 
system can only be understood in this context49. 
one could characterize the entire Goethe-period as a search for this 
unity, this “communality” as a criterion of humanity. The community is 
required for the completion of the individual. The individual consciousness 
is inadequate and the individual must be seen as an organic member of a 
greater whole. As Korff points out, totality is impossible in the individual; it 
cannot be the all. Yet, with others it can unite itself into a totality, where all 
can constitute a commonality, wherein the idea of humanity is to be real-
ized50. This led to the notion that their condition of self-realization and all 
culture is the community that has the right to demand universal education, 
indeed to insist that it is the duty to be educated. only with the transition 
through community and its forms can the human achieve a true selfhood, 
real and concrete content of which can only unfold in a concrete activity. 
The natural unity between duty and inclination, law and freedom, and so-
ciety and individual belongs to the beautiful spirit. 
49 Schrey, h. h. (1970). Dialogisches Denken [Dialogical Thinking]. Darmstadt, West Ger-
many: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 8.
50 Korff. (1927). Geist der Goethezeit [“Spirit” during the Time of Goethe] Vol. ii. Leipzig, 
Germany: Verlagsbuchhandlung, p. 332.
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in Romanticism, the same unity is sought through the longing for ful-
fillment in the other, another, who is distant and, as such, unreachable. in the 
dialogue of the romantics, one senses the painful path of earthly unfulfill-
ment. in a personal self-consciousness, one feels here the consciousness of 
the species, allowing for the communicability of the inner self with the oth-
ers. With humboldt, there emerges another dimension, subtending our dia-
logical encounter with the other; it is language51. Language as an objectiva-
tion of thought mediates a unique world view to the speaker, a speaker, who 
is neither the creator of thought nor of language. Language has indefinite-
ness, in process of which we experience only a brief duration of the past and 
a brief expectation from the future, although in its essence it encompasses all 
humanity. The individual experiences the greatest vitality in language to the 
extent that he is an emergence from the entire human kind. This is the field, 
wherein individuality, totality and universality are conjoined. it is only in 
language that the individual confronts the universality of spirit and culture 
and concretizes them to a specific meaning. 
The notion that language is primordial, that it precedes thought and 
reason, is maintained by J. G. hamann52. The word is not merely a designa-
tion of an object, a way of conceiving things, but rather a revelation and a 
veiling. This leads to the claim that the essence of dialogue must not only 
include language, but also history. Revelation and veiling are historical cat-
egories, and history, at the same time, makes possible human linguisticality. 
This linguisticality is the first move to the concrete dialogical dimension, to 
the historical actors engaged in time. This development is further enhanced 
by herder, who locates language between the extremes of rationalism, ex-
pounded by Leibniz, and the irrationalism of hamann53. Language is not 
just the highest achievement of the analytical power of thought (Leibniz), 
nor completely remote from understanding; rather, it is the basic power of 
human spirit. Thus, language is a product of immediate sense-experience 
as well as the work of reflection. Language is a means, through which the 
sensed world is transformed into a world of perception. it becomes, there-
fore, a hermeneutical key to the problem of philosophical anthropology as 
such. it means that language is not only a work, a system, an ergon, but also 
51 Schrey, h. h. (1970). Dialogisches Denken [Dialogical Thinking], p. 10-12.
52 ibid., p. 12-13.
53 ibid., p. 13.
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an activity, energeia, able to constitute a perceptual and experiential world. 
here, the human is no longer defined as a substance, but as an activity. 
Language is, therefore, understandable only if it is traced all the way to the 
spiritual activity, from which it originates, yielding the result that internal 
and external are completely intertwined. The subject-object dichotomy is 
beginning to break down, and this breakdown is required for a true dia-
logical process, where the other is no longer seen as an object or as a third 
person, whose signs we are attempting to decipher, but as a first person 
speaker, whose speech is the very interiority of the speaker directly acces-
sible to anyone. Jacobi took this notion one step further by showing that the 
entities of the world and the experience of such entities are given only on 
the basis of the concrete dialogical process manifest in language54.
Language constituted the bridge between the philosophies of “self-
consciousness”, ranging from Descartes through Kant and even Kierkeg-
aard, to the philosophy of dialogue, where the direct encounter of the other 
through language assumed supremacy. This led to the notion in feuerbach, 
for example, that even the Kantian universal rationality is not recognizable 
without its mediation through the dialogical partner55. A mediation of the 
self through the other is required for the recognition of the identity of rea-
son, or the recognition that a rational thought is not just an idiosyncracy of 
the self, but is rationality valid for all. only this dialogical process can guar-
antee rationality for me as well as for the other. This is another indication 
of the attempts to surpass the philosophy of “i-it” toward the philosophy of 
“i-Thou”. Thus, feuerbach’s thought is positing the dialogical principle as 
its foundation. 
Structure of Dialogical Thought in the Contemporary 
Tradition 
Throughout the traditional search for the dialogical region, we have 
encountered a specific phenomenon that attempted to account for the pos-
sibility of human interaction and human identity among the various singu-
lar differences. Thus, we found sociopolitical life in Aristotle functioning as 
the “medium”, through which encounter may take place, providing a means 
54 Schrey, h. h. (1970). Dialogisches Denken [Dialogical Thinking], p. 14.
55 feuerbach, L. (1966). Principles of the Philosophy of the future (V. Manfred, Trans.). in-
dianapolis, in: Robb & Merrill.
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to dialogue. At the same time, the sociopolitical life is “more” than the sum 
of individuals. This “more” seems to signify something that transcends the 
individual because it is required for (a) our ability to communicate and 
understand one another and (b) our humanity, that is, our very essence as 
humans. This “more” appeared in Augustine, in the form of Caritas, consti-
tuting a dimension that transcended the individuals and their uniqueness 
and constituted a common bond. And it also appeared in rationalism as the 
common reason, transcending individual idiosyncratics, and in Romanti-
cism, in the form of longing, of inadequacy, requiring the fulfillment of 
the self through the unattainable other. And the “more” finally emerged as 
language, which, although a product of the spiritual activity, plays a role in 
the constitution of the very spirituality, of the very activity in dialogical en-
counter. it also appeared very briefly in the notion of history as the “more” 
that is revealed and concealed in language. What is suggested here is that 
the dialogical process must account for the “more” in terms of (a) the first 
person speaker engaged with another first person, (b) language, which no 
two first person speakers engaged in dialogue can exhaust, and (c) history 
and tradition, with their institutions, within which dialogue takes place. 
The notion of the first person speaker may be obvious at first: a hu-
man being speaking to another human being. nevertheless, the positing 
of dialogue as a first principle of all human and world encounter requires a 
reevaluation of the constitution of the first person speaker. To begin with, 
if the first person speaker is, in principle, the foundation of dialogue and 
if dialogue is the basis of all human world encounter (world experience), 
then the first person can never become an object of any specific science, 
regardless of how inclusive the science may be and how well its theories 
may explain the individual in third person terms. Scientific theory, due to 
its assumed objectivity, views the first person in terms of a third person, as 
an object of a theory. Yet, this view requires a first person, who constructs 
the theory and correlates it to a set of selected phenomena. Thus, theoretical 
thought cannot abolish the first person; rather, it presupposes it as a condi-
tion for theoretical thought. This means that the theorizing first person, 
who constructs the theory, is much broader and encompasses more than 
the constructed theory, because the first person can construct other ob-
jectively valid theories. At the same time, although the theory attempts to 
explain human life, human behavior, human capacity to use language, and 
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influences the very object of its explanation. in terms of a dialogical en-
counter of person-to-person engagement, the theory that takes the person 
as an object (a third person) influences, by this very encounter, the investi-
gated person. if language is the meaningful activity that directly transmits 
to the other the sense or the meaning of this activity, then the very structure 
of the linguistically constituted theory changes the “object” of investiga-
tion, that is, the dialogical partner. in this sense, objectivity is not attain-
able. for example, in a psychiatric situation, when the psychiatrist uses a 
particular theory to “explain” the patient, the patient is changed in terms of 
the language of the theory and begins to think of herself/himself as a sum 
of erotic drives, father and mother hang-ups and psychotic syndromes. in 
brief, the dialogical principle, claiming the priority of first person encoun-
ters, does not permit and, indeed, undercuts the notion that the humans 
can be treated as objects or that human encounters can be explained by 
an objective scientific theory. This suggests, moreover, that the first person 
speaker is “more” than any particular theory could encompass. The first 
person, in this sense, is the encompassing background comprising the basis 
of all theories and objectivities. 
This leads us to another notion of the first person speaker, the pri-
mordial communicator. The attempt to explain human communication by 
a constructed theory requires an underlying process, which, in applying 
the theory to phenomena, selects the phenomena from a particular point 
of interest. hence, the correlation of a theory to phenomena is performed 
by the first person communicator, who involves his/her interests in the ap-
plication of the theory. The interests could range from religion to “pure 
objectivity”. nevertheless, a first person interest is always involved. hence, 
the first person communicator, the dialogical being, is always presupposed, 
although not accounted for by the theory or the selected phenomena. in 
this sense, again the first person is “more” than the theoretical explanation 
or the selected phenomena correlated to the explanation. 
The dialogical base, starting from the person-to-person encounter 
in the first person singular, requires a shift in the very concept of what 
a theory is. in the dialogical process, theories cannot be seen to have an 
extra-temporal, extra-mundane stance, capable of indifferently surveying 
their field of explication. in the dialogical process, the theory influences the 
speaking subject, who in turn influences the theory. The theory no longer 
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provides an explanation, but a horizon, a temporal movement of possible 
modalities of articulating the subject matter of discussion. The very hori-
zons are inconstant and change in correlation to the shifting views of the 
subject matter of concern of the dialogical partners. indeed, this dialogical 
process may jell into a semi-permanent theory, yet (a) the speakers and 
their dialogical process will constitute a broader and more encompassing 
background unencompassed by the theory and (b) the very subject mat-
ter of their discussion, for example, the communicative process, will be af-
fected by the theory. 
it must then be maintained that the dialogical process, which, for ex-
ample, attempts to deal with a theory of communication or with a socio-
historical approach to human events at the time that it takes place, cannot 
be an object of any science or any objective description, because it is pre-
cisely this process that primordially deals with any theoretical structure and 
objective phenomena and correlates the structure to the selected phenom-
ena, while itself is not included either in the theory or in the phenomena 
selected. This suggests that neither the theoretical exposition, nor objec-
tive observation can yield this underlying process; although always presup-
posed, the dialogical process seems to be anonymous. 
Although the dialogical process appeared to be broader than any ob-
jective explanation of it, nevertheless, it takes place in a language with its 
own requirements, its own selectivity of events and its own interpretation 
of the world, which cannot be encompassed either by the dialogical part-
ners or by an objective explanation. for example, although dealing with 
language, the dialogical partners cannot make the total language as such 
into an object of their concern, because the language as an object would be 
explicated by a language used by the dialogical partners, and this language 
would be much broader than the one that is being discussed. The language, 
into which we are born, the language that we use to talk about language 
and about communication, seems to be much broader and much more en-
compassing than the particular purposes, for which we employ it. At the 
same time, this broader language already offers a set of interpretations of 
the very dialogical partners and the process of dialogical encounter. it is, as 
heidegger said, the very house of being wherein we exist56. 
56 heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. (Macquarrie & e. Robinson, Trans.). new York: 
harper.
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But what comprises language? Taking language in terms of experience, 
it can be defined as a structuration of consciousness into a world. This is 
to say that the experiencing process and the things of experience are de-
ployed by linguistic articulation, ranging from a direct corporeal gesture to 
the most sophisticated mathematical systems. every experience and every 
experienced thing belong in a world always and already inhabited by lin-
guisticality; and precisely the deployment of things and experiences and the 
articulation of phenomena comprise the kind and the manner of the world 
that we inhabit. in turn, the way that the things are deployed constitutes a 
system of vectors, where one thing, one event, points to others inscribing 
spatio-temporal horizons, wherein the things, events and experiences have 
their loci, relationships and orientations. Linguistic process, in this sense, 
can inhabit anything, from a bodily gesture through spoken and written 
articulations, all the way to the conventional street signs and everyday im-
plements. it also inhabits our institutions with their silent directives, re-
quirements, requests and even imperatives. The laws speak not only from 
the mouths of judges, but also from institutionalized symbols, such as po-
lice, and from musty volumes stuffed in some forgotten corner of a library. 
And each of these institutions, although deploying the parameters of our 
actions and the modalities of our dialogue, in the silence of its linguistical-
ity, implicates other institutions and, as heidegger would have it, gathers 
them and reveals their silent speaking. Language, in this broad sense, is 
Logos, a power, and reveals not only things, events and their interrelation-
ships, but also us, the communicators. in speaking, the Logos erects a world, 
establishes a context and lends our dialogical process an intimacy through 
vast distances. The implement we employ, made by someone, communi-
cates to us the other’s presence, the one, who designed, the one, who made, 
and the one, who transported this implement to us, are all gathered in the 
implement, and the implement transmits the presence of the others. The 
shape of the handle of a hammer, carved and polished by the hand of the 
other, points to, indicates and speaks of the other, creating a silent dialogi-
cal process. And the hammer, in turn, is not just an object; as to a board 
and the board to a wall and the wall to a house and the house to a family, 
a town or a region that one inhabits. in its deployment of the world, the 
hammer gathers it and signifies it. This hammer already radiates various 
possibilities and uses and, thus, constitutes an entire communicative sys-
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tem, a communicative world of dialogue. As Theunissen once suggested, 
the very world of objects, events, things and characteristics is the dialogical 
medium, the communicative carrier57. This medium, therefore, performs 
two essential functions: on the one hand, it presents the others even in their 
absence and it institutes a dialogical connection; on the other hand, it erects 
a world of interconnections that open a region of spatio-temporal deploy-
ment of things and their continuous horizons. Were we to explicate the 
meaning of language as Logos, we would be well advised to look toward 
the communicative capacity, that is, the dialogical process of art. The work 
of art cannot be taken out of its context, cannot hang on walls for courses 
in art appreciation, cannot primarily become a property, a monetary value 
like so much coal, potatoes, lumber, or what have you. The art-work as a 
Logos belongs in a region that the work itself opens up. Let us take a pair 
of shoes by Van Gogh. indeed, the shoes are seen as being made of certain 
material and having a certain form and, thus, serviceability. Yet, it is also a 
gathered world that the shoes reveal. A peasant world of a maid, who wears 
these shoes, is inextricably intertwined. The shoes signify the world of the 
maid, as she plods tenaciously through the autumn furloughs of the field, 
raw wind at her face. To her shoes clings the rich damp loam, and beneath 
her feet she experiences the loneliness of the solitary evening path. in those 
shoes, she senses the silent call of the earth, whether in its abundant giv-
ing of grain or in its withholding in the bareness of winter. in these shoes 
speak the worry over her daily bread, the wordless triumph over need, the 
gladness at the announcement of birth and the silent tremble at the shadow 
of death. The shoes as Logos gather the world of the farm-maid and reveal 
the very concrete essence of a unique life. To make this perhaps more vivid, 
let us select some art-work that is not “representational”, such as a Greek 
temple. A temple represents nothing, as compared to what a picture might 
be said to do. The temple rather represents itself, it is present. But in this 
presence, the deity is also present and the region of holiness of sanctioning 
is opened up. And in it, the destiny of the human is shaped, whether it be 
birth or death, victory or defeat, or curse or blessing. And on account of 
the temple, the strength of the rock, on which the temple rests, appears for 
the first time with its strength, with its endurance; and so also the storm’s 
57 Theunissen, M. (1984). The other: Studies in the Social ontology of husserl, heidegger, 
Sartre, and Buber. (c. Macann, Trans.). cambridge, MA: MiT Press.
102
The Science of communicaTion 
violence is withstood by the temple. And the sheen of the marble, polished 
to perfection, comes to be manifest in the temple, as it reflects the rays of 
the sun and the shadows of the evening, where light and shadow, sun-ray 
and crevice communicate and point one to the other. The temple gathers all, 
gods and mortals, the ways of living and dying, the ethos of a people and the 
desperation of sinning against the gods. As Logos, the art-work gathers and 
deploys the world; it speaks to all who are of the world. 
At the same time, this art-work, this world that speaks, even in its noc-
turnal silence, is a product. it is erected, established by the human hand 
and human effort. hence, the Logos as an artwork, as a communicative de-
ployment and gathering of a world, also reveals the presence of the other, 
the dialogical partner, whoever he/she might have been, across temporal 
distances, bridging abysses of death, of generations and of centuries. We 
find the other, the dialogical partner, present in the visage of all artworks, of 
all institutions, from the edicts of gods to the poetic rhythm of a verse. The 
other emerges as a dialogical partner with the very presence of the artwork, 
verse institution, the other, who has instituted some modality of living, 
while himself/herself being instituted by the very world of communicative 
linguisticality. And precisely this instituting process, which, although erect-
ing the world and itself, lends the dynamism to the dialogical encounter. in 
language, and in all other communicative institutions, indeed, in the world, 
it is not the form or the shape that lends dynamism, but the presence of the 
dialogical partner as the shaper, as the establisher that constantly derails 
any attempts to asphyxiate human speaking and human deployment of a 
world in linguistic practice. 
But this linguisticality, this dimension that is identical with the very 
world of human residence, appears to be broader and more expansive, 
and the “more” in our experience that seems to be inexhaustible, to be the 
very dimension that dominates the dialogical partners and the dialogical 
encounter. it would seem that the dialogical partners and the anonymous 
background of all theoretical and mundane experience are merely brief 
moments in the process of world-linguisticality, of a world of communi-
cative interactions among all events and humans. These partners seem to 
be encompassed rather than encompassing. it seems that this linguistically 
deployed world, transmitted through traditions and institutions, can never 
be surveyed by any singular speaker, without this speaker becoming sub-
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merged and transformed along the lines required by the institutionalized 
linguisticality as the world of human habitat. indeed, the very notion of a 
dialogue, even if it were to happen “face to face”, would be derailed, trans-
formed along the institutionalized, that is, the pre-given communicative 
world that escapes our control. it would seem that the communicative, the 
dialogical partners are lost and all that is left is the overpowering world 
of linguisticality. A resolution between these two all-encompassing dimen-
sions (the anonymous first persons and the world linguisticality) must be 
found. And it is found, it seems to us, in the following way. 
Although the linguistic world, deployed across institutions and inter-
relationships, may seem to be independent of the first person speakers, it is, 
nevertheless, constantly founded by them. The relationship of the first per-
son speakers and language, the logos, can be explicated as follows. To main-
tain the dialogical base, it is essential that neither the individual dialogical 
partners, nor the linguistic process be given supremacy. in brief, in the or-
ganismic linguisticality, the individual should not be lost, but at the same 
time the individuals should not have such an extreme priority, where their 
relationships would be merely external. The dialogical process constitutes a 
commonality based on immanent relationships of independent personali-
ties. This commonality is actualized in dialogue, where the consciousness 
of the dialogical partners is deployed toward the world. And this deploy-
ment constitutes a founded unity. A founded unity consists of parts that 
cannot be one without the others. This unity must be distinguished from 
the unity of pervasion, where dependent parts are founded one in the other 
(tone quality and intensity in music) and deal with a unity, where inde-
pendent parts found a new content, for example, individual notes or tones 
build a melody. This is also valid for the linguisticality of the world, where 
the individual dialogical partners found a higher unity and, in turn, are 
founded by it as dialogical partners. This founded-founding relationship 
is such that the seemingly independent linguisticality, the logos, is a poly-
centrically articulated whole, a total movement. hence, the linguistic world 
is not some supra-consciousness, but is constituted in the dialogical process 
that is poly-centrically articulated. in this sense, the individual never leaves 
the dialogical region, because all of his/her linguisticality already means a 
communication with someone, somewhere and sometime58.
58 husserl, e. Gemeingeist i. A V 24 - A Viii 31.
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phenomenological principles of Dialogue 
The question of dialogue and its communicative function has been dis-
cussed by various phenomenologists, among whom the most notable are 
S. Strasser, h. Schrey, c. A. Va Peursen, B. Waldenfels and e. Minkowski. 
using their works and those of the major phenomenologists, such as hus-
serl and Merleau-Ponty, it is possible to extricate the following principles 
governing the experience of dialogue: 
1. The upper limit of dialogue would be transgressed, when a common 
core of meaning of a state of affairs or of things would be interpreted as a 
property of an inexpressible state of a subject capable of constituting mean-
ing that is completely private. in this case, the origin of meaning would 
be a subject, capable of understanding the other only in terms of its own 
private meaning, but never the meaning of the other. The understanding of 
what the other communicates would be always mediated through a grid of 
subjective meanings and states, precluding the possibility of direct compre-
hension of the other. 
2. The lowest limit of dialogue would be surpassed if the communica-
tive process were interpreted in terms of causality subtended by a funda-
mental assumption that communication occurs when certain physical, psy-
chological or physiological registers are disturbed. it is a thesis that is based 
on the concepts of the constancy hypothesis and of the stimulus-response 
syndrome. The constancy hypothesis claims that given certain external 
causal situations, that situation must elicit one response. Stated in causal 
terms, given a specific cause, one, and only one, specific effect will follow. 
The same can be maintained for the stimulus-response syndrome. Given a 
stimulus of a particular kind, a particular type of response is to be expected. 
But in this interpretation of the communicative process, the dialogical part-
ners are reduced to a system of natural signs, where one phenomenon can 
manifest only a specific other phenomenon: smoke is a sign of fire – a causal 
relationship. each sign is closed in its function within the causal range of 
possibilities. Yet, as we noted, the meaning-giving function and the expe-
rienced object are at variance with the natural-causal process, even when 
such a process is employed as a means of communicative transmission. 
When we listen, we do not react to the momentary sound-impressions in a 
one-to-one correlation, but to the meaning of the total sentence, paragraph, 
story or even a treatise. Moreover, each causal carrier is capable of con-
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taining an aura of meanings, among which we constantly select the proper 
ones in terms of their function in the total sense-making process. Another 
lower limit interpretation that would hinder the communicative process is 
the common dualism between the external and the internal states, between 
mind and body, where the body is a sign of internal or mental processes. 
At best, the relationship here is external and there is no guarantee that the 
visible signs correctly indicate the invisible mental states. Phenomenology 
suggests that in signifying, the subject is involved as a whole process. every 
intention is completely intertwined with every function of our being. it is 
not the case that we are angry about something with one part, while the rest 
of our functions remain passive; our entire being is angry and the anger 
is present in and through our gestures. While looking at an angry person, 
we do not decipher signs and then infer that the person has a psychic state 
called anger that he attempts to express externally. We see anger directly. 
The first pounding the table is not a sign of anger; it is anger present to di-
rect experience. What we directly experience is what is being communicat-
ed and not the sign. Sign is only a means, and to deal with a system of signs 
is not to deal with communication, but with the means of communication. 
3. even if the upper and lower limits of dialogue are not transgressed 
and a common-public world is assumed, the dialogical process would be 
disrupted if the events and objects in the common world possessed differ-
ent meanings to the dialogical partners. only an engagement in an identical 
signification, a recognizable core, that is, an experience of an identically 
meant object or event, guarantees the continuity of the dialogical process 
across the variances of the states of objectivity and subjectivity, external and 
internal. The meaning dimension in the dialogical process is fundamental. 
Meanings point to an essential core as an identifiable object and constitute 
the “repeatable”, the “atemporal’’ aspect that remains constant throughout 
the changes of objective events and subjective states. it is the common factor, 
the enduring experiential component, constituting the bonds of a dialogue. 
Although we may have an object in our common world, communication is 
possible if the object is meant in an identical way. While discussing a tree, 
an artist may mean it as an object of beauty, a businessman may signify it 
as so many feet of running board, and a botanist may see it as an example 
of a rare species. how the object is meant, intended, and the sharing of 
the meaning is presupposed by communication, by the dialogical process. 
106
The Science of communicaTion 
Although being distinct from, yet always related to the natural events, the 
significative dimension in dialogue constitutes a common historical matrix 
accessible to all dialogical partners. 
in this context, the term signification means a process that designates 
something other than itself, such that the designated meaning of the object 
or the thing meant is disassociable from the meant object or event. for 
example, an experiential act of judging means, signifies the object judged, 
but the meaning of the judgment (a) specifies the manner, in which the 
object is experienced, and (b) is applicable to other objects and events. The 
artist means the tree as an aesthetic object, but the meaning of aesthetic 
is not exhausted by the tree; it can also mean a sunset or a stormy sea. in 
brief, signification specifies the meaning of the given object and at the same 
time is detached, that is, not identical with the given object; it can apply to 
other objects as well. The “same things” are signified differently, and dif-
ferent things may be signified by an identical meaning. Yet, the significa-
tion is what constitutes the dialogical domain and allows communicability. 
The same or different things constitute a perceptual exemplification of the 
meaning that is being communicated. hence, the aim at a common object 
and event in the process of communication presupposes a common core 
of meaning of that something. if one person sees and signifies a table as a 
“dancing space” for his Spanish dancer, whereas another signifies it as an 
expensive antique, the divergence in meaning may lead to “bad blood”. 
Within the aforementioned context, we must avoid the theoreti-
cal positions that would lead to the reduction of the dialogical domain to 
an objective sum of things or to a set of psychosomatic states, closed in a 
monological isolation. Because the dialogical process embodies experience 
and because phenomenology contends that the only world we have is the 
experienced one, then the dialogical process must be seen as encompassing 
both objectivity and subjectivity. The dialogical process is the locus for the 
constitution of all commonality, where various significations are accepted, 
rejected, modified, abstracted or concretized in direct human speaking59.
The commonality is constituted on the basis of the co-presence of the 
dialogical partners, where the individual is constantly de-centered from 
his/her own modes of perception and experience not by his/her own self-
59 Waldenfels, B. (1971). Zwischenreich des Dialogs [The in-between Region of Dialogue], 
p. 224. 
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projection, wishes or desires, but by another individual engaged in a dia-
logue. it could be argued that without dialogue our views and experiences 
would be locked within a narrow range. We discover our own limits only 
when our views are contested in a dialogical encounter. The dialogical part-
ner decenters us from our own egocentricity and opens us up to experienc-
es that not only contest our own, but also expand our horizons. This pro-
cess is prior to any reflective self-reference of the individual to itself. in the 
dialogical domain, we are always oriented toward the other and the field of 
objectivity. The others are inescapably there, and we find ourselves in a dia-
logical domain that is oriented “poly-centrically”, or by various individuals. 
The others are always co-present and co-engaged in a way that neither the 
self, nor the others are constituted one through the other’s internal projec-
tions or inner representations, but rather emerge in a dialogue structured 
poly-centrically. each self constitutes a unique addition, a specific point of 
reference to a common field of significations, implicating the meanings of 
objects and subjective states. 
The “Essential” Structure of Dialogue 
A basic understanding of the dialogical domain requires an extrication 
of its “pure” structure in the sense that all dialogical processes presuppose 
such a structure. The following components comprise the “pure” structure: 
1. A significative orientation of the subject to a state of affairs, events 
or things, that is, an orientation, which, as an activity, “means” something 
other than itself in a specific way. 
2. By signifying, by meaning the states of affairs, things and events, the 
subject orients himself/herself to the other subject, who is not an object in 
the field, but someone, who is being addressed about something. 
3. By addressing the other, the subject orients the other to the meant 
state of affairs and also to himself/herself as the initiator of the address. 
4. By orienting himself/herself to the other, the subject is oriented in 
turn to himself/herself and recognizes his/her own uniqueness and contri-
bution to the dialogue. 
in short, i turn myself to someone for the sake of something, speak to 
the other about something and work with the other on something. This es-
sential structure remains constant across various interpretations and must 
be maintained if the dialogical domain is to remain dialogical. 
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The uniqueness of the dialogical relationship lies in that it abolishes 
the binary relationship of the self and the world or the self and other as an 
object in a field of perceptions, purposes, aims and reactions. The other self 
in a dialogue is also decentered toward the world in terms of the mean-
ing given to objects and events by the dialogical partner. The question of 
intersubjectivity here is quite different from the traditional question con-
cerning our relationship to and knowledge of the other. in the dialogical 
context, the other is experienced not as an object, given to the subject to be 
deciphered, but as a dialogical partner, engaged in a signification of things 
and events, as a process oriented toward the world and is understandable 
in terms of the intentional directions and the manner, in which these direc-
tions “mean” the things and events of the world. The subjects come to rec-
ognize their own positions, similarities and differences only in relationship 
to the signified events and objects and in relationship to each other. 
The other, the “alter ego”, assumes a particular position in the dialogue; 
speaking spatially, it has a locus not facing someone or being an all-encom-
passing process that either attempts to decipher the external signs of the 
other or projects a meaning onto such signs, but is “next to the dialogical 
partner”. originally present, the other is not yet seen either as an object of 
specific intentional orientations or a subject with his/her own orientations, 
but as a co-presence in all orientations and intentionalities in the dialogical 
domain. it is not the other, who is thematic, but what the other says, speaks 
about, acts upon and perceives and, thus, is present in all such activities. As 
husserl pointed out, “it is not the other that is thematic but what the other 
says when i am in a position to understand and incorporate what he says. 
The co-presence of the other is for me a co-presence and we are at some-
thing in a unity of function”60.
The acts of turning toward the other cannot be the same as those of 
dealing with the objects and events. The object motivates the self in terms of 
its significance. one does something with it, without its taking any initiative 
to the actor, the speaker. The relationship to an object is not a cooperation, 
a co-intentionality and co-orientation. if an object were to become such, it 
would be a fetish. The other is an addressee of the subject’s comportment, 
a receiver or a lender of signification of something. The mode of turning to 
60 Waldenfels, B. (1971). Zwischenreich des Dialogs [The in-between Region of Dialogue], 
p. 136, note 3.
109
Chapter IV. The Dialogical Domain
the other is one of addressing, contesting and evoking. As Waldenfels sug-
gested, the vocative sense comes here to the fore. The encounter of the other 
in a dialogue is not a confrontation between two subjectivities attempting 
to read external signs produced by each in order to decipher what the other 
is communicating, but a primordial presence before any reading of signs, 
a presence found in the very events and objects signified by the dialogical 
process. This can be exemplified by a dialogue in which the participants as-
sume an interrogative mood61. 
Keeping in mind the triadic dialogical structure, it is possible to ana-
lyze the dialogical domain as speaking and counter-speaking where one 
dissolves the other and incorporates it. Although the initiative may shift 
from one speaker to the other, lending one or the other a more pronounced 
active role, there is no sharp distinction between activity and passivity. 
Speaking and listening and speaking and answering are one event with var-
ious phases. A question and answer are unified in a contrary double move-
ment, a movement initiated by the questioner and reaching its aim in the 
counter-movement of a reception of an answer and a counter-movement 
coming from the listener fulfilling itself in the communication of an an-
swer. The movement and counter-movement are delimited from the very 
inception by the dialogical aim involving the partners. When one addresses 
the other about something, he/she assumes an active initiation; but what 
does it mean here to say “active”? While addressing someone or while ask-
ing a question “actively”, one is already “passively” expecting an answer that 
fulfills the question and at the same time contains an aura of possibilities of 
accepting, rejecting or correcting the answer and indeed of rephrasing the 
question. All this is contained in the dialogical region at the outset. The ac-
tivity and passivity are completely intertwined in this domain, where every 
initiation is already an expectation and every expectation has a co-presence 
of re-initiation. The speaker gives to the listener something to understand, 
the signified state of affairs, allowing him/her to hear, to immerse him/her-
self in the question and, while becoming a co-listener, to lend the initiative 
to the other in order to hear, accept, reject or re-ask. The very receptivity 
of the answer to the question fulfills the question and is constitutive of it. 
Question and answer, activity and passivity, are constantly shifting and in-
61 Waldenfels, B. (1971). Zwischenreich des Dialogs [The in-between Region of Dialogue], 
p. 143.
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tertwine aspects of one dialogical process, where both speakers are simulta-
neously active and passive62. 
The same requirements are present in the process of listening to a 
question. The passivity of listening is not a precursory step for a subsequent 
activity of responding, but is already an initiation. When the other opens 
a dialogue, the recipient is already participating; his/her eagerness or abil-
ity to accept the address enhances or hinders the inception. in receptiv-
ity, he/she already knows to be propelled toward an expected answer or a 
response, toward a co-presence of a field of events and objects, containing 
future possibilities, wherein the answer is accepted, rejected, understood 
or questioned. hence, he/she is already participating in the dialogical do-
main of open vectors of signification and resignification. While passively 
listening to a question and formulating an answer, the just asked question 
continues to be co-present in the formulation of the answer and the ac-
ceptance or rejection of the answer is already traced in the initial question 
and the passive formulation of the answer. While listening and at the same 
time formulating an answer, the listener intermixes passivity and activity in 
such a way that they constitute one process involving the addresser and the 
field of events and objects. Although such a process has analytical-logical 
distinctions, such distinctions do not imply the separation of functions. 
Actively asking and passively expecting an answer, passively listening and 
actively formulating an answer at the same time, are one process that, in 
each of its phases, concentrates and implies all other possible phases. The 
concept of concentration is analogous to our previously discussed phases 
of perception. The meaning of one perspective is a phase of all perspectives 
and contains them in a concentrated form by implying all of them. 
it should be stressed that the dialogical process does not create the 
commonality of signification of events, but unfolds it. This requirement is 
necessary to avoid reductionism of signification and of meaning, to some 
personal or interpersonal process. A mutual engagement in dialogue al-
ready assumes the meant objects and events and the possibility of signify-
ing them in various ways. What this suggests is that signification is not a 
subjective process or a process of an agreement among various subjects. 
it is always world-oriented, and in meaning the things and events of the 
62 husserl, e. (1966). Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis [Analysis of Passive Synthesis], sec-
tion 15.
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world, it itself becomes meaningful and signifying. This world-orientation 
is a condition for a dialogue. 
in dialogue, there is presupposed an “identical meaning” that can be 
experienced by the dialogical partners. it is a “unitary core” that is the theme 
of the dialogue and through which the things and events of the world are 
present to the speaker and the listener. The unitary core is present through 
the various modifications of addressing, listening, formulating, rejecting, 
accepting and understanding. This core of meaning lends stability and con-
tinuity to the various co-present phases of the dialogical process. Although 
the factual objects and events are intended in the dialogue, what is ulti-
mately given in the dialogical process is the manner, in which the objects 
and events are meant and their meaning unfolded. The dialogical partners 
assume what each means and realize the meaning in perception and corpo-
real behavior, each in accordance with his/her capacities, perceptual habits 
and open possibilities. 
it is to be noted that this is the juncture, in which the factual-perceptu-
al and significative motivations intersect. The significative process is always 
oriented toward perceptual and factual exemplification or “filling”, suggest-
ing further possibilities of meaning and, hence, constituting the extension 
of the dialogical domain. Thus, the factual events and objects of the world 
are always intertwined in the dialogical process of sharing of meaning. As 
we shall subsequently see, this intertwining allows the extension of the dia-
logical process across historical periods and dialogical partners, who are 
not corporeally presents63. 
Temporalization and Unity of the Dialogical Domain 
husserl suggested that the dialogical unity of the communicating 
members is pre-given in human experience. in mutual understanding, my 
experiences and acquisitions encounter those of the other as components of 
my own series within my experiential life. Yet, such a unity requires the role 
of temporality. Question and answer and speaking and response appear 
not only in relationship to the signified states of affairs, but also within a 
temporal interrelationship occurring passively in a common process. While 
signifying the states of affairs in one’s speaking at the present, one means 
63 husserl, e. Gemeingeist i.
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them precisely as the listener receives them. The present speaking is none-
theless but one phase in the dialogical process comprised of a continuation 
of someone’s address, initiation and inception and of someone’s response. 
in speaking, we have the co-presence of previous moments and phases to 
come; this constitutes a field of significative interconnections relating the 
states of affairs as well as the activities of the speakers. This process ex-
pands into a common temporal field with its indeterminate-determinable 
horizons. This is not to say that one enters a field of experience of the other 
as a temporal object; nor is it to say that in this temporalization there is 
a constitution of a “we” subject. Rather, in our constitution of the mean-
ing of the states of affairs, there is a constant opening and maintenance of 
temporal horizons comprising a scheme of possibilities for variations of 
meanings, among which our dialogical activity ranges in selectivity, that 
is, acceptance or rejection. The dialogical process and its temporal hori-
zons do not guarantee that the horizon of the dialogical partners cover the 
horizon of the dialogical partners cover one another point for point, pos-
sibility for possibility and meaning for meaning. There is a partial covering 
that leaves room for continuation and unification of understanding; yet, 
the dialogical process is also exposed to disruptions and fragmentations. 
for example, an unnoticed possibility from a temporal horizon may en-
ter the field of dialogue and change the meanings constituting the current 
phases of discourse. Thus, unification means, for dialogical and experiential 
life, that in the changes of opinions, articulations, and modes of appearance 
through the temporal phases there emerges a core of meaning. The core 
of meaning allows for partial covering of the implications experienced by 
the dialogical partners, leading at the same time to a partial fulfillment of 
meanings in perceptual life. This is to say, the perceptual fulfillment of the 
meanings emergent in the dialogue consists of either imagined objectivi-
ties or objectivities that had been experienced before. Because the dialogi-
cal partners had experienced such objectivities in different contexts, their 
perceptual filling of what is discussed in dialogue can never be completely 
identical for the dialogical partners. Although the kind of required filling 
from past experience, from recollection, is suggested by the dialogical part-
ner in a schematic way, each individual brings his/her own experiences to 
lend a concrete factual or perceptual filling for the schematized suggestions. 
Such suggestions could, of course, extend to a direct experience of enti-
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ties. hence, it could be said that although the activities dealing with the 
continuous unification of a common core of meaning comprise a unified 
relationship between the dialogical partners and poly-centrically articu-
lated movement, the phases within that movement intersect and mutually 
change, leading to a partial covering of meaning and schematized percep-
tual implications. This process is precisely the temporality of the dialogical 
domain. The temporality reveals, in turn, a passive aspect of “transitional 
experiences”, consisting of “background” intentionalities and silent impli-
cations that play at the fringes, at the surface and in the depth of dialogue. 
They constitute a context of expanded and encompassing common con-
sciousness, which seems to lack any temporal direction. on the fringes of 
the temporal structuration of the poly-centric field, there appears, as hus-
serl said, a “supra-personal” consciousness64.
The “supra-personal” consciousness is not some over-reaching entity, 
but emerges in the dialogical process and is sedimented in the individual 
experiences. This consciousness could be exemplified in the following way: 
in order to maintain the unity and continuity of the dialogical domain, it is 
in principle impossible to begin with an organismic society or with a radi-
cal egology. in organismic society, the individual is completely subsumed 
under the social system, whereas in egological conception the relationships 
are external and at best are either objective or subjective. only in the dia-
logical domain do we encounter a locus of commonality emerging from an 
immanence of the dialogical domain as a relationship between independ-
ent personalities. This commonality is actualized in communication, where 
we confront a common core of meaning of objects and states of affairs. The 
emergent meaning is a “higher unity”, a founded whole. A founded whole 
consists of parts that cannot be one without the other. here, we must dis-
tinguish between a unity of pervasion, where dependent parts are founded 
one in the other (tone quality and intensity), and where independent parts 
found a new content, for example, the tones build a melody. The latter is 
valid for the dialogical domain making up a “supra-consciousness”. using 
the metaphor of melody and individual notes, we can express this relation-
ship in the following manner: the notes are required as individual contribu-
tions to found the melody; yet, once the melody emerges from the notes, 
it in turn founds the notes as notes of a melody and lends them a function 
64 husserl, e. Gemeingeist i, A Viii 31.
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and meaning in the whole. in this sense, the melody founds the individual 
notes. Yet, it is no longer identical with such notes, because the notes can 
vary to a degree without changing the essence of the melody. This is not to 
say that the notes will not institute interesting variations of the melody; in-
deed, each variation will be a novel contribution; hence, the individual note 
is crucial for the continuity and, yet, variation of the melody. each individ-
ual note adds horizons of implications and suggestions within the melody, 
horizons that could be pursued and explored. This explorability, in rela-
tionship to other notes, comprises more than the individual notes would 
warrant; they establish a founded whole and, in turn, become founded by it. 
This metaphor is applicable to the dialogical domain. in the process of 
signifying, the individuals found a unity, a core of shared meaning, a mean-
ing that has a horizon of implications and a marginal region of options 
not explored by the individual contributors. it is more than the current 
possession of the individuals. hence, it binds the individuals as dialogical 
partners and engages them in the whole process of meaning unification. At 
the same time, the unique individual opinions, articulations, positions and 
sedimented experiences add a novelty, a shift to the dialogical domain and 
implicate unnoticed variations and horizons. Thus, the complex formation 
of significations and meaning, emerging in the dialogical process, includes 
and requires the dialogical partners and their mutual participation. The sig-
nifications of the one are immediately significations of the other, compris-
ing for the partners a complex dialogical domain that can be sedimented in 
them or institutionalized in language, art, corporeal habits, religion, moral-
ity, etc. here, the individual, without the loss of individuality, can become 
a carrier and transmittor of a tradition or institution without the loss of the 
ability to add to the “supra-consciousness” a unique meaning, which hori-
zon of implications may change the tradition and institutions. 
The domain of the dialogue and the melody constituted by the indi-
vidual signifiers allow the individual to assume an encompassing role, con-
sisting of an extension of experiences borrowed from others, an encom-
passment that can shift from one dialogical partner to others, to all possible 
partners, who, in their turn, can extend their dialogical domain toward 
greater encompassment. This implies that in one’s experiences and sensibil-
ities, one discovers the presence and intermingling of the experiences and 
sensibilities of the others, not merely those, who are actually present, but of 
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generations past and generations to come. As Waldenfels suggested, each 
individual has his own sensibilities, apperceptions and enduring unities of 
meaning, whereas the communicating community (the poly-centered field) 
has in its own right a sensibility, a continuous apperception and a correla-
tive world with indeterminate horizons. i see and hear not only with my 
senses, but also with those of others and the others with mine. And this is 
not merely an objective proposition, but a fact of consciousness for me and 
for all who are effective in my own activities and even in the sphere of my 
passivity. hence, each can orient himself/herself not only to his/her own, 
but also to “our” sense experience65. 
The founded dialogical domain serves all as an index of manifold 
meanings and possible perceptual appearances of objects and states of af-
fairs. What is experienced in communication by the one at the present is 
seen as having been experienced or just about to be experienced by the 
other and conversely. in this mutual transition of experiences, one’s own 
reality is grasped as the realization of the meant objects of the other and 
the perceived reality of the other as the fulfillment of one’s own intended 
meaning. Thus, prior to any expressed understanding, there is already a 
pre-given unity in the dialogical domain, occurring silently and unnoticed. 
What is present to others is also present to one in the process of distin-
guishing one’s own perspective from that of the others, where one borrows 
the vision or perception of the others to see the same thing “from there” 
and “from then”. Such sensibilities include the entire historical and insti-
tutional framework, entire traditions that comprise the “supra-individual 
consciousness”. it is, nevertheless, constantly maintained through, and by, 
the individual participants, who carry and orient the entire history and a 
tradition as a poly-centric dialogical domain. 
The founded dialogical domain serves all individuals as an index of the 
manifold ways of signifying objects and events and the possible ways in the 
communicative process seen by one. it is seen as having been experienced 
or just about to be experienced by another and conversely. in this transition, 
one experiences one’s own perceptions as the realization and fulfillment of 
the ways that the other means objects and events and the perceptions of 
the other as one’s own intended meaning and its correlation to objects and 
65 Waldenfels, B. (1971). Zwischenreich des Dialogs [The in-between Region of Dialogue], 
p. 162.
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events. Thus, prior to any explicit understanding, there is already a pre-
given unity in the dialogical domain, occurring silently and unnoticeably. 
What is present to one is also present to the others in the process of distin-
guishing one’s own perspective from that of others in terms of the meaning 
unit related to an object or event. The others provide points of reference, 
with perspectives both spatial and temporal, which are not mine and, yet, 
which i assume and include in the continuity of my perspectives and per-
ceptual possibilities. The senses of the others are co-continuous with mine 
and provide me with an extended perceptibility. 
These ways are institutionalizable, for example in education. During 
the process of education, one is engaged not only with one’s teachers, but 
also with the great figures of the past sedimented in books. The reader as-
sumes the meanings and perceptions of the past figures and then argues, 
agrees, disagrees or rejects their views. human institutions, in this sense, 
are not a sum of empirical facts, but a system of interrelated meanings that 
signify the world in diverse ways and from various perspectives. This sug-
gests that meaning is not necessarily embodied in the human subject, but 
can be carried by various means, such as books, buildings, street arrange-
ments, art works, rituals, etc. in this sense, the sociocultural and historical 
world, in which the human dwells, is a world of communication, a world 
comprised of significative interconnections. empirical objects and events 
in this world play a role of signs pointing to other signs and ultimately to 
the entire sociocultural system of meanings indicating the manners, in 
which objects and events are to be experienced. Thus, this world is basically 
a process of communication, and our engagement in it is basically a dialogi-
cal process. While being in dialogue with others, we are at the same time in 
a dialogue with the sociocultural and historical world embodied in institu-
tions that carry the experiences, conceptions, sensibilities and ultimately 
the significations of the anonymous dialogical partners. 
While noting the function of the “supra-consciousness” and the insti-
tutions, it is essential to note another dialogical aspect, in which the indi-
vidual appears as the “other” in the communicative process. in dialogue, the 
other appears other by revealing perceptions, ideas and meanings that i had 
never thought of, perceived or meant. The other can reveal a difference to 
me and in this difference can reveal my own individuality, my own unique 
position and sense limitation. The other may reveal ways of understand-
117
Chapter IV. The Dialogical Domain
ing that are surprising, irritating, puzzling, disturbing and even delightful. 
At the same time, the other can assert his/her difference by contesting my 
perceptions of the other’s meaning, thus, exposing me to my own failures66. 
in this contestation, the other creates a distance and opens an inter-
val between our understanding of each other without breaking the dia-
logical process. here, negativity appears: “i don’t understand, i don’t see; 
am i wrong?” The partners have a power of withdrawal into separation. 
The other can always emerge beyond what i have thought of him/her to 
contest my understanding, and, in turn, i can withdraw behind my own 
perceptions and meanings, compare them with the other’s perceptions and 
meanings, contest myself in terms of the other and contest the other. in this 
dialogical process, the other does not evoke unity with me, but a difference; 
it is a summons to be at my limit and to mark the difference between us and 
others. The presence of the other disturbs my own unity and authority and 
the sense of things. This suggests that our dialogue is not only indicative or 
interrogative, but it is also imperative, appellative and evocative. Whether i 
submit or not, a demand is placed on me. even if i remain indifferent, my 
indifference is in the face of a call that i resist or refuse you.
The emergence of the difference in the dialogical encounter is found-
ed on the concrete uninterchangeability of positions. The encounter is the 
primordial way that marks out my own position in a concrete situation. 
i am here facing the other, who is there and who indeed can become re-
mote from me and his own position; a possibility of continuous absence. 
Yet, the other defined my position. Still, another way that the individual 
appears as different from the dialogical partners lies in the disruption of 
dialogue. While speaking, we are constantly engaged in the world that our 
speaking articulates; and while hearing or listening i am engaged in the 
articulations of the other; yet, when the dialogue breaks, the individuals 
are thrown back upon themselves and recognize their differences. it is 
analogous to heidegger’s notion of a field of communication and activity, 
in which things and events point to one another. The hammer points to 
the nail, the nail to the board to be nailed, the board to the wall to be built, 
the wall to the house, and so on. The hammer does not appear as an entity 
in space, but as a communicative process in a system of relationships. it 
66 Levinas, e. (1970). Totality and infinity. (A. Lingis, Trans.). evanston, iL: northwestern 
university Press.
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is only when the hammer breaks that it appears in its individuality and 
separation; then the nails and the boards also appear in their separation. in 
the communicative process, the other draws me into a system that places 
demands on me to respond, even if the response is an attempt to escape 
the demand. This dialogical encounter could also be called vocative; in 
its informative process it does not only inform, but also delimits fields of 
experience and divergence of perspectives that can converge or diverge. 
in this sense, the convergence forms a common world, a cosmos, always 
exposed to disruption, contestation and divergence. The cosmos does not 
appear in the sole perceptual experience of data and perspectives, but is 
articulated in a speech that questions, delimits and responds, placing the 
individual speakers at the limits of their contributions for the understand-
ing of the meaning of things and events. 
But the difference of the other needs not appear only in face of the 
other; it can also appear in the institutionally and historically transmitted 
sense; when i read a book or participate in a ritual of different origin than 
mine, i am contested, my views, my understanding is silently challenged, 
and my sense of the order of the cosmos is disrupted and delimited; i am 
thrown back to grasp my own stance. in this sense, the dialogical process 
leads to individuation and the recognition of the individual differences. 
Alone, the individual’s perspective appears all-encompassing; it is only in 
interrogation or contestation that the individual is compelled to recognize 
the individuality of himself/herself and the individuality of the other. The 
dialogical process comprises the two major orientations: the constitution of 
the “supra-consciousness” that lends founded unity in human interaction 
and the achievement of individuation, of limitation, in which the individuals 
attain their experience of their own positions, perspectives and idiosyncratic 
meanings. The two aspects are not separate in the dialogical process; it is a 
continuous unification and separation, affinity and distance. in this sense, 
the dialogical domain is not an absolute encroachment on the individual, 
and the individual is not an absolute sovereign of his views and limitations. 
Concretization of the Dialogical Domain 
The delimitation of the structure of the dialogical domain is a neces-
sary, but an insufficient condition for the understanding of the communica-
tive process. it requires mediation by a specific, concrete linguistic tradition 
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and corporeal expression. A linguistic tradition is an interpretation of the 
dialogical domain in particular terms that limit the domain to a concrete 
historical milieu and corporeal comportment. The latter have their modes 
of activity and passivity, pliability and rigidity, stressing some and exclud-
ing other meanings. The linguistic modalities are, so to speak, ahead of ’ 
the activity and passivity of the dialogical partners. Their pliability, in fact, 
modulates, suggests and pre-figures the receptivities and obstructions in 
our own sensibilities. 
The dialogical process, although retaining the universality of its struc-
ture and meaning, is subsumed under the specificity of a situation, histori-
cal requirements and the expressive abilities of the dialogical partners. The 
word, the concrete linguistic gesture, delimits the pure meanings of the dia-
logical domain in terms of a situation that has its own field requirements. 
This field is constantly shaped and reshaped by the modulation of the voice, 
expanded or contracted by the wave of the hand, the questioning eyebrow 
or the shrug of the shoulders. This leads us to the consideration of the con-
crete gesture, of dialogical process as incarnate and historical. This is not to 
say that the dialogical process is understood here in terms of historicism. 
As we shall subsequently see, phenomenology allows a reflection on his-
tory that places historically transmitted modes of communication in their 
proper limits. historicism must itself be seen as a moment of phenomeno-
logical reflection on history. 
Phenomenological understanding of body, or corporeity, comprises a 
commitment to a situation, to a concrete world of action, an anchorage 
in a milieu, an immersion in an environment, in which language, gesture 
and bodily movements assume concrete meaning. corporeity, as Merleau-
Ponty’s work has shown, is a “being-toward-the-world”; it is a pre-objective 
and pre-subjective experience that can be designated as “practognosis”, 
where the world is experienced as a field of action67. The notion of signify-
ing and the signified assumes here a corporeal base, resulting in a process 
of signification such that although signifying the things and events in the 
field, the corporeal gestures and concrete expressions are, in turn, signified 
by objective terms and events. The function of corporeal processes, the ges-
tures and the linguistic vocalizations efface themselves before the signified, 
the pointed to. Their meaning is not read by observing the body, but by ob-
67 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception, p. 45.
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serving the phenomena, toward which the body is oriented. The meaning 
of the gestures is read from the total context; hence, the corporeal gestures 
reveal the field and their meaning is the field. The function of signifying 
and the signified is so intertwined, that the distinction between what does 
the signifying and what is the signified has not yet emerged. Moreover, the 
terms (the objects and events in the field) signify and point to each other 
by way of location of our bodies. While orienting myself toward a particu-
lar object, i find that the objects surrounding it are also oriented toward it 
and point to it, comprising a setting, in which the object and i assume a 
location. While observing, pointing to the house from this side, i find that 
the tree behind the house points to the other side of the house, and the 
houses surrounding it point to the sides of the house. in brief, the objects 
and events co-constitute a field of significations with my bodily gestures, a 
system of pointers and a mutual communicative system. in this sense, my 
body is never completely extricatable from the field, but is always engaged 
in a concrete communication with it68. 
Language also plays a fundamental role here; yet, it must be under-
stood in the concrete form of a “speaking subject”. it is to be noted that to 
speak with others is not reducible to empirical linguistic process or to con-
scious acts of speech. empiricism and rationalism fail to note that words 
have their sense and that we think and come to understanding in them. 
The terms are not objects of representations, but, deployable by corporeal 
capacities, engaged in an environment, in which language is completely in-
tertwined. Yet, the linguistic world is not an arbitrary process; it requires 
organization. it is not a conglomeration of phonematic, lexical and syntac-
tical forms, among which we may seek out components in an arbitrary way. 
Linguistic structures are part of the perceptual structures. This does not 
mean that linguistic structures are somehow correlated to the perceptual 
structures. in our constant perceptual and corporeal movement toward the 
world, we elicit formations that are not conglomerates of preexisting facts, 
but contexts, in which objects and events are located; language is the process 
of the extrication of the formations in the total environment. The percep-
tual process, in which the field is articulated, is completely involved in the 
language as a field of terms, phrases, statements, articulations and modes of 
behavior. Linguistic fields are not a summation of terms; rather, each term 
68 ibid., p. 60.
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makes sense only in relation to and distinction from other terms. The mean-
ing is not so much in terms as in their differentiation from each other. 
This is analogous to the perceptual experience. The perceived yellow 
is a function of the total chromatic field; among greens, the yellow is dull, 
among blacks, it is bright. homogeneous color is not given to perception. 
hence, every perception, as well as every linguistic term, is contextualized. 
There are no salient, permanent points of “reality” without a context, and 
there are no linguistic terms that do not emerge from the background of the 
entire perceptual and linguistic field. The particular term or phrase consti-
tutes a relief, a formation, a “figure in use”. Because the meaning of a term 
appears only in distinction from other terms, no word is comprehensible 
without the language, in which it is imbedded. 
The close interrelationship between perceptual field and language con-
cretizes the dialogical requirements into a situational and historical process. 
The poly-centrically oriented field is carried linguistically through historical 
development and the linguistic practice differentiates the perceptual fields 
from others through the structuration of linguistic processes employed by 
the others. This is not to say that the field of the current dialogical partners 
will cover those of the past without residua and ambiguities. As already 
noted, even the contemporaneous dialogical partners cannot achieve com-
plete identity of meaning. The terms in a context also imply more meaning 
than the context can exhaust. The term yellow, in a chromatic field, may 
be concretized to carry indefinite implications: bright, dull, rich, cowardly, 
passive, holy, etc. But this, in principle, does not preclude the possibility of 
partial covering with the experiences of others, whether contemporaneous 
or from a different historical time. 
Due to the inextricable interrelationship between the perceptual and 
linguistic fields, the words are not separable from the things and their quali-
ties; the term yellow inheres in the very perceived phenomenon. initially, 
we do not distinguish between the phenomenon and the term, precisely 
because the terms are oriented and signifying; they mean something other 
than themselves. hence, in the concrete dialogical process, the dialogical 
partners are always oriented toward something other than themselves or 
the words that they use. even when a language becomes a theme of dis-
course, the words used to describe language are not given as objects or sub-
jective functions, but as a process or articulation, providing a field for the 
122
The Science of communicaTion 
thematized language. in brief, concrete speaking draws its meaning from 
the perceptual field. 
The perceptual field, in turn, is articulated corporeally. Although being 
a principle of limitation, situatedness and localization, corporeal process 
and gestures transcend the limitations, go beyond the given position. Thus, 
while pointing to something and tracing its path, the gesture tends to say 
more, that is, to extend the movement. While pointing toward the shooting 
star across the horizon, the gesture can extend the path of the shooting star 
beyond our visibility. Yet, there is another way of transcending the situa-
tion; all bodily functions and gestures have a meaning that always leads to 
more meaning. When i signify a bright yellow, the brightness is contextual; 
yet, the yellow suggests other possible contexts, it transcends the limita-
tions of this context at the very time, when it is signified in concrete speak-
ing. This is why body is not just a limitation, but a positive initiation, an 
openness of the field beyond the given situation. Without the situatedness 
and, at the same time, transcendence of the situation, no dialogue could 
be possible, because it would be exhausted by the direct pointing to things 
that would not lead any further. The very meaning of the signified things 
and events reveals the facts and the concrete data and at the same time says 
more than the current data would exhaust; in its generality, it includes other 
things and events, other data already perceived or to be perceived. The mu-
tual implication between facts, data and their meaning allows any gesture to 
signify them and to transcend them in terms of more meanings, which are 
tacitly “waiting” to be articulated. 
corporeal rootedness is what accounts for situations, for concrete en-
gagement in a dialogue, and, at the same time, for transcendence of the 
situations. Although corporeally limited to a perspective, one transcends 
toward all perspectives and all times assumed by others and by things de-
ployed around the perceptual datum or object. corporeal gesture, in this 
sense, is a medium of articulation of the tacit meanings in the field. But 
because no gesture exhausts all meanings, the field of action implies and, in 
fact, solicits other gestures that continue to trace meanings that comprise 
a system of interconnected context. This means that no gesture is closed, 
univocal; each gesture communicates with other gestures, is prolonged and 
transfigured by them and the meanings that it and they explicate. in the ges-
tural communicative process with the world the perceptual field contains 
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more in meaning than the present gesture, makes each gesture ambiguous 
not in the sense that its communication is not understood, but in the sense 
that each gesture promises more and leaves us with the requirement to pur-
sue the dialogue further or at least with an interrogative mood. This leading 
on in the very perceptual field, in every gesture as the movement toward 
the world, allows for their transgression of limitations not toward some-
thing unlimited, but toward other contexts, extension and complication of 
meanings, a depth that always forebodes with more. Yet, in this movement 
toward depth, the signifying gesture is there for all to see and read and to 
trace further in a communicative process. in the process of speaking and 
gesturing toward something, the gesture reveals that something, to which 
the other’s glance is directed and at the same time located, that something 
in the perceptual field containing various significative possibilities and vec-
tors to be traced by the dialogical partners, leading immediately to a more 
in expression and to a beyond of what was just signified.
This process is founded on the notion of corporeity as the locus of 
limitation and transcendence comprising perspectives and temporal locali-
zations. Although corporeally we assume a perspective and a temporal lo-
cation, our gestures constantly break the limits of the spatio-temporal per-
spectives by adding those surrounding the experienced thing and of other 
times, in which the thing was experienced. The breaking of the limits is 
enhanced by direct speaking. Speaking extends and adds pliability to cor-
poreal gestures. in speaking, the gestures assume an extension that they 
themselves are in no position to accomplish. This is not to say that speaking 
is discontinuous with gestures; rather, speaking introduces variations to-
ward spatio-temporal depths of signification that gestures alone could not 
accomplish. Although my gesture, direct corporeal movement of the hand, 
cannot point to the African continent and make it visible in silence, the 
extension of the gesture into the word “Africa” makes the African continent 
present in a linguistic sense. This is not to detract from the contributions of 
the corporeal gesture, because it is the primary force of organization of the 
perceptual field into meaning units in such a way that sensations possess 
a depth instead of being flat and disjointed impressions; in gesture, sensa-
tions are transcended toward their communicative dimension. Sensations 
“speak” of tables, the tables of rooms and rooms of houses; where the sen-
sation of green is a green of a carpet, the carpet announces extension and 
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extension space. This process of communication among sensations that are 
constantly transcended toward the meaning units and the field, in which 
such units function, is traced by the corporeal gesture constituting an ex-
pression of the very sensations and their transcendence toward contextu-
alized things as meaning units. in this sense, corporeity is the basic com-
municative power: corporeity is the power that reveals the meaning of the 
perceptual field and the unified clusters in such a field and the manner, in 
which the clusters point to one another and implicate each other’s presence, 
comprising each for the other a context.
in the communicating process, corporeity must be seen as “intercor-
poreity” in the process of articulating a common field of action and percep-
tion. in this sense, the other is directly decipherable in terms of the gestures 
that he/she performs, gestures that are elicited by the field as a play-space 
of the dialogical partners, wherein the meaning units are deployed and 
their vectors traced before any question of subjectivity or objectivity. This 
is the pre-theoretical domain of direct engagement in tasks, the dialogue 
in handling of things, a praxiological domain, where gestures not only sig-
nify things, but also handle them, balance them, reach them toward the 
other, where speaking is a continuation, a refinement of the handling as the 
fundamental form of communication. This handling, this praxiology, is the 
basic inter-corporeal process.
The inter-corporeal communicative dimension constitutes itself pre-
personally; it is anonymous. A reflection on this anonymity discovers a 
particular cogito, a corporeal sedimentation of concrete experiences that 
are always centered about one’s own corporeity; yet, such a centering is con-
stantly decentered by a field of concrete perceptions and actions that are 
borrowed from others. This “borrowing” is mutual. one’s own corporeity 
possesses a sedimented style taken up and propagated by the corporeity of 
the other in the emergence and intersection of gestures, be such gestures a 
fleeting expression of sadness captured in the upraised brow of the other 
or an entire literary work. The other’s gestures are suggested modalities of 
one’s own ability to be toward the world in a communicative engagement. 
Whereas the corporeal gestures of one’s own body constitute an intercon-
nected system of meaning implications with open horizons, intermingled 
with the corporeal gestures of the other, it comprises a unitary process. 
There are deformations in this process, but they are not divisive. Rather, the 
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deformations are experienced across the receptivity of the other’s corpore-
ity and are signified by various expressive gestures: being surprised, taken 
aback, disappointed, etc., may disrupt the homogeneous process and, yet, 
these expressions make sense within the constant structuration of commu-
nication in the inter-corporeal domain. This inter-corporeal communica-
tive process is a phenomenon that traces itself across two corporeities that 
reveal not only their own interrelationships, but also the phenomenal field, 
to which they are primordially geared. 
history 
history has been understood in various ways: a cyclical process of ad-
vance and decline, a linear process progressing toward perfection, growth, 
establishment of conditions for democracy and freedom and even utopian 
state. We shall not quarrel with any of the conceptions of history. They are at 
base metaphysical. our task is to understand history within experience and 
its communicative process. The establishment of the communicative fields 
through the others, through our poly-centric interrelationships, leads us to 
experience the generations that have gone before us. in this sense, our own 
experience is interlaced with those of the persons, who have gone before us. 
Their experiences are embodied in the language we use, in the writings we 
read, in the institutions we live in and in the rituals we perform. our per-
ceptions and meanings are partially their perceptions and meanings; while 
trying to understand what they said, we also add and subtract from what 
they said, because we cannot cover their horizon point for point as they 
cannot cover ours. our communication is not just a constitution of poly-
centric field, but also of a historical field. 
What should be obvious is that the historical field is not a repetition 
or progression. Repetition and progression are comprehensible within the 
experiential field of communication, a field that although inclusive of the 
presence of the persons in the past has not yet assumed any temporal direc-
tion. To trace one event from the past to the present in a serial progression 
is to assume the field of presence that includes more of the past than the 
historically traced line would encompass. The same is valid with respect to 
the cyclical repetition: to repeat something is possible on the differentia-
tions. hence, the differentiated field must be given as a condition for the 
understanding of history as cyclical repetition. 
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The historical field of action is fundamentally concrete intercorpo-
real interaction. All historically transmitted sense and perceptions appear 
only when they are concretely expressed either in institutions, or in human 
expressions. Such expressions are sedimented in language, ritual, art and 
education. They are also sedimented in human corporeal expression and 
gesture. When a child pronounces the first word, he/she is already swept up 
into a linguistic style already present, although historical. By picking up a 
spoon, the child is immersed in a way of eating that belongs to a particular 
people and their history. The habits are sedimented in concrete implements 
and linguistic procedures and by employing them the child is already in a 
historical, experiential dimension. The spoon communicates a way of han-
dling food and the way the other has shaped the spoon. The communication 
with the other is already present in the implement. The other’s perceptions 
and relations to the world inhabit the instrument and offer the child, or for 
that matter the grown-up, similar ways of perceiving and handling. hence, 
the world is not perceptible as a “pure nature”, but as a world that is inter-
mingled with the field of significations that also include the past as “depth” 
of the significations and depth of perceptions. The implements are both in-
tercorporeally communicative and at the same time have a communication 
about the world. The handle of the hammer communicates the other’s grip, 
process of polishing, but also communicates the world of interrelationships; 
it points to a nail, the nail to a board, the board to a wall, the wall to a house 
and, finally, to the entire neighborhood, its zoning laws, labor unions, etc., 
and these contain the presence of the history of laws, labor unions, strikes 
and social classes and their ideologies. intercorporeity is here also related to 
the world as a field of action, containing within itself a historical depth, not 
as a past, but as an effective presence in every corporeal gesture and action. 
Although we find ourselves in the historically given dialogical flui-
dum, we must not ascribe some extra-experiential dimension to this flu-
idum, having a causal force, and capable of determining human actions 
and thoughts. first of all, the historical dimension, sedimented and present 
in institutions and incorporated in our everyday interactions, is primar-
ily shaped by meaning and signification, comprising a system of intercon-
nected “signs”. Any kind of strict determinism requires causality: given one 
set of material conditions, a definite result will follow. The result is predict-
able from the conditions. But meaning is not a cause, even if it is expressed 
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within and through the empirical-material dimension. Although the mate-
rial carrier of meaning may be a cause, and although we may react to it as a 
cause, in its function as carrier of meaning it effaces itself and points away 
from itself. While reading a text, we are facing certain material conditions, 
such as letters on a paper, yet we are not looking at the letters, but rather 
through the letters we “see” what they point to, what they mean and what 
they signify. not being a spatial thing, meaning cannot be a cause. hence, 
in a fundamental sense, the institutions do not cause our behavior; rather, 
they have a horizon of meanings, within which we orient ourselves, but 
which are also pliable. The same building that is a school can also mean a 
warehouse, an architectural design, an obstruction or a sore sight. in this 
sense, the building as a thing to which we may react causally has no hori-
zons and, hence, no history; only as an institution with meaning horizons 
that it has a history. Secondly, although the institutions have a horizon of 
meanings, the meanings are only comprehensible to the individuals in their 
communication. hence, the individuals are never left out of sight. “in them-
selves” the institutions would be empirical things, such as buildings, marks 
on paper or natural things. They become institutions only for someone by 
becoming carriers of meaning. hence, the meaning horizons, incorporated 
in institutions, are the meanings that previous generations, and specifically 
individuals in communication, have embodied in the institutions. The lat-
ter carry the systems of significative interconnections and perceptions of 
the individuals in communicative process. What the institutions as build-
ings that is communicated through the institutions. They are transmissions 
of intersubjective dialogue and its poly-centrically deployed field of the 
previous generations, but in such a way that the meaning is present to us 
as our own horizon, as a part of our own intersubjective poly-centric field. 
hence, institutions are not causes, but aspects of our dialogical encounter 
and an extension of our own poly-centric field of meaning and perceptions. 
in this sense, our field of experience and its horizons are historical; through 
institutions we borrow and incorporate the perceptions of our own and of 
previous generations; our perceptions contain a historical depth. As already 
mentioned, this historical depth is interlaced with our own perceptions and 
meaning horizons and, thus, it is prior to and a ground of any theory of his-
tory, whether cyclically or linearly conceived. 
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Regarded in light of the preceding discussion, institutions can also be 
understood communicatively. As a system of meanings and embodied per-
ceptions, they communicate with the “voice” of others, whose meaning is 
embodied in them. Although in our pre-reflective life the institutions seem 
to be an anonymous and all-encompassing “power”, upon reflection they 
reveal our “extended body” carrying the meanings of others, the percep-
tions and expressions of our dialogical partners, and revealing to us as-
pects of the world from “then and there”. The anonymous institutions and 
their overwhelming presence are the “we-consciousness” that is ultimately 
a poly-centric field of communication, a field that founds us, but also a field 
that is founded by the individuals: like melody and notes. 
Concluding remarks 
The dialogical domain is the fundamental dimension, within which 
the humans dwell. it allows community, institutions and the individual 
to function in their proper modes without losing sight of their relation-
ships. Although the dialogical institutions are all-encompassing, it is to be 
remembered that the individual, as carrier and origin of dialogue, is also in 
a position to confront the institutions and shift their meaning horizons in 
ways, in which they have not been given before. As Merleau-Ponty noted, 
although the institutionalized language creates the author, the author also 
creates the language and the audience; the audience, in turn, creates the 
author by finding more than the author intended69.
Phenomenological understanding of dialogue is not a theory imposed 
from above by some autocratic reason, but rather it is an exposition of the 
communicative process as it takes place in experience. historically speak-
ing, the autocratic reason has also emerged in the dialogical process and 
has become an institutionalized mode of signifying and perceiving. hence, 
at the phenomenological level, it too belongs in a dialogical domain and 
not above it. its autocracy also shifts from situation to situation, where ra-
tionality is signified and re-signified in terms of the world that it attempts 
to deploy and in terms of the dialogical engagement of the partners. in any 
other view, it would become a metaphysical position disconnected from 
any concrete human interaction and experience. 
69 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). The Specter of a Pure Language. in J. o’neill (Trans.), The Prose 
of the World (p. 11- 13). evanston, iL: northwestern university Press.
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Admittedly, this brief exposition of the dialogical process is incom-
plete; it merely shows the basic outlines of communicative process without 
any pretense of detailed analyses of specific situations. Yet, any specific situ-
ation will have to assume the dialogical domain outlined here; specific cases 
would be a way of focusing the dialogical process although not abandoning 
it. our subsequent discussions will focus on more concrete dialogical pro-
cesses concerned with expression, bodily abilities and concrete constitution 





it is remarkable that language has the power to move us to action to 
transfigure our views, to spread an imaginary panorama across books, in-
stitutions and daily events, to express the presence of demonic or divine 
powers and send a shiver up and down our backs; it has the capacity to 
signify and to serialize things of our surroundings and to signify them with 
detached designations; finally, it is able to integrate dispersed events that 
are remote in space and time into a transparent unified whole. All these 
comprise the domains of communication. The difficulty in the explication 
of such domains inheres in the fact that our attempts to delimit them place 
us in a different domain. To experience a particular domain in its own func-
tion we have to be in it, move with it and be encapsulated by it. once we 
make an object of it, we transgress its limits and disrupt its process. it is like 
dealing with an expression: while expressing joy, we are “in it”, we are cap-
tured by it, and we do not notice its force. Yet, when we attempt to analyze 
it, when we try to look at the mirror to decipher the expression, we find 
ourselves facing a face that is not joy, but an effort to decipher joy. it is no 
longer joyous expression, but a curious one. Any attempt to reconstruct joy 
in this manner would be a failure. 
We are faced then with two tasks: (a) to reveal these domains in their 
“deficient mode” insofar as their manifestation will have to be through an-
other mode of communication, and (b) to show how all the domains are co-
present in the explication of one through the other. This means that we are 
operating in all domains of communication and no longer have the privi-
leged access to only one. hence, we admit at the outset that the explication 
of one, although being distinct from the others, must become transparent 
through the domain that we use to explicate the first one. This is why the 
concepts of intertwining and transparency are unavoidable. 
The effective domain of communication is the power of transforma-
tion, the capacity to “make” events occur, to make them present. To grasp 
this domain it is necessary to expand the notion of communication. As 
many writers have suggested, there are modes of communicating’ that do 
not involve oral speaking; there is body language, sign language in natural 
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settings, such as smoke being a sign of fire, darkening skies and flashing 
lightning being signs of a coming storm and the bending tree in the wind 
being a sign of the resiliency of the tree and the force of the wind. They all 
“speak” in their silence. Yet, in an effective communicating “without words”, 
the sign is inextricably interwoven with what it is a sign of. The “of ” here 
does not have any distance. Take for example a ritual evoking the “pride 
of the nation” and the “great sacrifices” of the honorable forefathers in a 
remote past, calling for an identification of the individual with the evoca-
tion, with the slogans, and the “grand party”. The power of the ritualistic 
performance by the speaker, performing a ritualistic incantation, does not 
comprise a communication of a message, but of an affectivity that has the 
power to transform the person and to make him into a “follower” of some 
would-be leader, star, cause or purpose. indeed, the individual becomes the 
very embodiment of the cause and is willing to sacrifice all for its fulfill-
ment. Before imitation, symbolization or signification, there is the identity 
of one process with the other, of one event with another. The ritualistic in-
cantation “inhabits” the audience, makes it the very force that will dedicate 
itself to the “vital tasks” of the party, the church, or the organization. 
But the notion of affective domain of communication extends further. 
in order to affect the public or the audience, the speaker “becomes” the 
very embodiment of the destiny of the cause, becomes its power and pur-
pose. All the gestures, expressions and the specifically designed surround-
ings are, without any distance, the very powers with which the audience 
identifies. The proud body posture, the trembling voice and the pounding 
fist are coextensive and of equal value with the flags, the emblems of the 
organization, and the signs of the cult. Thus, one event or object can assume 
with equal affect the place of the other. This suggests that there is no “indi-
vidualism” in the sense of fixed units that would remain constant. it is not 
the individual, who speaks, but the vital powers of the nation, the church, of 
the founder. one does not speak in one’s own name, but in the name of an 
all pervading power to transform, to make the audience into the very pride 
of the flag, demise of the enemies and conquest of the future. This complete 
enmeshment in the vital reveals the fact that human awareness in this do-
main of communication is not yet individuated and functions in, what we 
could call theatrical identification. every event speaks the vital interest and 
can be transformed into any event having equal vital interest. This does not 
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mean that at this level the human was a subject with private interests; rather, 
his vital powers could be incorporated and transfigured into anything, and 
the vital powers of anything could be assumed by him; he could become 
those vital powers. Thus, the preacher becomes the word of a divinity and 
speaks with the power of the divinity; the reborn is, indeed, a “new” person, 
inhabited by the “word” that made him “whole”. it is a theatrical enactment 
in earnest. one does not “believe” in being a new person, one is the new 
person. if we extend this to theatric performance and what it communi-
cates, we could say that the actor does not play the role, but becomes the 
very embodiment of the role. This is obvious not only from a theatrical per-
formance, where a good actor disappears in order to become most affective, 
but also to all audio-visual media. Such media are essentially the means of 
communication for affect. it is not so much what is being said, but the ways, 
in which the sayings and performances, inclusive of the designed staging 
of the environment on the media, become affective or can transform the 
audience. This suggests that prior to symbolic function, where one event 
symbolizes another, there is an identity of the symbol and the symbolized. 
This communicative identity is the origin of symbol once the identity is rent 
asunder into two distinct functions. Yet, this separation would take us out 
of the vital domain of speaking. it is to be noted that in this domain words 
of the speaker are only one facet of communication. 
if this domain of communication, this affective power, were to be 
transposed to the spoken language alone, if it were to extend its domain 
into vocal articulation, this vital notion of communication would acquire 
greater articulation, greater flexibility and yet would retain the power of 
transformation. The linguistic origins of this communicative mode rest in 
the practices of magic and ritual. The linguistic term “magic” stems from 
the indo-european root “mag(h)”. it is a part of a linguistic field that con-
tains our words make, machine and mechanism and the Germanic words 
Macht, Moegen and Vermoegen (power, desire and capacity). But the power 
of the word in magic is transformative and at the same time capable of 
being the very power of the events. This is found in the magical power of 
names. When a warrior assumes a name “mad bear”, it does not mean that 
he has acquired a label; rather, he has become the mad bear. The very name 
is pervaded with the powers of a raging, powerful and vital bear. The name 
does not label the warrior and does not associate the warrior with the bear: 
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it is the bear. As Merleau-Ponty would say, the name inhabits the thing and 
the thing pervades the name. There is no symbolic distance. 
The power of the word to do and to make is very obvious in early ritual. 
it is well documented that when gods create, they do so with the power 
of speaking with a word. By speaking, the gods can bring order out of chaos. 
But the origin of this power of the word is found in the ritual, where the 
power, the vital capacity of the word, was identical with the event. only by 
having this identity that the word was also empowered to transform “as 
if by magic”. in the early sun ritual, “The Zaotar must bring about a high 
(loud) speaking”. his speaking announces the coming of the dawn. The an-
nouncement is not symbolic of the dawning sun; it is the very power of 
the dawning sun, which spreads the fields and forests into visibility and 
into holy light. The world is born. What this suggests is that the Zaotar, the 
priest in his speaking, has the right word that is the power of the dawn to 
upsurge. This is the power of the word not to create, but to transfigure the 
darkness into light. Magic is not creation: it is transfiguration. This essential 
structure subtends various manifestations of transformative speaking. 
Although the “magical”, the transformative power of speaking, is one 
of the original modes of linguistic use, it cannot be relegated to the dark 
ages, to the unsophisticated and pre-rational consciousness. The magical 
dimension of speaking – in a broad sense of speaking – is just as present in 
the modern age. first of all, it has appeared in modern institutions, such as 
technology. Technology has a mode of communicating its power of trans-
formation of “raw materials” into desired commodities. in this sense, the 
various modern movements, such as capitalism, pragmatism and Marxism, 
are at base magical. They promise to transform the “stuff ” of the world into 
humanly desired results. As Marx had noted, the task is not to interpret 
reality, but to change it. With this change he also meant the change of the 
human itself. This magical conception, in fact, subtends the entire set of as-
sumptions claiming with the establishment of “material, social and political 
conditions” that the human will be changed. This states that the power of 
the conditions is identical with and communicates the very transformation 
of human beings. curiously, the governments of the two opposing super-
powers are engaged in the same attempt to establish all sorts of conditions 
through technocratic-bureaucratic means with the assumption that such 
means will eo ipso transform the human into a desired entity. The third 
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world leaders make the same assumption: dictators are justified and, in-
deed, justify themselves by the claim that they are establishing conditions 
for “radical” change. They are the Zaotars, the shamans of modern age. This 
shamanism extends all the way to human-behavioral sciences, proclaim-
ing, for example, that if crime is to be eliminated, then conditions must be 
established to yield a different human entity. it is remarkable that the condi-
tions and the desired results function within the magical understanding of 
time. in magical incantation, the spatiotemporal distances are abolished. if 
one performs a ritual, the ritual has, indeed is, the power that is identical 
with events happening elsewhere and at another time: the rain 
Dance and the incantation means that tomorrow’s rain is present in the 
ritual. The same is true of modern concept of conditions. What one does 
today in the form of establishment of conditions is assumed to establish the 
presence of the transformed “reality” tomorrow. There is the primordial 
identity of the event called conditions and the result that is expected. G. h. 
Mead, in fact, suggested that the modern science in its technological guise 
is magical, because it allows us to avoid undesirable results and to obtain 
desirable results. it is capable of transforming events70. 
What follows from this domain of communication are the various con-
structions of slogans, political incantations and even advertisement. here, 
the individual is “compelled” to identify with the slogan and its message, to 
become one with the political movement, one with the advertised automo-
bile and its erotic attraction of the opposite sex, its virility, power and feline 
grace. Through incantation the sum of gears, wheels, plastic and tin are 
swallowed up by the word and are transformed into a secret potion, into an 
object of neighborhoods adoration and envy into an elevated being, elevat-
ing with it the proud owner, who is identified with it. As Merleau-Ponty 
would point out, the power of the word, its magic, inhabits the thing and 
transforms it into depths otherwise unattainable71. how else are we to un-
derstand the individual’s identification with a mere thing, the individual’s 
submergence into a political movement, under the banner of slogans? how 
else are we to understand of a shrunken figure with little moustache, who 
combed his hair in a wrong way? in direct vocal presence, as opposed to 
mass mediation, vital exhortations-incantation and repetition of slogans-
70 Mead, G. h. (1970). Mind, Self and Society. chicago, iL: university of chicago Press. 
71 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). The Specter of a Pure Language. In The Prose of the World. 
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flood over the mass of participants moving them to lose their individuality 
and to identify with the vital, encompassing, protective “we-consciousness” 
characteristic of the cult, clan, organization. The language of slogans and 
advertisements, the silent language of technology and the bureaucratized 
governmental procedures are magical. We seek “governmental solutions” to 
our problems, which means we expect the governments to transform events 
in our favor. Through advertisement incantation we become enchanted by 
the product, we become identical with the powers of the product, and we 
become the athletes of Wheaties and the superstars of Mercedes. 
There is another preoccupation of our age that has its roots in the mag-
ical incantation, magical ritual: it is what Poggeler called mantic hermeneu-
tics72. it is the preoccupation with forecasting, with reading the entrails to 
decipher the events to come. Although our forecasters are too modest to 
read entrails, they, nonetheless, read all sorts of portents: so many farmers 
have planted so many acres; the predicted expectation, if everything else re-
mains equal, will be so many tons of grain. This forecasting is not innocent. 
People identify themselves with the autumn’s great crop yield in spring and 
buy stock, sell houses to invest, send the market into frenzy and get into 
a violent argument with their spouses. This simply indicates the original 
presence of the magical domain of communication. The terms “great crop, 
booming yield” are identical with the future in such a way that the future 
is already present: indeed, it is identical with the presently spoken words, 
which send the economists, and the buyers, and sellers of stock into frenzy 
of activity, into dreams of riches and nightmares of loss. The same is valid 
for the weather forecasting. 
Merleau-Ponty, for example, revealed another aspect of speaking, 
which is “magically transformative”73. Speaking transforms perception and 
institutes an experience that is different from anything previously encoun-
tered. When a person works at a job, he perceives the surroundings, others 
and himself in terms of accustomed characteristics. his boss is a nice guy, 
who gives him a job, a periodical raise and an occasional pat on the back. 
Yet, if the worker would happen to be passing by a place, where a revolution-
72 Poggeler, o. (1983). heidegger und die herrneneutische Philosophie. [heidegger and 
hermenteutical Philosophy). freiburg, West Germany: Alber. 
73 Merieau-Ponty, M. (1973). Science and the experience of expression. In The Prose of the 
W orld.
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ary is making a speech pointing out that the boss (the owner of the means 
of production) is really an exploiter, a person to squeeze the last ounce of 
labor power out of the worker, for the least amount of capital expenditure, 
the worker’s perception of the boss may be radically transformed: he may 
begin to see his boss’s niceness as a sly way to enhance exploitation, to keep 
the worker passive and submissive. The perceptual transformation is lin-
guistically incantated. one does not simply change one’s mind; rather, the 
entire being is transformed: The boss is now hateful, the entire emotional 
tonality is changed and the worker is no longer happy at his task.
examples could be added from every domain of life. for the purpose 
of this presentation suffice it to say that the process of transformation re-
quires an identification with an event, which is incantated in communica-
tion. Through the power of the spoken word, the person is brought to the 
identity of what is being advertised or incantated, and in this identity he 
is transformed. This identity, this identification with others, this becom-
ing the other, is still powerfully present in the theatrical performances. The 
actor becomes the hero, and, as the saying goes, the person in the audi-
ence may identify himself with the hero, indeed, may for a moment become 
the hero. Thus, our fascination with acting, with heroes and with Saturday 
night cowboys: for a moment we become such heroes. for a moment we are 
in the power of what is being communicated. 
When dealing with the expressive domain, we already encountered the 
psychic domain of communication. it is the locus and origin of symbols, 
imagery and creativity. Symbolization is not to be confused with the magi-
cal process of an identification of one event with another. Such a process is 
an origin of association. in the context of language, symbolization is found-
ed on the expressive domain of communicating. once again it is to be noted 
that communicating here has a broader sense than direct verbal articula-
tion, although the verbal articulation is most predominant as the psychic 
domain of communication. The psychic, the expressive domain, constitutes 
a depth of imagery, of symbolisms, ranging from poetic sayings to divine 
and demonic figures. it has been said that the modern trend in linguistic 
understanding toward representation and away from expressivity has led 
to the impoverishment of language, the loss of imagination and, indeed, 
the loss of human psychic depth. As existentialism would have it, such a 
movement comprises the death, the collapse of interiority. Representative, 
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propositional speaking lacks the psychological charge, the depth of experi-
ence. To love, in this mode of speaking, means simply to propose to some-
one on a street corner for a one-night-stand of physiological stimulation. 
What then is this psychic, expressive domain of communicating? ex-
pressivity, as we saw, is a modality of speaking in its broader sense, comprises 
a mood, a physiognomy of events, yet in a way, that the events and their factu-
al characteristics are not identical with the mood or physiognomy. The trees 
seem droopy, the lover gives a passionate look from the folds of the overcoat 
to the entire bodily stance. The person down the street is tired, the mother 
approaching the child looks inviting, all expressive aspect irreducible to the 
sum of factual descriptions of parts of the objects that bear the expressions. 
A peculiar characteristic of the expressive domain is that it can be transmit-
ted across various media. The expression of hope in the human gaze can be 
transmitted to, and communicated by, various institutionalized means: it can 
appear in the plastic art, poetry and political institutions. expressivity is not 
bound to any specific medium for its manifestation. expressivity is one of 
the fundamental ways that we communicate with the world and the world 
communicates with us. What is being suggested is that the psychic dimen-
sion of speaking is not a characteristic of humans; it is rather the expressive 
dimension of things and humans, their mood, their atmosphere, in which 
things and we participate. it is the lonely and oppressive night, under weight 
of which we sit, and the loneliness is written across our face and our entire 
posture. it is not a specific thing that is lonely; rather, the things are means, 
by which the loneliness is revealed. The psychic-expressive dimension of 
communication is, therefore, prior to what we call subject-object dichotomy, 
prior to the dichotomy of psyche and body. The child looking at the inviting 
posture of the mother does not read external signs of internal states, in or-
der then to decipher and interpret the external signs and deduce from them 
the mother’s internal states. The expression is direct, immediate, the child is 
carried away into the mother’s arms by the inviting posture. The returning 
soldier catches a sight of his sweetheart in the crowd, who gives him a pas-
sionate look. The look is spread across her face and her entire being. it is a 
direct communication not about things or facts, but of psychic expressivity. 
Direct verbal linguistic speaking contains this dimension most remark-
ably in the voiced expression. The sound, in general, has the capacity to be 
shaded by expressive phenomena perhaps more than by any other mode of 
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communication. While listening to a symphony, we not only hear a succes-
sion of sounds, but also the shades of moods, of tensilities of excitement, sad-
ness, grandeur, frivolity, irony, pride, eeriness and tenderness. indeed, the 
instruments may vary and the factual components of the environment may 
change, yet, the expressive mood may remain constant; at the same time, the 
instruments and the factual situation may remain constant, and yet they may 
capture a variety of psychic-expressive aspects. it is not the case that the audi-
ence must assume some internal state, such as sadness, nor that the musician 
must somehow become internally sad to infuse the strings and tubes with 
sadness; the very sound is shaded by sad expression and spreads the sadness, 
communicates its expressivity across the audience and the orchestra. 
in human speaking, the voice captures the expressive domain, although 
this domain is manifest across the entire human physiognomy. When we 
speak about something, our speaking also reveals the expressive characteris-
tics of that something. The described event is a sad one and our voice reveals 
the sadness; it is an exciting event, and our voice is shaded with excitement, 
which spreads across our entire physiognomy and across the brightened face. 
indeed, the proposition “And Brutus is an honorable man” refers to Brutus, 
yet the way an actor voices such a proposition with irony reveals something 
else. While listening, we not only hear propositional statements, but we also 
capture the expressive shadings that carry the mood, the mood of the situa-
tion, of the things and of our own being. What is called the psychic domain, 
comprised of various feelings, attitudes, attractions, indifferences, despera-
tions, fears, horrors, loves and joys, is fundamentally the expressive domain 
of our communication with the world and with each other. it is prior to the 
characterization of factual qualities of objects and of the internal states of 
the subject. Rather, the psychic-expressive domain is manifest across and 
through various objects without becoming identical with them. While ap-
pearing on a face, an expression of horror tends to spread, to generalize and 
to intensify the entire atmosphere with horror. This spread of the psychic-
expressive phenomena is captured by various means of communication: the 
voice in speaking, the physiognomy of a corporeal gesture, the tensility of a 
situation or a demonic grimace of a mask. 
The spread, the movement of psychic-expressive domain across and 
through various “carriers”, points to a peculiar structure appropriate to ex-
pressivity: a polar structure. What this means is that the expressive domain 
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tends to intensify itself by spreading and polarizing itself. The joy expressed 
in a voice tends to prolong itself in the voices of others and, in turn, the 
voice of others tends to intensify the joy initially expressed. it is akin to 
the Sartrean description of erotic passion. A woman starts to talk to a man 
and her voice begins to express passion; captured by the movement of the 
expression, his voice too turns toward eroticism and toward an expression 
of desire; her voice is intensified, her passion is fed by his sonorous desire, 
and his desire is fed by her expressed sounded passion. The expressive, psy-
chic domain in its movement is polarized and feeds on itself, it intensifies 
through itself. An expression of horror spreads to others and polarizes in 
their expression of the same horror; expression of horror encounters ex-
pression of horror and intensifies itself. here, horror feeds on horror. As the 
sayings go, horror gripped the whole community and appeared on the faces 
of all of its members, or fear spread like a fire. our corporeal gestures, con-
figurations and our linguistic expressions capture this psychic-expressive 
domain and communicate it and propagate it through the simplest means, 
such as a voice, a story telling, an art work or a ritualistic mask. 
The polarity of expressivity may appear in most unique and diverse ways. 
The gripping silence of the night can be intensified by its polar aspect, a lonely 
sound, and the lonely sound can be intensified by all pervasive stillness. The 
depth of darkness can be intensified by a flash of light, and the expressed, 
voiced desperation can be manifest in its depth by an expression of frivolity. 
The joy expressed by the voice of the other reveals the depth of my despera-
tion, communicates my expressed state more intensely. The movement of the 
psychic-expressive domain is captured, polarized and intensified. in the pro-
cess of speaking, we respond, at least at one strata, to the expressive domain 
that captures us directly prior to any reading of signs or interpretation. The 
communication at this level is direct and captures the communicating part-
ners in a domain of expressivity that the partners polarize and intensify. 
The psychic-expressive domain is also the source of imagination and 
creativity in linguistic process. The description of a face in terms of its fac-
tual and physiological components does not inflame the imagination. Yet, 
the description of its expressive domain, of its capturing the multitude of 
psychic shadings, leads into an indefinite variety of possibilities. The lov-
ing, the passionate, the painful, the hateful, the adoring, the proud and the 
desperate, all open up imagination and linguistic expression toward rich-
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ness inaccessible for factual delimitation of physical or physiological char-
acteristics. The same is valid of sound and other means of expression. A 
description of the factual process of sound transmission would give us a 
proposition of what sound is, but this proposition would miss the multi-
dimensional expressivity of sound. The sad, the joyous, the despising tone, 
the distant, the peaceful and the tumultuous, the soft and harsh, the goose-
step and the sway, all are capable of imaginary continuation and of inspir-
ing creativity to continue in the capturing a variety of expressive possibili-
ties. This is what lends our speaking its flexibility, its expressive variability 
and its open creativity. At the same time, it is the source of ambivalence, 
because the voice, while capturing an expressive modality, may be shaded 
at the same time by other, although less pronounced, expressive modalities. 
This leads to the possibility of intersection of various expressive modalities, 
which would intensify and shade one another. Another aspect, revealing 
creativity and imagery in communicative speaking, is the process of mani-
festation of the same expressive modality across the most varied means. 
The anger may appear in the visage of gods, in figures in animistic ritual, in 
poetic expressions, in the reprimanding voice of authority and even in the 
angry look of the storm. here, creativity and imagination are variations of 
the medium to capture the expressive domain, to arrest their fleeting force, 
in order to make it visible, audible and communicated in dialogical interac-
tion. This variability of media is what allows us to experience the various 
expressions communicated through various experiential fields. Because the 
anger, expressed in the mask, can also be expressed in sound and in an an-
gry movement, then the visual experience of an angry expression is eo ipso 
an audial experience of anger. There is a direct communicability among 
various fields of experience in terms of the modality of expression that may 
pervade all of them. At the level of psychic-expressive communication, the 
entire range of experiential registers, so to speak, are synthesized and uni-
fied by the expressive aspect. At the same time, the expressive aspect can 
explode in most fascinating images in terms of most diverse media, from 
visual through audial, tactile and kinesthetic not only across various media, 
but also across a combination of media, such as sound and picture in film, 
music and dance in theatre, and their indefinite imaginary combinations. 
The psychic-expressive domain is the source of creativity and proliferation 
of imagination. obviously, what is meant here by imagination is not an im-
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age in a visual sense, it is rather an expressive sense capable of varying and 
transforming expressions, combining and recombining media with expres-
sive aspects; it is a total experiential process involving all experiential do-
mains and media of expression. 
Although being manifest across various media, and specifically across 
human speaking and expressive capacity, the psychic-expressive domain is 
not identical with any media and, hence, transcends spatial sum of factual 
characteristics. The transcendence does not mean that the expressive do-
main is extra-worldly. That is why it can inhabit and be expressed in terms 
of the highest human aspirations; in fact, it is the driving force of such aspi-
rations. nothing great is done without a great passion. Just like the Platonic 
aspiration toward the highest; the perfect is inspired by eros, an eros, which 
pervades all Platonic expressions and pervades the very perfect ideas. his 
expressions are fed by the erotic enticement of the perfect, unending ideas, 
ideas, which are ultimately charged with erotic attraction. 
The “transcendence”, and yet worldliness of the psychic-expressive do-
main, is also the source of symbol. At this level of language, symbol can 
be found everywhere without the required conception of cultural influence 
or historical development. The same symbolic configurations can be found 
everywhere without any necessary connections with geographic or histori-
cal nature. What this means is that the psychic-expressive domain can be 
manifest at different times and in different places; captured and frozen in a 
particular medium and transferable to other media without the loss of the 
expressive value. What this means is that a symbol is an expressive structure, 
which can appear in most diverse and individuated images and media. Yet, 
all such images and media indicate a primordial unity, a source of which 
all of the images are manifestations. At the communicative-linguistic level, 
the expression of pride may appear across various guises, through diverse 
media, and evolve a multitude of images; yet, all of them are swayed by the 
expression. here, the most diverse communicative processes reveal one ex-
pressive domain. Yet, at another communicative level the expression of pride 
is only one function of a more fundamental structure of symbol: As was 
noted, the expressive domain in its movement polarizes itself and intensi-
fies itself. This movement of polarization, yielding light and dark, love and 
hate, pride and degradation, joy and sadness, divine benevolence and de-
monic malevolence, father sky and mother earth – the entire cosmic tension 
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between good and evil – is a movement that constitutes a basic psychic-
expressive symbol that cannot be exhausted by any image, by any concre-
tization, although all images, all media of expressive transmission and all 
specific polarizations reveal this basic symbolic configuration. in this sense, 
the symbol is a source of creativity, imagination and expressivity. it is like 
the chinese Tai-chi, containing the polarizing movement of light and dark, 
but at the same time expressing the yin-yang and leading to the sky-earth, 
male-female polarization; and these are deviated across a multitude of cre-
ated expressive forms of good and evil, love and hate, pride and degrada-
tion, high and low; and in Africa, among the Yorubas, it is expressed in the 
relationship of god and woman, the structure of granaries, and so forth. The 
psychic-expressive domain as a source of symbolic understanding reveals 
the inexhaustible depth of symbol and, hence, the proliferation of expressive 
images and media of expression. Language, in its turn, at the level of expres-
sivity, is one of the major aspects, in which the symbolic structure inheres. 
At the same time, the symbolic structure of language as an expressive power 
is what gives language its indefinite pliability. The expressive domain and its 
symbolic structure appear in all linguistic institutions and modes of com-
munication. Without this expressive domain and its basic symbolic configu-
ration, communication would be reduced to a linguistic process that would 
exclude most of the cultural institutions, and specifically the institution of 
language, in which we live and understand one another. 
The psychic expressive domain could be called the “soul” of language. 
it has its use and effectivity in every walk of our lives. in the promoting of 
either political figures or of some more noble commodities, the expressive 
domain plays a key role. The commodity is embellished with psychic at-
tractiveness and in many cases with joyous audial-musical accompaniment. 
The car is not just presented with its magical power of transformation of a 
110-pound backpacked bookkeeper into a virile demon of sexuality, but 
also as having expressive, psychically attractive characteristics: it is sleek, 
silent, winged like a spirited steed, and it is proud and swift like an eagle 
aiming at the shimmering glory of the high-noon sun – aye, the magnifi-
cent creature on four wheels. And the soaring tune sends our spirits to the 
heights of freedom, to unfolding images, and to the local car dealer, where 
we become proud owners, only to inspire envy, jealousy and erotic solicita-
tion of our neighbor and his wife. 
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And it is functional in daily conversation when one, for example, at-
tempts to convince a friend to go to the movies, to hear a lecture or to join 
a club. The film received “fantastic” reviews, the actors were “dynamic” and 
captured well the “characters” of the story. The club has some “exciting” 
events and some really “cool” people and for new members some “attrac-
tive” opportunities. The speaker is really inspiring and has captured the 
“pulse” of our times; he has some “deep” insights and “provokes” a “heated” 
debate. And the friend is enticed, inspired and convinced; he is swept up in 
the mood, in the attunement to the expressive domain of the words. 
And even scientists, attempting to convince the public that the leak in 
the nuclear reactor poses no danger, are very adept at using expressive lan-
guage: The situation is not “desperate” and the community should remain 
“calm”, and the experts have been sent to “defuse” the “tension”. Although “ap-
prehensive”, the members of the community remain in their “cozy” homes. 
And in the religious ritual, the announced divine beings are not just 
entities in the sky, but are “glorious, wrathful, kind, and inspiring”. no one 
prays to the Aristotelian logical prime move unless it is transformed into 
and revealed by expressive language. Without such expressivity, it remains 
remote and uninspiring. it does not lend itself to the proliferation of images 
and symbolic expressions. Greeks did not worship it: and only when chris-
tianity incorporated it into an expressive language that it became prolifer-
ated across a multitude of psychically charged images and expressions, only 
then that it became alive and moved its people to unfold expressive images 
across all sensorial registers, from music to poetry, and to depictions of hell 
and heaven in gothic and baroque cathedrals. 
Without the expressive domain, language remains dead. And because, 
as already mentioned, the audial field adds the immediate attunement to 
expressivity, the modern person uses sound to embellish all of his prod-
ucts, all of his ceremonies by audial expressivity. The audial expressivity 
brings things and events into our immediacy in an encompassing way. 
While watching a movie, we are drawn into it through the expressivity of 
sound. if the sound breaks and the film continues to role, the figures appear 
remote, lifeless caricatures; when sound reappears, the figures resume a life, 
acquire a depth and draw the audience into the wind of their actions. As 
e. Straus has shown, the audial field carries a direct psychic expressivity, 
which lends body closeness of things and calls for our participation, moves 
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us to inspiration74. Although the visual panorama and visually given lan-
guage does not lack expressivity, it, nevertheless, is enhanced by audiality 
and its expressive force. A story well told is more alive than a story read in 
solitary silence. This accounts for the attraction to theatrical performance. 
Although theatre originates in the magical domain of communication and 
its transformative power, its attraction consists of the audial expressive do-
main that sets the moods and images of the scenery. in this sense, the magi-
cal power and the expressive domain are mutually enhancing. expressivity 
is the very soul of the play. 
An expressivity of language is the very soul of our encounters in a dia-
logical process. The failure of our communicative theories of our speech 
education and our education of children in reading classes is that we tend 
to abolish the expressive aspects of language not only by stripping expressive 
terms from vocabulary, but more dangerously by demanding silent reading 
and learning. The audial imagery and the vocally articulated expressivity is 
the place, where the soul of the language is learned and communicated. in 
this silence, not only the soul of language, but the psyche of the person and its 
imaginatory power begin to diminish. We know only too well that an unused 
function tends to shrink and vanish. Speaking phenomenologically, expres-
sive language, gesture, expressive characteristics of the world are not mirrors 
of psyche: they are psyche. Diminish one and the other is equally diminished. 
The logical, the propositional, the rational and the mental domains 
of communication comprise the world of experience deployed in a serial 
manner. The world is a sum of objects and their characteristics having de-
terminate spatiotemporal locations and relationships. This communicative 
domain has its genesis in an awareness of the following aspects of the world:
1. Lineal-horizontal orientation and directionality: it is an awareness 
of movement, which has an aim, a distance to be covered from here to there, 
from now to then. in accordance with the lineal orientation, things, objects 
can be serially arrayed next to each other and one after the other. 
2. The awareness of horizontal-lineal direction leads to the aware-
ness of permanent localization. The permanence is one of spatiotemporal 
loci and the loci can be occupied by permanent objects. The condition for 
permanence is reiteration of location. We know from the work of eugene 
74 Straus, e. (1963). The Primary World of Senses (G. needleman, Trans.) new York: The 
free Press. 
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fink that even Platonic ideality is founded on the establishment of abso-
lute immutability of spatiotemporal loci75. We recall that Zeno, following 
Parmenides, has shown that permanence and immutability depend on the 
condition of an infinite divisibility of any spatiotemporal location. This in-
finite divisibility leads to an absolute immutability. hence, Plato’s ideas, the 
perfect never-changing entities are an expression of this condition. They 
are infinite because they are at the end of all divisibility and this “end” at 
infinity is absolutely permanent. The result is that anything can be repeated 
and reiterated by the return to the same immutable spatiotemporal locus. 
Permanent location lends permanence to things. 
3. The linguistic term assumes in this context a character of permanent 
definitory referentiality. Words signify, point, or direct. Words are perma-
nent not because there is permanence in the noises we make, but because 
their directionality, their signification is locked into permanent loci. At 
the same time, words must be aligned in permanent syntactical locations. 
Words must assume a proper location and a grammatical correctness (di-
rectionality) in a sentence. The awareness of lineal orientation and localiza-
tion is also the condition for writing and for deployment of the “grammata” 
of the letters in spatiotemporal loci. 
4. The awareness of directionality as a basis of signification and the con-
sciousness of permanent loci permit the disattachment of terms from singu-
lar reference to objects and their transposition to other objects. The terms 
assume permanence and syntactical location and can refer to a multitude of 
permanent loci inhabited by “permanent” objects. it is to be noted that the 
relationship of things and words and words with words must be understood 
in terms of spatiotemporal arrangement. This suggests that the propositional 
dimension of language is dominated by spatial metaphor of awareness. in-
deed, temporal concepts owe much of their sensibility to spatial elements 
sedimented in them. Temporal concepts derive from the indo-Germanic 
root “ti”, meaning to divide, cut up and stretch. Thus, time is a segment or a 
stretch and is founded in this dimension of language on spatial directions and 
localizations. even the qualifying terms of time are usually spatial: long or 
short period, great expanses of time, etc. even notions, such as “soon, present, 
75 fink, e. (1957). Zur ontologische friihgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Bewegung. [concern-
ing ontological early history of Space-Time-Movement]. The hague, netherlands: Mar-
tinus nijhoff. 
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past, and future” are not temporal, but derivative from spatial metaphors. Be-
fore and after share the same fate: in front and aft. 
5. The preceding suggestions indicate that the propositional language is 
not only arrayed serially in a horizontal fashion, but that it also has a func-
tion of spatial depth. Terms refer to things before us as “objects”, as German-
ic “Gegenstande”, as standing against us and as having a location there in 
contrast to here. This mode of linguistic referentiality, directed toward per-
manent objects, assumes a spatially localized relationship between the object 
and the subject. This relationship is known as that of perspectivity. Although 
referring to things by proper nouns, we qualify the noun and, thus, give a 
perspective to the object. it is possible to change our perspective by mov-
ing spatially. to a different location, while retaining the identical position of 
the object: we assume a different position to the object and have a different 
qualifying perspective. The notion of spatial positionality and propositional 
reference appears in most diverse guises in our propositional dimension of 
language: a politician takes a position with respect to the issues; the supreme 
court takes a “stand” concerning the eRA; religion or science provide differ-
ent perspectives to the world; the debater is defending his position against 
his/her opponent. As is well known, Leibniz built his entire metaphysics on 
the interrelationship of monadological perspectives76. Propositional lan-
guage as referential is co-equal with localization, direction and variation of 
spatial locations of the subject and spatial distance in depth. 
6. Lineal orientation and the possibility of localization also inhabits the 
propositional language in terms of “why, because, and, if-then” modalities. 
Why did something happen? Because something before it caused it to hap-
pen. “if i move from here to there, then i shall see the other side”. “if John will 
buy flowers, then Mary will like him”. These are successions of events, one 
resulting from the other. “if i make this proposition, then certain conclusions 
will follow”. Propositional language is, thus, logical and at the same time it is 
connected with lineal causality. To use propositional language is also to im-
plicitly assume the world of spatiotemporally interconnected causality. When 
we ask the question “Why?”, implicitly we are asking a causal question. 
7. At the beginning of the discussion of this linguistic dimension, it 
was suggested that localization and its divisibility were the sources of per-
76 Leibniz, G. W. (1898). The Monadology and other Philosophical urritings cR. Latta, 
Trans.). oxford: clarendon Press. 
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fect, stable and infinite ideas. The awareness of localization and, thus, spa-
tiality as a succession and deployment of localizations comprise the sourc-
es of what is known as logical analysis of concepts and of reification and 
atomization. Awareness of localization allows us to divide and subdivide 
something into smaller and smaller units into atoms. This possibility is cor-
relative to the possibility of an analysis of linguistic terms, of their splitting 
into analytic components and “locating” as such components within the 
“framework” of a logistic system, possessing “constant places” for “vari-
ables”. As it is well known, this dimension of language had resulted in theo-
ries of linguistic atomism. it sought for the “smallest” linguistic component, 
from which language could be additively constructed in a serial process. 
The much bemoaned “reification” of the experienced world has its roots 
here. The propositional dimension of language has the power of reification. 
The notion of analysis is the notion of spatial atomization and, hence, dif-
ferentiation of localities and their directional interrelationships. 
8. The propositional domain of communication could be called logical, 
rational and mental. The reason for this is that the term mind has its origins 
in an oriented, directed and linear experience. And the notion of rational-
ity, which in the west is synonymous with logical, stems from logos, original 
meaning of which was not as heidegger thought, gathering, but goal ori-
ented calculation. Mind directs experience and the understanding of the 
world in terms of lineally calculative progression toward something. hence, 
propositional language is rational-logical language, a language of localiza-
tion, orientation, and ultimately of spatiotemporal analysis of locations and 
their lineal interrelationships. Although it could be objected that mind and 
logic are not spatiotemporal objects, upon closer investigation what we call 
mind and logic are pure spatiotemporal structures of localities devoid of 
things that would occupy such localities. The mental orientations from here 
to there, from now to then and from high to low are pure spatiotemporal 
locations remaining constant. After all, in this modality of spatiotempo-
ral awareness, possessing points of fixity and localizability, the things may 
change as spatiotemporal objects, but the locations remain constant: any-
thing can fill them. hence, they have the characteristic of changelessness. 
The same is valid for logic. its seeming “extra-spatiality and temporality” is 
nothing else than an arrangement and manipulation of static spatiotempo-
ral loci arranged in serial successions, capable of being split up analytically 
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into smaller loci. hence, the loci of propositional logic can be “instantiated” 
by objects that fill the pure and static spatiotemporal loci. conceptuality 
and logic of the propositional language is a purification of linear space-
time structure from the changing things. After all, in this structure, things 
change their locations in space and time, but the spatiotemporal locations 
remain constant. The Platonic world of ideas and the rational logicism are 
but two variants of linear space-time awareness. 
9. The propositional language in its logistic stage correlates to the 
modern world of technology. if the process of spatialization and linearity is 
pushed to the extreme, the world is experienced as a sum of “material facts” 
having specific spatiotemporal loci and directions. Such loci, their relation-
ships and directions can be calculated and the results of the change of loci 
can be predicted. if the process is inverted and the result is calculated, it is 
possible to reconstruct the spatiotemporal structure and the relationship 
of the loci, which gave rise to the result. This places us in a peculiar posi-
tion: we can calculate, be rational about the required arrangement of spa-
tiotemporally located events or objects and get desired results. We can set 
up, according to the modern parlance, the proper “material” conditions and 
derive the “projected results”. The latter are the differently arranged spati-
otemporal components following from the arrangement of the conditions. 
What we call logic, scientific reason and even experimentation is the pure 
arrangement, pure variation of spatiotemporal static locations and their re-
lationships and directions and the calculation as to what such variations 
would yield as a result. The variation can be done at will and objects can 
resultantly be instantiated to yield the calculated results. Technology is pre-
cisely this process: we establish results by calculating the spatiotemporally 
required conditions and get the projected results in linear time. The result 
is a different, although logically calculated, arrangement of spatiotemporal 
components. This, of course, involves the logic of “if-then” because we are 
in a position to make such propositions as “if we establish these conditions, 
then the results will be as follows”. The propositional language couched in 
this modality is a language of modern logistics, technocracy and scientific 
procedures. The educators proclaim that if we establish “better” schools, 
then the children will be better educated; the liberals proclaim that if we 
provide full employment, then the crime rate will drop; the Marxists pro-
claim that if we establish a socialistic economy, then we get a new kind of 
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human. What is remarkable is that this language and its technocratic mode 
of understanding is a language that, at its own strata, integrates magic. it 
is a language of transformation: change the conditions and the results are 
read in the conditions, like the coming rain is read in the entrails or the rain 
dance. The propositional language sweeps up all the other linguistic dimen-
sions and arranges them in terms of its own world of awareness. 
As in the previous communicative domains, the propositional lan-
guage also functions in everyday discourse. it could be called the language 
of facts and practical affairs. We ask questions of each other in terms of 
“why” and give answers with words such as “because”. We say “if you want 
to have fun, you ought to go to the street scene”, and so forth. We talk about 
moving children from one grade up to the next, progressing them from 
one year to the following. We speak of aesthetic, economic and religious 
perspectives; we speak of language in terms of reference, signification and 
the logical connectors of terms. While using the magical and the expressive 
linguistic dimensions in our political or business proclamations, we also 
employ the propositional language as an integral part of our total speaking. 
While embellishing the car with sleekness and winged power, while en-
chanting it with a melody, we also intertwine propositional, that is, spatial 
vocabulary, such as “it will get you there in the shortest time and provide 
you with the highest mileage”. We say that it can devour distances and that 
you will just love the convenient location of the stick shift, the ashtray and 
the high beam. not even religion lags behind. The god is the most distant, 
although his glory is near; he is the highest and we, in our sinful degrada-
tion, are the lowest. The Brahman is beyond all paths, although all paths 
lead to Brahman. expressive and propositional language is integrated. 
But magic, the transformative dimension of language, is also integrated. 
The propositional language in advertising, for example, is not designed 
just to give us facts, but to “change our minds” about buying another car 
and getting over to the dealer and buying this car, or at least to convince us 
to change cars. The Skinnerian factual propositions – purely spatial meta-
phors – carry the magical weight of exhortation of enchantment to change 
our society into Walden ii and to allow technocrats to deal with us “factual-
ly”. having decided to go to a theatre, we consult our friend, who proclaims 
that if you go to see this play, you will be disappointed because the cast is 
not up to par and lacks the charm to perform the roles; thus, we change 
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our minds, we are transformed by the language that includes the magical 
transformative power, the expressive power in terminology used and the 
propositional, spatial deployment of factual events. We are changed, disap-
pointed and relocated. 
This leads to the integral domain of communication. it is nonlinear 
and resultantly cannot be understood in terms of the spatial loci. in this 
sense, the integral time dimension is also free from seriality and succes-
sion and could be called atemporal, that is, time free. This is not to say that 
atemporal is eternal; the notion of eternity is bound with lineal temporality 
and is derived from the ever present now and its infinite divisibility. Gebser 
gives us analogy by using the terms immoral, moral and amoral77. The latter 
is free from morality, but is in no way some eternal law of action. 
The question of time is the question of our age. Bergson, Whitehead, 
husserl, heidegger, einstein, heisenberg, freud, Jung, Rilke, nietzsche and 
a multitude of other important thinkers of our age struggled with the ques-
tion of time. This is an eruption of time into our “propositional” space con-
sciousness. Because every field of endeavor stresses time, how is language 
related to the question of time and, specifically, atemporality? The breadth 
of the question includes every mode of speaking from poetry through lit-
erature and science. Although these areas offer interesting examples, the 
basic linguistic transposition from spatial metaphor to atemporal mode of 
speaking lies at a more fundamental level. Such a level will have to be deci-
phered along various strata. 
1. There is a movement in language that is abolishing the spatial meta-
phor in various ways. The poets and writers, from hoelderlin through Kaf-
ka, Valery and Rilke have abandoned the propositional language and have 
instituted a mode of writing that is not identical with the expressive writ-
ing. They have, in main, abandoned “if-then” structures; they have dropped 
“why-because” configurations and comparatives, they have redefined the 
function of adjectives and adverbs and substantiated the inflictive while 
verbalizing the substantive. it is known that in propositional language the 
adjective qualifies the substantive, even when the propositional structure 
would include expressive dimension: “the angry sword” or the “invit-
ing meadow”. The 20th century writers have exploded this “perspectival” 
77 Gebser, J. (1985). The ever-Present origin. (n. Barstad & A. Mickunas, Trans.). Athens, 
oh: ohio university Press, p. 2. 
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function of the adjective: Kafka uses expressions, such as “and he entered 
greetingly the siding grass”. here, an all sided relationship is established; 
the adjective becomes relational. After all, Kafka does not say that “he en-
tered sideways in grass”, but allows the mutual activity of the subject and the 
grass. What was once simply spatially located and viewed from the perspec-
tive of the subject is now dynamized, enacted and, hence, temporalized. The 
adjectival relationality leads to “adjectival ambivalence”. The dynamization 
is also pronounced in the verbalization of the substantive. The substan-
tive being the static and the verb being the active elements of language, 
in propositional speaking they were separated; yet, with our age, they are 
conjoined and quite persistently. nietzsche was one of the first to note the 
drastic importance and consequence of such a conjunction. in Zarathustra, 
the term Sphinx is exploded by verbalization and, hence, the substantive is 
integrated with the temporal, the dynamic. he speaks of “ensphinxed” by 
the cat girls and immediately adds, “may god forgive me the linguistic sin”. 
in propositional speaking, the term “god” was the most substantive of all 
substantives, the symbol of all fixity and changelessness. With the verbaliza-
tion of the substantive, any spatial fixity, any permanent locus is abolished; 
space is temporalized. What these modes of linguistic employment suggest 
is an awareness of the concrete function of time in space. Time is no longer 
a mere succession of spatial loci and the events that occupy them; rather, 
the spatial loci and their occupants are temporalized. This is the integration 
of space and time manifest from physics through lyric poetry. 
2. The dynamization of the substantive and the “adjectival ambiva-
lence” leading to the primacy of mutual interrelationships and not one-
sided static perspectivity abolish the notion of fixed spatiotemporal loci 
and require an awareness of the world as a field of mutual interactions and 
implications. Any localization is temporary and is possible only within the 
mutual interrelationships in a field. The spatiotemporal field is prior to any 
locus and any locus is possible within the transformations of the field. Any 
permanence is given only in terms of the flux of the field. hence, any static-
ity is relative and is identifiable only through the differentiation of it from 
other functions in the field. integral language is correlative to the notion of 
the field, and various linguists of this century have elaborated a field con-
ception of language. from de Saussure through Trier, Weisgerber, husserl, 
Levy Straus, Prague school of linguistics, Tartu school of semiology, Grei-
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mas and his structural semantics, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and 
Derrida’s Grammatology, there is a common thread: language is a field and 
not a sum of terms that signify fixed objects and are related by logical con-
nectors and copula. in the field of linguistics, the terms are clustered along 
similarities and differences. hence, the meaning of a term is only possible 
in its relationship to other terms and in its difference from dissimilar terms. 
The similarities and dissimilarities must be present as a total field in order 
for a term to have a meaning. What this suggests is that the meaning of a 
term is not in its unitary power of signifying of some pre-given entity, but 
in its relationship to other terms. The shift in the relationship among some 
of the terms in the field is also a shift of the meaning of all of the terms. As 
Merleau-Ponty had noted, the meaning of the term is not so much in the 
terms as “between” the terms78. The term “cousin” does not have a meaning 
because it signifies a particular person, but it is meaningful in the field of 
terms of family relationships. each term is integral to the field. 
3. The integral domain of communication is also “open”. Although the 
tendency of propositional-spatial language is to analyze and, thus, close 
terms by refined definitions, the integral language shows that every term 
is open and involves an aura, a spread prior to any spatiotemporal localiza-
tion. Thus, the mode of writing that begins with “and” indicates dissolu-
tion of a temporal beginning “now” point: it is no longer a copula of terms, 
but opens the entire field, which is implicitly present in the continuity that 
the statement beginning with “and” indicates. The openness is specifically 
manifest in the field function of any term. The term “cousin”, or for that mat-
ter “brother”, is understandable in the field of family terms; yet, the family 
terms are themselves open. The father of the brother is the “provider” and 
opens up into the economic process and relationships of the community 
and its linguistic field. What this means is that any attempted definition of 
a particular term is exploded into the total field, within which these terms 
are understood and make sense. Propositional language is only an abstrac-
tive moment in the open field; the function of such a language is ultimately 
comprehensible within the integral field. in this sense, a proposition does 
not imply a set of conclusions or subsequent results, but primarily implies 
78 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). consciousness and the Acquisition of Language. (R Silverman, 
Trans.). evanston, iL: northwestern university Press, p. 90-93. 
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the entire field, it opens up toward the totality of language. The field is prior 
to succession and localization.
4. The integral language is also diacritical. A language is less a sum 
of signs, such as words and grammatical and syntactical forms and series, 
than a differentiation of signs from one another comprising a linguistic uni-
verse, a field. This accounts for the fact that while possessing a finite set of 
terms, language is an indefinitely open process. As Merleau-Ponty argued, 
terms to not signify anything, and each one does not express a meaning, but 
marks a divergence of meaning between itself and other terms79. The terms 
of language are engendered only by the differences that appear among 
them. hence, terms are not loci in a logistic or grammatical seriality: rather, 
they abolish themselves by being exploded not by their own meaning, but 
by the difference in meaning from other terms. But this diacritical aspect of 
integral language has its base in the awareness of time that has no succes-
sive moments, but a contemporaneity of an emergent, upsurgent field. in 
the awareness of past and future, the terms “past and future” do not make 
sense without their relationship such that each term marks a difference of 
the other term; the past is past because it is conversely different from the 
future. Yet, the movement of awareness that establishes their difference is 
neither past nor future. As a matter of fact, it could not be said to be the pre-
sent, because the present too makes sense only on the basis of its difference 
between the present and the past or the present and the future. This move-
ment, establishing temporal loci and their differences, is atemporal. not an 
eternal atemporality, but a dynamic upsurgence that, although establish-
ing any term, explodes the term, derails it toward its difference. The move-
ment to establish any term is a movement that establishes the difference of 
the term to other terms; it is a movement that establishes a field and not 
a series of terms. This atemporal movement of awareness is precisely the 
erupting temporality that, although disrupting the spatiotemporal fixity of 
any location, is itself unlocalizable. This movement of awareness subtends 
and is a condition of localization. And any localization is possible only as 
a difference of other localizations, and the latter are not absolute points of 
reference, but are exploded into differences of other than themselves. The 
atemporal movement of consciousness, as Gebser called it, is precisely the 
79 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). consciousness and the Acquisition of Language. (R Silverman, 
Trans.). evanston, iL: northwestern university Press. 
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time-consciousness that is not identical with any spatiotemporal location80. 
in this sense, it marks a difference between itself and any other term. it is 
now somewhat clear why at the outset of our discussion we claimed that 
any linguistic dimension is possible on the basis of a difference between it 
and something more fundamental. This something is the movement of the 
atemporal-integrative consciousness that sets the differences and, in doing 
so, is different from any posited terms. Any attempt to eradicate this atem-
poral movement of the difference will have to presuppose it. The difference 
is integrative because by marking the terms as different, it also holds them 
together as unified, as not given one without the other. 
5. The integral dimension of language respects the claim that the emer-
gent atemporal consciousness is transparent. Although the arguments con-
cerning the transparency of consciousness were centered mainly in phe-
nomenology, the question of transparency appears in various domains of 
scientific and aesthetic research. our discussion of the diacritical aspect 
of integral domain of language and its foundation in the movement of the 
atemporal awareness comprises the configuration for the transparency of 
integral language. The emergence of a linguistic term, such as a sfuture, 
meaning of which is its difference from the present and the past, requires 
that all three terms remain present in the field and be seen one through 
the other. The term future, in order to have a meaning, must be transpar-
ent with its difference, such as the terms present or past. This suggests that 
the present, past and future are not serial, but comprise a field, in which 
each term is transparent with the difference of the other terms. Another 
example would be terms, such as high tone. in propositional language, the 
terms high tone would refer to, would signify a tonal quality; in integral 
linguistics, these terms are exploded into their difference from the terms 
low tone. Their meaning would be possible on the basis of this difference. 
hence, they would be field terms and not terms of signification. in its differ-
ence from low tone, the meaning of the phrase high tone is transparent with 
the low tone. Both phrases are co-present as a field and are transparent one 
through the other. They are not successive, but each is transparent with and 
articulates the other in their differentiation. The transparency of integral 
linguistics suggests that this linguistic domain is prior to signification, that 
is, prior to pointing; before pointing to each other, the terms are transpar-
80 Gebser, J. (1985). The ever-Present origin, p. 374. 
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ent with each other as a total field. Moreover, this dimension is also prior to 
association and any metaphor. in order to associate two terms, they must 
be co-present and in their differentiation they must be given one through 
the other. This is not to say that the two terms cannot be associated or that 
propositional signification language loses its import. indeed, the term yes-
terday signifies yesterday and can be associated with the term today. Yet, 
the association and signification are now aspects of a self-articulating lin-
guistic field, terms of which are transparent through each other in their 
co-presence and differentiation. The integral linguistics are very much part 
and parcel of our everyday commerce and communication. When some-
one says “i am looking for a book which i left here yesterday”, he/she has 
a field that is articulated in terms of the co-presence of the temporal dif-
ferentiations. he/she is looking for a book at the present, which involves 
the co-presence of yesterday and the immediate future, in which the book 
will be found. The person functions in the linguistic field, in which vari-
ous components are co-present in their differentiation and transparency. 
The soon-to-be-found book is differentiated in its temporal aspect from the 
book that was here yesterday. 
6. The integral linguistics, as an atemporal movement of the difference 
and its establishment of a field, is also apsychic and arational. it is free from 
imagery and free from spatiotemporal localizations, precisely because it 
is a condition of imagery and all localizations. Take, for example, modern 
geometry: although initially geometry was bound to spatially represented 
figures, requiring either visual-perceptual symbolization or their visualiza-
tion in imagination, modern geometry is elevated to a system of articulated 
signs, requiring no perceptual or imaginary content. indeed, such content 
is a hindrance. in this sense, there is no pre-given geometry derivable from 
a pre-given three-dimensional space. As e. Stroker suggested, modern ge-
ometries are not at first pre-given in some spatial intuition or imagination, 
but emerge in the process of articulation of a sign system; they have their 
“being” in nothing else than in their process of articulation, because they 
cannot appeal to anything pre-given that they would signify81. it is an emer-
gence of a differentiation of a pure field. As she says, the presence of mod-
ern geometry is not an attempt to elucidate something given more precisely, 
but that such a geometry is in its process of pure construction and, thus, is 
81 Stroker, e. (1987). investigations in Philosophy of Space, p. 211-221.
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an achievement requiring no spatiality. it is pure articulation and differen-
tiation of the atemporal field. This is why there are no pre-given prescripts 
how such an articulation should occur. Such an articulation is free and can 
assume most varied ways. in this sense, the integral linguistics is completely 
open to indefinite possibilities. if rationality depends on the spatial meta-
phor and the serial articulation of something pre-given as an entity, a spa-
tiotemporal fact, then the new sciences, such as geometry, are arational. if 
the old geometry and its ratio depended on the axioms that were spatially 
pre-given or imaginatively symbolized, then the new geometry has no such 
spatially pre-given axioms and no such rational base; in the process of con-
struction, the new geometry, as a mode of speaking, emerges with its own 
axioms that are not tied to any spatiotemporal requirements. 
This is a rational language that has no causal connections, nor does it 
imply causal succession. We cannot imagine what einstein’s system says: 
any visualized model is simply that, visualized help, an auxiliary tool, but 
not a representation of the language of physics. This is not to say that im-
agery vanishes; rather, it is integrated and assumes its function without be-
ing predominant. 
7. The last aspect of the pure linguisticality integrates the notion of 
“world without opposite”. The world of opposites belongs in the context of 
propositional, rationalistic domain of language. it is a dualistic world of lan-
guage as representation, of subject and object and of subjective expressions 
and objective statements; yet, the integral dimension of language surpasses 
dualisms. for example, subject and object are not opposites: they comprise 
a field and emerge as co-present not as independent terms, but as a mark of 
the difference they have from each other. in this sense, they do not point to 
and signify each other; rather, they are transparent through each other as 
functions of a differentiated field. hence, terms do not signify, point to or 
represent something opposite facing them. Before they can point either to 
objects in a field or to each other, they already contain the difference to the 
other within themselves transparently. in this sense, each term is already a 
field having no opposites. The integral linguistic domain has no opposite 
yet in another sense: it does not “face” and signify pre-given objects, but 
emerges with a field of differentiated unifications, within which objects can 
be signified and located and within which spatiotemporal loci and orienta-
tions can be established. indeed, it is a “world without opposite” because in 
157
Chapter V. Concretization of Language
its pure speaking, such as in the case of geometrical emergence of an articu-
lated and differentiated “sign” system, there appears a world to be inhabited 
by various empirical ideal and metaphysical entities. What this suggests is 
that this dimension of language is not some kind of mystical microcosmos 
alight with the macrocosmos. it is not some absolute working through, and 
appearing in, us. in brief, in our language we do not express a pre-given 
sum of things or some absolute development by becoming an expression 
of such pre-given realities. The basic modality of the understanding of lan-
guage is, indeed, different from the propositional language; hence, this mo-
dality is relevant for the understanding of the 20th century consciousness. 
The integral domain of communication includes all other domains, but 
in its own way; the magical domain, the transformative power, is present in 
the process of articulation, when one term, in its difference to other terms, 
is also the other term in its meaning; it has the expressive domain insofar, 
as the expressive terms are not only tensed or deployed polarly – love-hate, 
joy-sadness – but are seen one through the other in their co-presence in 
the field; and it has the propositional rational domain of signifying and 
of arraying terms and objects in spatiotemporal seriality. from the discus-
sion of the integral domain of communication, it is obvious that the future 
is immanent in the present. The understanding of the present is, indeed, 
possible only on the basis of the differentiation and co-presence of the tem-
poral, concrete field, in which present, past and future play a role. This is 
also the reason why we can claim that the integral consciousness cannot 
be understood in terms of progress, evolution or unfolding. All these no-
tions suggest lineality and already presuppose an atemporal awareness and 
the emergent field of experience, within which progress and so forth can 
find their orientations and temporal articulations. And this is also why we 
can claim that every term is an intensified field containing the world; after 
all, every term is a mark of difference of all other terms and their fields, 
comprising a dimension of awareness and linguisticality as a concrete and 
immediate domain, within which we live and find our way among things, 
objects, systems and common chores. indeed, we live in a world without 
opposite because our facing the integral world dimension is a marker of 
the difference of our being from other beings is a difference of those beings 
from us within the same field. 
158
ChapTEr VI
Intercultural Communication reflected through Doxa, 
argumentation and Semio-Discursive analysis
Introduction
Language is a device of communication. An argument becomes opin-
ion, when the speaker communicates it to his/her interlocutor and the in-
terlocutor is convinced. As Philippe Breton remarks, “To convince is one 
of the essential modalities of communication” (Breton, 1996:3). To com-
municate is to convince, i.e., “to propose to an audience good reasons to 
adhere to an opinion” (Breton, 1996: 3). Such an opinion is known as doxa. 
Ruth Amossy shows that “the rhetoric as art of persuading emphasizes the 
essential function of the doxa or common opinion in the verbal communi-
cation” (Amossy, 1991: 89).
Rolands Barthes defined doxa as “Public opinion, Majoritaire Spirit, 
the petit bourgeois consensus, the Voice of the nature, the Violence of the 
Prejudice” (Barthes, 1995: 52), based on his famous structuralist practices 
to reconstruct sign systems statically without social, ideological or other 
consideration. his negative vision of the dominant opinion associated with 
the notion of ideologies and structuralism presupposes that content could 
be received as a code model. This assumption has been overcome by several 
theoreticians, who tried to incorporate the outside that the structuralists 
ignored. Barthes himself had no use for this outside, focusing on psychoa-
nalysis, the notion of text, the pleasure of the text and “the death of the 
author” (Barthes, 1968). cultural studies invoke the semiological model, 
audience studies and media affect theories to develop an encoding-decod-
ing model. See Sperber and Wilson’s work on relevance and the implicit 
inferences model versus the code model and the discourse analysis of the 
french School, particularly Michel foucault.
This paper works with this background of communication studies 
from semiology to discourse analysis. intercultural communication and 
argumentation work together to construct doxa: “the whole of beliefs and 
shared opinions which are used as the base of communication and permit 
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verbal interaction”82. i examine this process through stereotype, a form of 
doxa, the entirety of beliefs and shared opinions, which serve as a basis for 
communication and permit verbal interaction83. 
how does doxa/opinion, Barthes’ “Voice of the nature”, form through 
structuration, communication and persuasion of an opinion through tra-
ditional rhetorical functions, such as ethos, logos and pathos? Would the 
doxa relating to the others, constructed by the usage of stereotype, help 
or impair understanding? As Walter Lippman said, without stereotype, it 
would be difficult to contact an unknown person. Stereotypes sometimes 
help us prepare for a first meeting with an unknown person. But at the 
same time, stereotypical images risk leading to misunderstanding (Lipp-
man, 1997: 59-60). using some case studies of intercultural communica-
tion between Japan and the West as examples, i will address these questions 
and suggest some possibilities of intercultural communication in the global 
communication age.
historical overview on studies of doxa in communication is presented 
next: from the Saussurean semiology developed by Roland Barthes to com-
munication studies.
communication has been studied from interdisciplinary points of 
view. The study of the construction of doxa was one of the most funda-
mental questions of mass media communication studies of the 20th cen-
tury (Yoshimi, 2004: 44). critically based on Gustave Le Bon’s notion of the 
crowd, the character of which is impulsiveness, mobility and irritability84, 
Gabriel Tarde shows in his book “opinion and crowd” that newspapers 
and magazines are one of the factors promoting the reflection of opinions 
and the public, a purely psychological group of which each individual is 
physically separated, but is connected through their feeling, in which state 
82 cf. Amossy, R. Les idées reçues. Paris: nathan, 1991. english translations from french and 
Japanese are by the author of this text.
83 cf. Amossy, R. Les idées reçues. Paris, nathan, 1991.
84 “1. Impulsiveness, Mobility and Irritability of Crowds. The crowd is at the mercy of all exte-
rior exciting causes, and reflects their incessant variations —The impulses which the crowd 
obeys are so imperious as to annihilate the feeling of personal interest—Premeditation is 
absent from crowds—Racial influence. “The Sentiments and Morality of crowds”. chap-
ter 2 in The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. (Second edition). Dunwoody, Georgia: 
norman S. Berg, 15-44. <http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/ Lebon/LeBon_1895/Le-
Bon_1895_03.html>. [accessed on 13-08-2013].
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they share a certain contemporary idea that is born through the media85. 
Jürgen habermas indicates that although public space, in which opinion 
was born, was limited space, such as the coffee house of the 18th century, 
and later in the 19th and 20th centuries the commercial public media when 
that was born, public space has moved from being a space of cultural dis-
cussion to one of consumption86. Thus, the importance of the role of the 
media in the construction of doxa is emphasised. in the uSA, since the 
1920s, mass communication research has been particularly active through 
the areas of the psychological and sociological study of media influence, in 
measuring political propaganda (Yoshimi, 2004: 55). in these circumstanc-
es, communication was suspected of symbolic violence and is understood 
as a device of dominant power. After criticism of the cultural industry87 by 
the frankfort School, Max horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Structural-
ism, born in france, found ideology in opinion construction. 
Roland Barthes, on remarking in Communication no4 that structural-
ism spreads the hypothesis from linguistic school to other disciplines of 
the human Sciences (anthropology, history, literature, psychoanalyse), de-
veloped Saussurean semiological theory. in 1956, Barthes based his book 
“Mythologies” on ferdinand de Saussure’s courses in general linguistics, 
carrying out a semiological analysis of several ‘myths’ then found in french 
society. for Barthes, myth was a parole (speech in english) and a system of 
communication. Myth is a device of ideology, which realises the beliefs – of 
which the doxa (opinion) is the system – in discourse. The myth is a sign, its 
signified is an ideologem, its signifier could be anything: each object of the 
world could pass from a closed silent existence to oral situation, open to the 
appropriation of the society (Barthes, 1957: 216, 221). 
85 Tarde (1989), p.31.
86 habermas (1986), p.183.
87 cultural industries refer to “commercially and state-owned organisations in the arts and 
media, committed to the direct production, sponsorship, display and distribution of cul-
tural goods and services”, a term, which was first coined by Adorno. “The forms and effects 
of mass culture are seen to serve the ends of commodification and to duplicate the social 
relations of capitalism in the realm of ideology. The cultural industries are seen as manipu-
lative and their audiences as passive consumers. They are then contrasted in both respects 
with the non-commercial forms of authentic art, thought of as a product of the lone artist 
of integrity.” (Brooker: 60-61)
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in this work, on emphasising the importance of the development of 
the publicity, of the mass media, which make more urgent than before the 
constitution of a semiological science, Barthes aimed to analyse how the 
communication media generates symbolic power (Barthes, 1982: 167).
Within the framework of structural semiology, Barthes also analysed 
media discourses on fashion, in “The fashion System”, in order to “reconsti-
tute a formal system, without social, ideological, aesthetic difference consid-
erations” (Barthes, 1967: 21). After publication, Barthes himself considered 
this volume to be one to be overcome as a practice of structural semiology 
(Barthes, 1985: 11-12)88. Sperber and Wilson, who proposed the inference 
model89, including the presentation and interpretation of evidence, rather 
than Shannon’s code model90, equally criticised the structural semiology 
proposed by Lévi-Strauss and Barthes: “Structural semiology could not find 
a system combining sign and message which could explain (…) how works 
of myth or literature could be successfully communicated” (Sperber and 
Wilson: 9, 11).
Thus, after this period, communication studies emphasised not static 
structural analysis, which aims only to expose symbolic violence, but rather 
the ‘inter-subjective movement’, of which the linguistic turn (such as Austin 
(America), Benvenist (france), Bakhtin (Russia), Jakobson (uSA)) ques-
tions the addressees (for example, reader’s theory, as proposed by eco, 
88 After this period, Barthes aimed to analyse the signifier of the text, for example, with his 
work “The empire of Signs” in an effort to construct paradoxa rather than to analyse the 
signified of the sign in order to reinforce endoxa (Shinoda, 1989: 236, 246).
89 “The inferential model, (is) a communicator provides evidence of her intention to convey 
a certain meaning, which is inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence pro-
vided.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 249)
90 “The code model, (is) a communicator encodes her intended message into a signal, which is 
decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 249)
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Barthes, and audience studies, such as cultural Studies). concerning the 
linguistic turn, in the preface to Patrick charaudeau’s “Langage et discours-
éléments de sémiolinguistique (Théorie et pratique)”, it is written that:
The need for research renewal goes in two opposite directions: 
on the one hand, generative grammar and syntax belonging to the 
scientific movement (…) of a logical nature, independent of the con-
texts. The ‘sentence’ is the privileged level of the study, the sentence of 
language, cleared from the liberty of discourse. on the other hand, it 
is open to what could explain the effects of discourses, extroversion 
tending to integrate the maximum number of elements able to ex-
plain the textual communication mechanism through its contexts, its 
situations, its implications, of which the importance is attached to the 
pragmatics, to the interlocutor’s knowledge, to the detectable inten-
tions and possible interpretation. (charaudeau, 1983:3)
Thus, within the framework of french discourse analysis, the system, 
by which doxa is successfully constructed and communicated, can be ex-
plained from the semio-discursive (Bonnafous and charaudeau, 1996: 39) 
point of view: semio is constructed through categories of form (words, se-
quences of words and their layout), which signify as they are and which 
are not only the transparent traces of certain content; discursive signifies 
as categories of form-sense are ones of usage, from which to regulate the 
combination, the contextualisation and the inter-textualisation according 
to the condition of production (op. cit.). That is, the doxa could be said to be 
constructed and communicated through the “process of enunciation (con-
struction of receptor’s register)”, “procedure of structuralisation (construc-
tion of representation of Public Space)”, etc. (ibid., 41-42). And these pro-
cedures could be examined from the rhetorical point of view (Mainguenau 
and charaudeau, 2002: 44).
communication, according to Breton, is composed of three modali-
ties: to express, to inform, to convince in order to manipulate and to argue 
(Breton, 2004: 3). The communication of doxa/opinion, which “is a point 
of view which, in a debate for example, opposes others” (ibid., 28), and 
“the entirety of beliefs, values, representations of the world, trust in others 
which an individual forms to be oneself ” (ibid., 24) belong to the ‘convince’ 
modality. To convince is composed of two further modalities: manipula-
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tion, as a procedure of symbolic power, such as the analysis object of Bar-
thesian semiology, and argumentation91, which, as opinion construction, 




         
Argument Audience
context of the reception
Philippe Breton’s schema of argumentative communication (Breton, 1996:20)
According to this model, proposed by Breton, the opinion of the ora-
tor/writer, who proposes the argument, belongs to the domain of plausibil-
ity, which is to say opinion, point of view. The opinion is shaped as argu-
ment by the orator in order to convince the audience. The audience is that 
person/group, which the orator wants to convince to adhere to the opinion 
that he/she proposes. The argument, conditioned by the context of recep-
tion, is the whole of the opinions, values and judgements that an audience 
shares, which precedes to argumentation act and which plays a role in the 
reception of the argument, in its acceptation, or reject (ibid., 18-19). The 
argument designs its content and its packaging, its argumentative mould 
and can be divided into 4 families: the analogic (analogy, example, meta-
phor) (op. cit., 32, 40-41), authority (competence, experience, evidence) 
and frame (definition, association, dissociation) (op. cit., 40-41).
91 After the discredit of the rhetoric since the end of 19th century, chaim Perelman redefines 
in his book “The new Rhetoric”, published in 1970, the argumentation as “the study of 
the discursive techniques permitting one to provoke or to increase the adherence of the 
sprits to a thesis which is presented for their agreement” (quoted by Breton, 1996: 11). in 
contrast to the rhetorical figure as ornament, Perelman also defines a “rhetorical figure as 
argumentative if, carrying a change to perspective, its usage appears normal in relation 
with the new suggested situation” (Perelman: 14).
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The Intercultural Stereotype:  
Doxa as an argumentative Device
Based on the above-mentioned reflexion on construction of doxa in 
communication, doxa on others in the intercultural communication is ex-
amined next.
Stereotype can be defined as the construction of Doxa relating to oth-
ers within intercultural communication in order to convince audience/
readers, who do not belong to the society of represented others, that is, 
those with limited information on others in the audience’s society. Stereo-
type is defined by Walter Lippman in his famous work “Public opinion”92 
published in 1922. he shows it as a consensual image that helps us mediate 
our relationship with reality. Stereotype is a ready-made representation, an 
existing cultural scheme. According to Lippman, stereotypes are essential 
to social life. Without them, it would not be possible for individuals to un-
derstand reality, to categorise it or to react on it. When two individuals 
do not know each other personally, each notes a feature about the other 
that distinguishes a well-known type and fills the rest with the help of the 
stereotypes, which they have in their mind. These images are “raised from 
fiction (…) because they present a social imaginary” (quoted by Amossy, 
1991: 26).
Lippman continues: “We imagine most things before we experience 
them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely 
aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception. They mark out cer-
tain objects as familiar or strange, emphasizing the difference, so that the 
slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, and the somewhat as sharply alien. 
They are aroused by small signs, which may vary from a true index to a 
vague analogy.” (Lippmann, 1997: 59) Thus, in consideration with the re-
ceiver’s register, opinion should be constructed by argument by way of ste-
reotypes of the other, which the receiver can understand through linguistic 
competence and encyclopaedic knowledge shared within society. The me-
dia should presuppose the “model reader”, using eco’s term developed by 
Maingueneau, which is “one which the text implicates by its characteristics” 
(Mainguenau and charaudeau, 2002: 338). Based on their ideas, it could be 
considered that in speech, cooperative essential activity, and in the media, 
92 Lippmann, W. Public Opinion, new York: free Press Paperbacks, 1997, (1st edition 1992), 
p. 53-100 (part 3 Stereotypes).
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the model reader (or audience as addressee) is an imaginary addressee, to 
which the addresser (speaker/writer) should presuppose certain linguistic 
or encyclopaedic competences to interpret a particular discourse.
for Ruth Amossy, the stereotype as fixed collective representation is a 
construction of reading (Amossy, 1991: 21) in the sense that it emerges just 
when the addressee focuses on the discourse’s scattered and often lacunary 
elements in order to reconstruct something according to a pre-existing cul-
tural model (Amossy, 1991: 33). it could be said that stereotypes lean on the 
interpretation that the addressee carries out, thanks to his encyclopaedic 
knowledge. The stereotype rises from the doxa, that is, the whole of the 
beliefs and shared opinions that are used on the basis of communication 
permitting verbal interaction.
Ruth Amossy distinguished the stereotype from the cliché in the fol-
lowing way:
“The cliché is as a group of the words which it is possible to bring 
out materially from the text, though the stereotype constitutes a vari-
able scheme in its formulation, which the addressee must reconstruct: 
“as sparing as a Jew” is a recognisable cliché to everyone…. The stereo-
type does not formulate any opinion: it consist of a scheme, or an image, 
which attributes a west of features (miserliness, cupidity) to the catego-
ries of the Jew without the general reality on which its repose would be 
enounced under the form of explicit idea.” (Amossy, 1991: 33) 
from the point of view of the rhetoric, she defines the stereotype as a 
form of doxa, permitting the construction of argumentation.
“The argumentative interaction is founded on the shared knowledge 
which confers plausibility on the statement. its premises and the points of 
accord on which it leans, are loaned to an accredited doxa by the audience. 
More than structured totality, this doxa is a blurred whole and a fluctuat-
ing opinion admitted in a given socio-cultural space, in the centre of which 
opposite doctrines and points of view coexist. it had better speak on the 
‘elements of doxa’ than doxa. These elements constitute a topic which is ex-
changed in diverse discursive forms: rhetoric topos, idée reçue, pragmatic 
topos, maxim, stereotype.” (Amossy, 2000: 114)
The stereotype could be considered a form of doxa that consist of a 
scheme or an image that attributes a whole set of features permitting con-
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struction of the foundation of the argumentative communication and ab-
stract scheme, “known in advance, rooted in the cultural memory, which 
generates in the texts of lexical or argumentative formation (metaphor, 
enthymeme, anecdote…) materially isolable and pointed out by their re-
petitive features” (honoré, 1994: 9). Stereotypes, which are not presented 
directly, permit the addressee to mobilise a shared knowledge to complete 
what it is not said and the sender to escape from the responsibility of the 
sender’s discourse93. Stereotypes are also a kind of device to make argumen-
tation incontestable. The stereotype could be an analogical argumentation 
device (analogy, example, metaphor), a framing device (definition, associa-
tion, near-logic, dissociation) or a community device (common opinion, 
value, platitude), as Breton proposes.
What is the function of the stereotype in argumentation? Aristotle de-
fines rhetoric as “the faculty to discover speculatively what might be proper 
way to persuade in each case.” (Rhétorique, Livre i t.) Rhetoric as the art of 
persuasion emphasises the important role of doxa, or the shared opinion, 
in verbal communication. Aristotle also poses three argumentational paths 
within Rhetoric: logos, pathos and ethos. The first stems from rational or-
der, while the second and the third are affective. ethos expresses the char-
acter of the orator, the image, which he presents to the public; pathos is 
the full set of emotions, which the orator tries to provoke in the audience; 
and finally, logos is the logic and more objective argumentation that pro-
vides the way to proof in the modern sense. The three concepts can apply 
to the stereotypes, which find credible argumentation and which make an 
opinion plausible. That is, the stereotype as a form of doxa that permits con-
struction on the basis of all argumentation is able to correspond to pathetic, 
logical and ethical functions used in argumentation.
As for the Breton argumentation model, logic is used to make an argu-
ment publically credible/logical to construct an opinion that convinces an 
audience. The pathetic and ethical functions are used to directly mobilise 
audience’s feeling.
93 According to Ducrot, “The general question of the implicit (…) is to know how something 
could be said without accepting the responsibility of having said it, which amounts to 
a benefit for, at the same time, the efficiency of speech and of the innocence of silence.” 
(Ducrot quoted by Amossy, 2000: 151-152)
167
Chapter VI. Intercultural Communication Reflected through Doxa, 
Argumentation and Semio-discursive Analysis
opinion
orator
         
Argument Audience
context of the reception
The schema of argumentative communication based on the argumentation  
of Philippe Breton (Breton, 1996: 34)
Construction of Doxa relating to Others in the  
Intercultural Context
Japanese fashion, as represented in french newspapers in the 1980s, 
is used here as an example to explain the intercultural stereotype of ar-
gumentation as a communication modality. Through the bias of intercul-
tural stereotypes, a journalist wanted to persuade his readers of the valid-
ity of his approach on the creators of Japanese fashion, who had invented 
a new line of clothes that ignored the body and the form, which disrupt 
the conventional notion on european clothes (Baudot, 1999: 313). The 
french media presented the Japanese fashion of the 1980s, a period that 
corresponds to what was called the ‘Japanese economic offensive in the 
occident, consciously or unconsciously through intercultural stereotypes 
relating to Japan, in particular that of violence94. As an example, in order 
to illustrate the arrival of the Japanese fashion creators in Paris, metaphors 
relating to war were used: “a battalion of Japanese” and “the yellow peril”95, 
94 Jean-Paul honoré questions the representation of Japan in contemporary french writ-
ten media between 1980 and 1994, in which two lexical positive and negative groups of 
stereotypes are used: on the one hand, energy, harmony, spirituality, honour, suppleness, 
aesthetics, tradition and innovation; on the other, violence, conformism, esotericism, al-
ienation, duplicity, vapidity, archaism and loss of cultural identity (honoré, 1994: 9). 
95 «un bataillon de Japonais» et «[le] péril jaune», Le Figaro, 18/03/1983.
Logos
ethos Pathos
                   Mobilisation of the  
                   passions
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or “the Japanese landed in force at Carré du Louvre to present us their 
collection”96.
for what function could these stereotypes be used? in order to per-
suade logically the addressee, the sender/enunciator exploits the logic func-
tion of the stereotype. in particular, reasons why the agents do one thing or 
another are exploited in order to explain the reason relevantly and reduc-
tively. in another example, (“pallid and gloomy models (of Japanese creator 
designer, Comme des Garçons) pace up and down the podium in the Prus-
sian style (has it not been said before that the Japanese are the Prussians 
of Asia?”97), not only Japanese creators, as we saw, but also their models 
are implicitly interpreted by way of “Prussian style”. The expression “in the 
Prussian style” refers to the strict discipline of Prussian soldiers, and “the 
Prussians” designates the soldiers of Germany, while it was under the he-
gemony of Prussia. These expressions are used to represent indistinctly the 
model wearing clothes by Japanese fashion designers as military style, ac-
cording to a generalising expression “the Japanese”. 
The pathetic function is used to arouse an emotive reaction in the ad-
dressee that facilitates persuasion, for example, sentiments, such as curios-
ity, laughter, surprise, as well as a moral reaction. The above-mentioned 
clichés, such as “a battalion of Japanese”, “the yellow peril”, “the Japanese 
landed in force”, have a pathetic function: even if these expressions are used 
to identify just three Japanese designers, clichés evoking a large number of 
enemies are chosen by the sender/enunciator. These clichés tend to raise a 
feeling of indignation toward Japanese designers in the addressee during 
the period, when Japan companies “invaded” european markets.
The ethical function is equally used to construct the guarantor ethos 
of the sender98. 
“The ethos recovers not only the vocal dimension properly, but 
also the whole of the physical and psychic determinations attached 
by the collective representation to the enunciator’s character. Accord-
96 original text: «les Japonais ont débarqué en force au carré du Louvre pour nous présenter 
leur collection», Le Figaro, 20/10/1989.
97 original text: «des mannequins blafards et mornes, arpentant le podium à la prussienne 
(ne disait-on pas autrefois que «les Japonais sont les Prussiens de l’Asie»?)», Libération, 
20/03/1983.
98 Dominique Maingueneau defines the notion of ethos in the written as well as in the oral, as 
the personality that the enunciator reveals through enunciation (Mainguenau, 2000: 79-81).
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ing to Mainguenau the guarantor’s representation of the body of the 
enunciator – the figure of which the addressee should construct from 
textual indices of diverse orders – is affected by a ‘character’ and a 
‘corporality’, of which the level of precision is varied according the text 
(…). The ethos involves a discipline of body grasped through a global 
behaviour. The character and corporality of the guarantor comes from 
the whole, diffused from a socially privileged or underprivileged rep-
resentation, on which the enunciation bases that which it contributes 
in return to reinforce or transform. These cultural stereotypes circu-
late in the most diver domains.” (Mainguenau, 2000: 79-81)
The ethos of the guarantor, assumed by the journalist of the above-
mentioned examples, and who lent on the ethical function of the stereotype, 
has two parts: the ethos of authority and the ethos of morality. The enuncia-
tor intervenes as an expert, who interprets the Japanese fashion through 
the pre-established prism of an interiorised cultural illusion. This ethical 
function of authority often works in coordination with the logic function, 
which is articulated from precedent in order to convince readers better. 
The ethos of morality often works by implicit opposition. in this case, the 
stereotype has two simultaneous functions: the ethical and the pathetic. in 
other words, in order to provoke a particular feeling in the addressee, the 
enunciator constructs an ethos of the guarantor that is sensible to the same 
feeling in his addressee. Thus, to clarify his position in the discourse, the 
guarantor outlines his or her ethos by way of a stereotype that works in the 
mainly implicit opposition.
The above-mentioned clichés, such as “a battalion of Japanese”, “the 
yellow peril”, “the Japanese landed in force”, also have an ethical function. 
By provoking indignation in the reader, these clichés construct the ethos of 
the guarantor as Japanophobic journalist and represent the negative aspect 
of Japanese designers. This allows the construction of the ethos of morality, 
which is that of the occidental fighting against the Japanese expansion of 
that period.
The above-mentioned cliché, which follows “(has it not been said 
before that the Japanese are the Prussians of Asia?)”99, outlines an ethical 
99 The original text: «des mannequins blafards et mornes, arpentant le podium à la prus-
sienne (ne disait-on pas autrefois que «les Japonais sont les Prussiens de l’Asie»?)».
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function that is used to construct the journalist’s guarantor, knowing Japa-
nese history well in order to be confirmed as a specialist authority on Japan.
By Way of Conclusion: Identity Construction through  
Intercultural Communication
The doxa, relating to others, constructed and communicated from a 
semio-discursive point of view, could often be considered directly as the 
identities of these others.
identity can be defined using three points, such as the following ones: 
first, it can be defined as a constructed representation. olivier explains:
“The identities are representations, images, and not realities. The 
identity is constructed. The identities are the object of permanent in-
terpretations and reinterpretations (…) it is the system of representa-
tion of the self and the other for individual identities, and of our and 
others’ collective identity.” (olivier, 2009: 8)
The second point is that the other can be necessary to construct the 
identity of the self: identity is a “product of the relation to others” (Ben-
ichou, 2006: 13). As the third point, i indicate that the other is not a reality, 
but a representation. According to J Berting, “the observation of the other 
is to be governed by collective representations or stereotypes as soon as the 
distinction is done: a person is the other because a person has one or several 
features which distinguish them from us” (Berting, 2009: 58). 
identity could be defined as a representation produced in relation to 
the representation of the other by stereotypes, where the other has some 
features distinguishing them from us. The collective representation of the 
other formed by stereotypes is used to construct the self-identity. 
it could be said that doxa/opinion relating to others represented/con-
structed/communicated through the intercultural stereotypes could be 
considered as identity. This type of representation/identity constructed at 
the crossing point of the view of the self and the other is the plausible, al-
though the reality is not. however, as mentioned above, these types of rep-
resentation/identity permit solicitation of mutual understanding between 
the self and the other, and at the same time risk some misunderstanding. 
in any case, this type of representation/identity, constructed through the 
other’s gaze, could also be said to be one of identity of the self, even if it was 
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further from the ‘real’ self than before. currently, in the 21st century, when 
transnational information systems, such as the internet, are more devel-
oped than we imagined, the eyes of diverse others possessing various cul-
tural backgrounds construct representation/identity on the self with eyes, 
according to which various representations/identities of the self might be 
constructed and communicated.
in this sense, in a period, when social and personal identity can be 
multiple and changing, and “no centre of our interior exists”, as Jean-claude 
Kaufmann remarks (Kaufmann, 2008), identity in the intercultural com-
munication context of the transnational information age could be more 
varied than before. it is true that intercultural communication has already 
aimed to understand different cultures; however, today it could be said to 
be one of the first steps to know these “inter” identities/representations of 
the self-constructed and communicated through intercultural communica-
tion in order to promote mutual understanding in the intercultural context.
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The following discussion is concerned with the question of expression, 
specifically the meaning of corporeal expression. The examples of expres-
sion are numerous: love, joy, hate, sadness, indifference, pride, submission, 
etc. Phenomenologists, from Sartre through Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe to 
Seebohm, argued that corporeal expressions and our perception of them 
have a primacy over interpretation and intellectual projections100. The argu-
ments that will demonstrate the primacy of expression are designed to show 
the inadequacies of various theoretical positions founded in modern dual-
isms of interior-exterior, mind-body and senses-intellect. The other task is 
to show the “essence” of expression by using the well-known method of vari-
ation and the transpositionality of one event into various contexts without 
the loss of the “familiarity” of the event. What is meant by the term “essence” 
was delimited earlier and will appear in the discussion of expression. 
Explanatory Frameworks of Expression 
one of the major theoretical principles used in the explanation of ex-
pression is dualism between the “outer” and the “inner”. The outer is inter-
preted in various ways: as a bodily process, as sense impressions and even as 
a mechanism. The inner is understood to be a mind, a reason, a psyche or a 
spirit. in this sense, it is claimed that the outer is experienced by the outer – 
the physical senses – and conceived as located sense organs. The sense or-
gans experience the bodily presence, the actions of another. in brief, they 
offer to the experiencer the “outer” functions of another human subject. 
it follows then that the inner functions of the other are perceived as so 
many external actions, corporeal shapes and mechanical processes. if there 
is interiority, a consciousness or a psyche, then it is inaccessible directly to 
the perceiver’s external organs, because the latter perceive only the external 
bodily processes. Both the perceived body and its activities and the perceiv-
100 Seebohm, T. (1985). Die Begrundung der hermeneutik Diltheys in husserls Transcenden-
taler Phaenomenologie [The foundation of Dilthey’s hermeneutics in husserl’s Transcen-
dental Phenomenology]. in e. W. orth (ed.), Dilthey und die Philosophie der Gegenwart. 
Munchen, West Germany: Verlag Karl Alber, p. 97-125.
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ing organs are related in a multitude of mechanical relays, impressions and 
reactions offering the interaction of two “exteriorities”. in this sense, corpo-
real expressivity would have to be the experience of these organic circuits, 
impressions and reactions, the sum of bodily mechanisms, light and sound 
waves, the distances between raised eyebrows and lids, and measurements 
of the movement of hands or the pivot of the head. The pure description 
of the sense experience would give us external relationships without any 
indications of interiority. in this sense, the outer would not constitute the 
expression of the inner and, hence, expression would cease to make sense. 
if there is expression, then it must depend on interiority, which is 
distinct from the external bodily processes. Given the assumption of this 
distinction, the exteriority would have to be re-characterized. The exterior-
ity would have to be understood in terms of a system of signs of interior 
states. This suggests that the bodily activities are “more” than mechanical 
functions and that the experiencer is confronted with “overabundance” of 
expression over impression and of meaning over physiology. Yet, if the du-
alistic principle is maintained, then an immediate question must be posed: 
“if the outer organs can experience only the impressional data, that is, the 
bodily movements, then how does the experiencer grasp the expressive 
characteristics through the senses?” After all, the senses cannot give more 
than the external processes. Such a conception of sensibility cannot suggest 
any event to be a sign of another event, and, above all, an event that is hid-
den behind and signified by exteriority.
To answer this question, the protagonists of the dualistic principle are 
compelled to maintain that the overabundance of expression over impres-
sion, although not experienced through the senses, except as signs to be 
deciphered, is present in its immediacy to the interiority of the experiencer. 
This immediate presence is what allows the experience of the expressions of 
the other. The experiencer can decipher the other’s corporeal movements, 
that is, the external processes as signs of an interiority, as being similar or 
analogous to those of the experiencer. it is then concluded that an anologi-
cal inference is performed, a kind of likening, through which the other’s ex-
ternal signs are understood as expressions of inner states. each of us, it is 
said, has been at times angry or joyful, dignited or dejected, and, thus, has 
experienced the expressions in our own interiority. We have projected these 
expressive characteristics through our bodies and, hence, we are in a posi-
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tion to read the same projection of other’s as signs of their internal states. 
This is to say, when we see similar corporeal functions in others, when we 
note the same facial contortions in the heroic statues, in the masks of gods 
or in the portraits of the past ages, we infer through analogy that they too 
are or were possessors of similar internal states as our own. 
Besides the problem concerning the impossibility of showing how the 
senses would be able to suggest more than the mechanical process of another 
corporeity, there appears another set of problems with analogization. if we 
feel anger as an interior state, do we, like some narcissus, run to the pool to 
observe the external signs, the corporeal configurations as expressions of our 
internal states? even if one were not a narcissus, but an actor, or even a scien-
tific researcher of expression, and were to rush with every interior experience 
of anger or joy to some reflecting surface in order to note the external signs 
of internal events, one could not obtain a precise picture. The attempts to ob-
serve one’s own angry expression through the external signs would interfere 
and would offer an image of someone trying to observe an angry expres-
sion. even if it were possible to constantly observe one’s own interior states 
expressed in one’s own external corporeal signs, the dualistic principle and 
the analogical inference would preclude our understanding of the signs and, 
indeed, on two counts: (a) the mirroring surfaces would offer an external set 
of impressions to a corporeal set of organs; hence, the interior subject would 
have to find another mode of analogizing, which ultimately would lead to an 
infinite regress, and (b) the external configurations present in the reflecting 
surface do not reveal that they are signs of the interiority of the observing 
subject and his/her interior states. Self-observation, thus, offers no solution. 
The analogical inference breaks down even if we grant that the external 
senses, through some mysterious process, could read impressions as signs 
of internal events that are analogous to ours. Take, for example, the cases 
where degrees of expressive intensity are involved. A person, who feels well 
and who has a joyful disposition, perceives bitterness in another. indeed, 
the person may have had disappointing hours in his/her life, yet, he has 
never been as bitter as the person he/she sees before him/her. he/she per-
ceives an expression never fully experienced before either in his/her own 
interiority or through external physiological signs. And yet, he/she sees the 
bitterness without having to analogize or to recall his/her previous internal 
states of disappointment. 
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The question of the “assumption” of analogous internal states, sug-
gested by the experienced bodily signs of the other, leads to the following 
considerations. it seems that there is no necessity for the experiencer to 
assume internally the states that are expressed by the other. To experience a 
sad expression in the face of the other does not require that the experiencer 
become sad, nor must the experiencer turn to his/her internal states in or-
der to perform analogical inferences. it seems that while experiencing an 
expression of sadness, we are not required to read the corporeal contortions 
of the other as signs of the other’s internal states and then to infer from 
those signs that we too possess such internal states. even if we were to grant 
that the corporeal expressions are signs of internal states and are required 
for the experiencer, we would have to admit that the expressions, such as 
sadness, are experienced prior to the experience of corporeal configura-
tions as signs of internal states. The reason for this claim lies in the notion of 
a sign. The sign cannot be deciphered “in itself ”, that is, it cannot be seen as 
a set of independent events to be interpreted in their own right. Rather, the 
sign must efface itself, become anonymous and must be overlooked in fa-
vor of the signified. The signified must assume priority over the sign. Thus, 
it is precisely the “overlooking” of the anatomical, the physiological, me-
chanical, the sense-impressional that reveals the expressive. in this sense, 
the expression must assume priority over the signs, and the signs, in their 
function, must become anonymous. 
Although the thesis of exteriority as a system of signs of the interi-
ority is untenable, it is designed to maintain and preserve the sensualistic 
theory, the physiologically designed corporeity as externality in distinction 
to internality. This thesis postulates two modes of perception-internal and 
external, wherein we encounter within ourselves the analogates of the inner 
states of the other, while perceiving external bodily signs by our external 
senses. it should be inquired why we would need this externality of signs 
if we are required to assume the analogous inner states of the other in our 
own interiority in order to grasp the other’s physiological movements as 
expressions of the other’s interiority? After all, we would have to assume 
the internal states before we could make sense of the external signs of the 
other; yet, if we do that, then the external signs, the corporeal functions 
become redundant. if the perceived corporeal expression does not make 
sense in itself before we can assume the required inner states, then such an 
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assumption must already be made before we can perceive the external as-
pects of signs of internal states. But this means that the expression must be 
read directly through the signs, abolishing the distinction between internal 
and external. The signs must yield to the expression; the latter must be per-
ceived directly as “pain” or “joy” or “indifference”101. 
Still, another variant of the dualistic thesis of expression is depicted 
in terms of objectivation. The indifferent sense experience, that is, the pure 
externality of things and others, is invested with expressive characteristics 
by the objectivations of the experiencer’s inner states. it is a process of ob-
jectivation of the internal states in such a way, that the states are projected 
and attached to the indifferent external sense data, lending these data an 
expressive character. This thesis results in the claim that the experienced 
expressions of the other are actually a multiplication of the experiencer. Yet, 
this notion of objectivation, or what some would call projection, was seen 
to be the origin of sacrificial uses, magical activities, totemism, fetishism, 
ancestral worship, symbolism and myth. At the same time, this thesis em-
ploys various magical terms to characterize this experience: anthropomor-
phism, personification, besoulment, all meaning some assumed inner hu-
man predisposition to project the conceptions, feelings, thoughts, desires 
and hopes onto the indifferent, “externally” perceived world. Although this 
thesis starts with a fundamental dualism, it too leads to the impossibility of 
grasping expression. Any expressive characteristics would have to be seen 
as projections of the subjective state. This means that what one person pro-
jects onto the indifferent material or corporeal processes of the other is not 
necessarily what the other experiences internally. if this thesis were correct, 
then it would follow that what i experience externally in sense impressions, 
as the corporeal processes of the other would assume expressive character-
istics only and insofar as i project my internal states onto such impression 
and processes. But this means that my experience is not of the expressive 
characteristics of the other, but of my own internal states. With respect to 
the experience of expressive characteristics, this is pure solipsism. it pre-
cludes the possibility of the experience of the same expression by two per-
sons; after all, while observing the corporeal-external processes of some-
one, the two perceivers (a) may project different expressive characteristics 
101 Klages, L. (1970). Grundlegung der Wissenschaft vom Ausdruck [foundations of the Sci-
ence of expression]. Bonn, West Germany: h. Bouvier, p. 70.
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on the perceived corporeal processes, and (b) they have no access to each 
other’s interior experiences, because any experience of interior expressivity 
would be immediately abolished in favor of the projections of one or the 
other perceiver. That is to say, while two persons were to experience the 
expressions of a third person, they would be projecting their own internal 
states onto the third person; at the same time, the process of projection 
would apply to the relationship between the two perceivers, because their 
experience of each other’s expressive characteristics would be nothing else 
than the projection of their own internal states onto the external and indif-
ferent processes of one another. 
The preceding outlined arguments point to one conclusion: the ex-
perience of expression and, indeed, the expressive process itself cannot be 
founded on the dualistic thesis, regardless of how such a thesis would be in-
terpreted – mind-body, internal-external, spirit-matter, psyche-physiology, 
etc. in principle, the dualistic understanding of experiential process leads 
to absurdities. it could be observed that the dualistic thesis is maintainable 
not on philosophical, but on dogmatic grounds, which favor the concep-
tion of corporeity as an anatomical summation of parts reacting to external 
disturbances; because such an anatomical entity does not have expressivity, 
then expressivity is relegated to “subjective” or internal states. Yet, this rel-
egation is precisely what precludes any kind of justifiable understanding of 
the prevalent consensus that we constantly encounter the expressive aspects 
in our experience of the others. in brief, the dualistic thesis fails to explain 
expressive communication. 
These, of course, are not the only problems encountered by the dual-
istic thesis. Although the experience of expression is never given with two 
sides, one perceptual-external, and one internal, requiring two modes of 
apprehension, if assumed, this theory would have to establish a third mode 
of perception, unifying the inner with the outer, a reading of the outer signs 
in order to correlate them to the inner states or processes. if from time im-
memorial humanity had been functioning with two modes of awareness, 
then surely it would have created two distinct sets of linguistic systems. 
even if we have terms for the so-called inner states and perceptions, the 
terms are derived from direct perceptual experience, that is, immediate 
corporeal expressivity. The glowing love and the glowing fire, the icy silence 
and the icy winter are present prior to dualism. 
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The Immediacy of Expression 
if the dualistic thesis leads to blind alleys, then the only alternative is to 
argue for the immediacy of expression, for the immediate presence of joy, 
pain, sorrow, indifference, anger, etc. The corporeal expression will have to 
be read through and intertwined in the corporeal activities. The very ges-
tures, movements and configurations of the body are directly expressive. if 
the returning hero were asked about the facial and postural physiology of 
his beloved, who, in a crowd, gave him a passionate look, he would be una-
ble to report the specific physiological features and changes that took place. 
She, in turn, could not reproduce at will the physiological requirements 
that would reveal the passionate expression. Thus, if the physiological data, 
the so-called externality, is not attended to, then the mechanisms either of 
analogization or projection are redundant. The corporeal expression must 
speak directly. it has long been noted that even an infant of 7 or 8 months 
answers with comfort and pleasure to a smile and with fear to a terrify-
ing expression. Moreover, the infant can respond to a terrifying or pleasant 
voice even if the direct physiological characteristics of the producer of the 
voice are not present, that is, if the speaker is in another room. As it is well 
known, erwin Straus goes so far as to suggest that the reading of direct ex-
pression goes across species barriers102. 
The unacceptability of the dualistic theories leads to a conclusion that 
the experience of expression is an experience of direct expressive meaning. 
This is not to say that the experience of meaning is always clear; rather, 
the physiological-corporeal configurations have depths of ambiguities. 
The pleasant smile might clash with a cold gaze. The problem with du-
alistic theories is that they have detached the appearance from its mean-
ing, the expression from its direct presence and attempted to reconstruct 
it theoretically from physiological and sensualistic elements. expression is 
a meaning unit and the meaning is the very expression. one good reason 
for this position is that any theory that purports to explain expression in 
terms of any other components presupposes expression as obvious and as 
a criterion, by which to judge or interpret the physiological or sensualistic 
elements. Because this presupposition cannot be explained in terms of any 
102 Straus, e. (1966). Phenomenological psychology. (e. eng, Trans.) new York: Basic Books, 
p. 225.
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dualistic theory, then the immediacy of expression is the more plausible 
position, which makes sense. Thus, corporeity is the very appearance, an 
expression of meaning, and the meaning is the expressive corporeity. This is 
the foundation of the understanding of expression and the condition for the 
possibility of the experience of expressions of others and the proliferation 
of expression through institutions. 
it could be objected that the immediacy of expression would preclude 
mistakes, yet, as a matter of fact, we do make mistakes in our experience of 
expressions. indeed, yet the errors are corrected not by analogical inferenc-
es or objectivations, that is, the correct deciphering of physiological signs, 
but by other expressions. The rejection of the primacy and immediacy of 
expression and the ability to experience its meaning is tantamount to re-
jection of thinking or sense experience simply because we make mistakes 
in thinking and in sense experience. Thinking can correct the mistakes of 
thought and sense experience can correct the mistakes of perception. if cor-
poreal expressions were founded on dualism, then they would be arbitrary 
and local, having no universal style, no accessibility to “outsiders” and ulti-
mately reducible to the privacy of the subject. 
There is another thesis that maintains that expressions are intellectually 
mediated, that is, mediated by culturally instituted habits and conventions. 
expressions are learned and, hence, are local. it is said, for example, that 
in distinct cultures distinct and various bodily gestures are used to reveal 
the same expression, such as an indifferent shrugging off of an accusation 
in one culture and a stony passivity, revealing the same indifference in an-
other. Due to this difference in corporeal postures, it is maintained that the 
corporeal expressions are learned, mediated by thought and, hence, must 
be seen as signs of interior states or of institutionally acquired behavior. 
To counter this claim it is not necessary to repeat the problems discussed 
earlier of dualism and of detachment of signs from expression and mean-
ing. The following arguments would indicate the inadequacy of this thesis: 
1. Although physiological and material media may be varied, they can 
capture the same expression. The universality of expression is attested to by 
the fact that it is capable of appearing through various media. 
2. expressive meaning remains even if we cannot read it due to a 
particular mode of capturing it in a particular culture. no doubt, the me-
dia may mislead us and we may be compelled to correct our perception 
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through learning; yet, the correction assumes the immediate presence of 
the expression over impression. 
3. if the expression is identical with the physiological changes and 
sense data experiences, learned within a particular culture, then expression 
is either abolished or subjectivated. if it is abolished, then no physiological 
changes would make sense; if subjectivated, then we are back to dualism. 
Although a third alternative is possible, it cannot explain expression, that 
is, the alternative, which would claim that the expressions are neither physi-
ological, nor sensualistic processes, nor subjective experiences arbitrarily 
attached to external signs, but are rather culturally established phenomena. 
if the latter is correct, it is still the case that expression must be immedi-
ately read as a cultural phenomenon in the different cultural media. it is 
presupposed if the cultural media are to be understood as arbitrary signs of 
expression. To select the signs, one must be directly aware of the expression 
in order to make sense of the signs. 
4. it can be argued that the learning of expressions is not mediated 
through culture or thought, but rather reinforced through other expres-
sive gestures and actions. it is not the case that a parent says to the child 
that “when i make this facial configuration, it means that i am angry, and, 
therefore, when you want to let me know that you are angry, you must in 
turn make a similar configuration”. This, of course, would require that both 
stand in front of some reflecting surface in order to ascertain that the con-
figurations are similar. Moreover, this would already assume that we under-
stand the meaning of the configurations if any comparisons between them 
are to be made. 
it could be maintained then that what we learn is not the expressive as-
pect, but the means of expression. But to learn the means we must have the 
experience of expression. The theory of learning of the means of expression 
(a) assume a dualism and all of its attendant problems and (b) must assume 
the primacy of expression and its experience in order to talk about the means 
of expression. This assumption of course leads us back to the same conclu-
sion, namely, the immediacy of the experienced expression and its insepara-
bility from the means; in this sense, the distinctions between the means and 
expression, between learning and immediacy, are undercut. Also surpassed 
is the notion of a corporeity, which is a physiology distinct from expressivity. 
To be corporeal is to be expressive, and to be expressive is to be corporeal. 
182
The Science of communicaTion 
The “Essence” of Expression 
Although the expressive aspects of corporeity may be understood in 
terms of their intentionality (joy is joy about something), to capture the 
essence of expression, we must bracket the specific direction of expression 
and articulate the corporeal process as expressivity, communicative of the 
joy or heavy burdens of the world. A sign, expressing the weight of our bur-
dens, or a relief, communicates our world even if it is performed in solitude. 
it is a spontaneous corporeal event presenting our state in the world. As 
Walter otto suggested, expressive corporeity is primarily self-presentation 
and is paralleled by equally spontaneous comprehension of a situation. This 
spontaneity is found in ritual, dance and music, and it escapes any tele-
ological orientation. it is a free manifestation, a play with one’s own powers 
as they manifest the total context. 
one basic expression revealing the way of being human is originally 
the upright stance, but not a still standing. Rather, it is upright stepping out, 
the celebrated dignity of the stillness of movement, playing such a signifi-
cant role in cults. in it the elevation appears, the pride and holiness and the 
luminescence of human visage. As Dante said, “he abandoned the hurried-
ness which robs each action of its nobility”, and Petrarch praised the pacific 
and light movement of Laura, while Plutarch praised Sophocles for his still 
manner and movement. And in his characterization of high-mindedness, 
Aristotle pointed out that it is to be accompanied by the stillness and dig-
nity of movement. This kind of movement is recognized as an expression 
of dignity and pride103. Although it can be considered teleologically, more 
fundamentally it is a corporeal expression of a situation. it is the originary 
appearance of measure, earnestness, pride, greatness, elevation and dignity. 
it is not something learned, willed or consciously intended, but an origi-
nary phenomenon of being human. 
for example, the festive walk, practiced in all cultures in various ways, 
is still known to us in the march of mourning. indeed, such a walk is ori-
ented toward the cemetery; yet, when we notice such a walk, when we hear 
the music, we recognize that, like all festive events, it too has its meaning 
in a total situation. We recognize the solemn walk and a solemn music. The 
103 otto, W. (1974). Die Gestalt und das Sein [form and Being]. Darmstadt, West Germany: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 78.
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music and its expressivity transform the participants into the right attitude. 
Yet, despite the wondrous creation of such tonality, its character and form 
are not invented by the composer; to the contrary, the music is learned from 
the shape of the expressive movement. from the very uprightness that we 
are, the music, like our feet, ties us to the earth and at the same time it is 
sadly elevating toward our head and the sun, the holy light. 
Although expression appears as corporeity, it is not locked within the 
limits of physiological body. every corporeal gesture, every movement 
forms a continuity, a flow of anger and joy, elevation and submission, pro-
ducing a variant of itself and prolonging itself into a schema. An adjustment 
to one expressive configuration is an adjustment to a series of like configu-
rations, where expressed pain can be pain expressed by anyone and in any-
thing. if my expressed pain is a variant among other possible expressions of 
pain, then it is equivalent to and interchangeable with them. The particular 
expressions pass, but, in passing, they create a schema for continuation, 
proliferation and repetition. 
While inhering in individual gesture, self-display of corporeity, the 
expression transcends the boundaries of anatomical individuality and cap-
tures others in its mood. This being captured by and being moved by ex-
pression is well depicted in phenomena, such as desire and eroticism, where 
one is transfigured, elevated, and ennobled104. The expressive power was 
well depicted by the Greeks, who allowed themselves to be moved by its 
sway. This power best appears in Greek depiction of mythological figures. 
Although myths are usually seen as an ideological description of sociopo-
litical order, such a view fails to realize that myths have a more fundamental 
rooting in corporeal expressivity. Look at hermes: his characteristics are all 
expressive and relate to the nocturnal domain, the dark side of life. none-
theless, he is not an indication of the joyless nocturnal hours of forlornness, 
but of the enchanting solitude of wonder. hermes is the way that darkness 
can bewitch the human by the sense of abandonment and, at the same time, 
by the experience of the expression of a luminescence that can show the 
way and lend solace to the abandoned. hermes is the wonder of the night, 
pervading every facet and every domain of things mundane and sublime, 
104 otto, W. (1974). Die Gestalt und das Sein [form and Being]. Darmstadt, West Germany: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 75.
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pervading night’s dangers and favors105. in this sense, he is an expressive 
dimension, immanent to and appearing in all things, and yet transcend-
ing the characteristics of things. The human is captured by this dimension. 
And human experience assumes a different expressivity, when it is con-
fronted by the expressive characterizations announced by Aphrodite. The 
mood across everything is different. it is the tenderness of everything call-
ing to enchantment, to embrace and to sweet and breath-taking flow of 
all into all. it is an expression manifest across all things as attractive and 
harmonious. And she is contrasted to Artemis, the feminine. This goddess 
is the soul, the expression of wildness with its heights and depths, with her 
animals and tormenting beauty, with her rejecting look and maternal care 
and her blood-lusting hunt-lust, playfulness, tenderness, bright glory, inac-
cessibility and horror, all expressive characteristics. What the mythical fig-
ures suggest is the generality and, at the same time, the individuality of the 
expressive aspect of corporeity, an aspect that proliferates and can inhabit 
anything, can be manifest across the face of all events without being reduc-
ible to such events. hence, the mythical figures can be seen as transcending 
the characterization of things in their anatomical properties; yet, as mani-
festations of expressivity, the figures are inner-worldly. The mythical figures 
are a way to manifest the expressive corporeal process without any admix-
ture with anatomy or physiology. Such a process, nonetheless, can appear 
everywhere; in the faces of statues, where the great utopian dreams of days 
to come are inscribed in the uplifted postures of the “revolutionary” classes; 
the victories shine from the canvases, tensed with fierce steeds and proud 
warriors, while the defeats are spread across the canvas in prostrate bodies, 
all corporeal expressions. The expressive power of corporeity is the very 
locus of manifestation of expressions, which provide transformations from 
one expressive modality to another, from direct vision to institutionalized 
records of writing, where the same proud posture, the haughty gaze, the 
same sorrow of defeat, pervade the volumes of poetry, literature and even 
religious ritual. it is the same expressive power that manifests Greek move-
ment toward thee-centrism, the pagan “enthusiasm” with arms spread and 
open toward the sky and the christian despatialization and fallen submis-
sion in kneeling and prostration. from the donning of the mask, angry or 
benevolent, to the solemn magic of transforming wine into blood and bread 
105 Lingis, A. (1984). excesses: eros and culture. Albany, nY: SunY Press, p. 47.
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into flesh, the expressive characteristics are what are directly manifest and 
what moves the experiencer prior to intellectualization, by capturing the 
experiencer in the mood that spreads without respect to the otherwise in-
different “reality”. 
corporeal expressivity, in brief, can assume any “embodiment”, be-
cause it is not something called “interior” or subjective, but rather directly 
present, inner-worldly and yet transcendent of materiality. This transcend-
ence is precisely what is capable of affecting us, although the expressive 
dimension is primarily the self-manifestation of a corporeal being. The ef-
fectivity is not an intentional act, stemming from an interiority of a subject, 
but a movement of expressivity that tenses across our own gestures and 
visage. This means that the immediacy of expression is not so much faced 
or confronted as participated in and lived through. it is like the “lively” tune 
that sends our limbs into frenzy, or the Dionysian tragedy calling the par-
ticipants into a movement. And it is in this movement that the participants 
are captured by the expressivity that transforms them into extra-human be-
ings in the dance. Thus, the maidens danced the nymphs, while men were 
half-animal; this has nothing to do with animism and its magic. Rather, 
such dances are spontaneous expressions of being moved, being gripped 
by a presence of expressivity, where what does the gripping and the being 
gripped are one. 
This conception of expressivity abandons not only the inner-outer 
dualism, but also the distinction between our corporeal expressivity and 
its characterization, and the expressivity manifest among the experienced 
phenomena: the fearsome storm and the fear across the face participates in 
one expressive movement; the lonely night and the lonely heart, the bright 
morning and the sparkling eye converge in the medium of expressivity that 
does not lend itself into separations. it could be said in terms of Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of meaning that meaning is no longer an anthropocentric 
projection of the human; we find more meaning than we can project. The 
same can be maintained of expressivity: we find more expressions than we 
can project. While attempting to radiate an expressive joy across the morn-
ing sun and the shimmering tree tops, we are drawn into the expressed 
morning glory and find ourselves moved with the expressive presence. 
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postscript 
The primacy of expression is prior to signification and, resultantly, it is 
more participation than detached observation. it seems that the phenom-
enological conception of expressivity lends itself to the explanation of the 
experience of attraction between the humans and the world, an attraction 
that is the bond that makes things familiar, without the familiarity being 
our own projection. The peculiar characteristic of expressivity is that it is 
not an object of intentionality; if it is intended, pointed to, it evaporates 
not into “nothingness”, but into a movement that encompasses everything, 
including the intender. in this sense, corporeal expressivity is part of our 
immediate communication with the world’s own expressivity; to have the 
one is to have the other. 
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ChapTEr VIII
phenomenology and Medical Imaging: Transcendental 
reflections on CaD (Computer aided Detection)
“I always saw better when my eyes were closed…”
(Feng Shui)
Introduction
Today, medical imaging is regarded as one the most advanced and the-
oretically challenging research fields, constantly modifying and improving 
medical diagnostics. on the other hand, it became the new “hot spot” for dif-
ferent scientific approaches to meet embracing investigations from cognitive 
sciences as well as new clinical applications106. e. husserl, in turn, designed 
phenomenology as the quest concerning the basis of any kind of knowledge 
(Wissenschaft) or, as nicolas De Warren puts it, “how experience is at all 
“thinkable””107, while facing the question of application phenomenology to 
other fields of research. Thus, phenomenology as the discipline investigat-
ing and describing various involvements (intentional acts) of consciousness 
(in its passive and active modalities) in constituting any kind of experience 
(theoretical, aesthetical, affective, volitional, etc.) had spread all over a num-
ber of disciplines, be it humane, social or in a smaller degree natural ones108,
Medicine, though rather late, also did received phenomenological 
inputs, but usually those were concerned with the “humane” od medical 
matters, be it existential hermeneutics of decease (M. heidegger, h.  G. 
Gadamer) or various forms of existential therapy (V. frankl, M. Boss, 
L. Binswanger)109. This means that empirical methods of medical diagnos-
tics based on imaging were left without any attention, while transcendental 
106 See in this regard Marcum, J. A. Humanizing Modern Medicine. An Introductory Philosophy 
of Medicine (Vol. 99). Springer, 2008.
107 Warren, n. Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology. 
cambridge university Press, 2009, p. 11.
108 See in this regard Thompson, e. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of 
Mind. harvard university Press, 2007; Varela, f. J., Thompson e. and Rosch, e. The Em-
bodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. The MiT Press, 1991.
109 See in this regard Spiegelberg, h. Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry; a Historical 
Introduction. evanston, illinois: northwestern university Press, 1972.
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findings of phenomenology were gradually overshadowed by the expan-
sion of psychological and neurological methods110. Thus, our major point 
of departure concerning this investigation is a deep dissatisfaction with 
this one-sided reception of medicine in phenomenology, which missed the 
specificity of medical imaging and the role of the consciousness of radiolo-
gist completely111. husserlian approach, in turn, grants very rich analysis 
of noematic structures (Noematische Sinn) involved in the constitution of 
diagnostic acts, while determining particular satisfaction conditions for an 
intentional “object” of those acts to be identified as such and such (for ex-
ample, “cancerous tumor”), which evidences if the diagnosis inherent in the 
judgmental act is veridical112.
Intentional analysis of Medical Imaging
Without husserlian phenomenology it is hard to imagine how the 
very complexity of the realm of cognition, out of which diagnostic judg-
ment emerges, could be uncovered113. one of the basic and all permeating 
features of this complexity is the dialectics between endless modalities of 
presence and absence in the constitution of all kinds of experience: “for 
husserl, phenomenology has the task of tracing the essential interconnec-
tions of fulfillment among acts, reflecting on the interplay between pres-
ence and absence in intentional experience as a whole.”114 on the other 
110 See in this regard Kornienko, V. n., Pronin, i. n. Diagnostic Neuroradiology. Springer-Ver-
lag Berlin heidelberg, 2009; Price, D. D., Barrell, J. J. Inner Experience and Neuroscience: 
Merging Both Perspectives. Massachusetts institute of Technology, 2012.
111 Thus, though practical aim of this investigation is to improve differential diagnosis, but 
differently form physicians relying on their intuition, which in turn rests on average sta-
tistics of medical history analysis and physical examination tests results, we suggest that 
phenomenological analysis enables construction of more sophisticated imaging and even-
tually richer image analysis. This also reminds us the totally different connotations of the 
word “intuition” in the use of contemporary medicine and classical phenomenology.
112 “evidence” in husserlian phenomenology is the act of experience, when the experiential 
articulation grasps thing as given. “intuition” then marks experience of facts and, thus, op-
poses harsh Kantian constructivism (of the world). See in this regard Levin, D. M. Reason 
and Evidence in Husserl’s Phenomenology. northwestern university Press, 1970.
113 See in this regard Geniusas, S. The Tremulous Grounds of Judgment: husserl’s Discovery 
of the World-horizon, in Urteil und Fehlurteil. S. Loidolt and S. Lehmann (eds.). Vienna: 
Turia und Kant, 2011.
114 crowell, S. G. husserlian Phenomenology, in A Companion to Phenomenology and Exis-
tentialism. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 15.
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hand, natural sciences (and relevant empirical methods) by the way of their 
attitude115 always were determined by the presence of the posited being. 
This means that cAD is bound to and is construed according to the gen-
eralities of natural attitude and operates according to the “first”, “natural” 
level of experience – presence116, which just means that it scans pixels of 
image without correlating this data with any other mode of givenness and 
thus is strictly limited117.
Soon after turning his attention to constitutive significance of directly 
non-present elements, husserl was forced to distinct between several con-
ceptions of Imagination, i.e. Physical, Pictorial or Image consciousness and 
Phantasie118. Because primal interest of this article lies in media as medical 
images, we will turn our attention to (physical) Image consciousness (Bild-
bewusstsein) because though both types of imaging consciousness present 
an absent object “as if ” it was actual, i.e., presentifies it (Vergegenwärtigung), 
the image consciousness does so on the basis of perception (physical hyle 
of the image). however, we must not forget that crucial for any theoretical 
enterprise neutrality modification is performed by Phantasie, thus, bring-
115 “Natural attitude” in Husserlian phenomenology essentially designates thetic belief, which 
means taking world’s (including subjects-object dichotomy) actuality for granted. Another 
basic feature of this naïve, not articulated, yet intelligible, sphere is explanations based on 
causal relations between things.
116 it is true that usually you can apprehend just one aspect of the object at a time, unless you are 
a cubist, as Solomon nicely puts it paraphrasing f. nietzsche. Jean Gubser, in turn, points out 
interesting moment in the history of art, when P. Picasso depicts time as painting all aspect of 
human body as appearing at once (see in this regard Gebser, J. The Ever-Present Origin. Trans. 
noel Barstad with Algis Mickunas. Athens: ohio university Press, 1991). We think this is a 
perfect example of artistic genius showing how space and time is available for perception only 
in present (whole) via endless presentations (“additional” temporal, spatial and thematic mo-
ments, which are meaningfully related to the primal impression of the “now” moment). This, 
in turn, raises the major question of whether can we “equip” cAD with such temporal depth?
117 Today, there is no general agreement between physicians concerning the utility of cAD. 
Proponents stress the future of image based technologies saving human resources and ex-
panding detection of cancerous cases, while opponents point to a very low efficiency rate and 
high costs of exploitation. But the main disagreements concern the distinction between two 
basic criteria applied to cAD’s operations – sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity measures 
the proportion of actual positives, which are correctly identified as such (e.g. the percentage 
of sick people who are correctly identified as having the condition). Specificity measures the 
proportion of negatives, which are correctly identified (e.g. the percentage of healthy people, 
who are correctly identified as not having the condition).
118 See in this regard husserl, e. Collected Works. Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory 
(1898-1925). Trans. John B. Brough. Springer, 2005.
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ing two structurally different types of image consciousness relatively close 
due to inspection of any concrete judgment:
“Likewise, we have actuality and inactuality within the sphere of 
impressional intuitions. The actuality then consists in the impressional 
intuiting pure and simple in its doxic modes — in certainty, doubt, deem-
ing possible, nullity, and so on. The inactuality consists in the analogue 
of pure phantasy (and amounts to a concept of imagination, inasmuch as 
mere imagining expresses precisely the neutralizing of actuality). hence 
all aesthetic image-consciousness (image-object consciousness) belongs 
here, insofar as pure image-contemplation is carried out.
now every judgment has its inactuality modification. Actuality 
amounts to a concept of originarity.81 Judgment in the originary and 
proper sense is the actual act of judgment. its inactual modification is 
the mere thinking of “S is P.” i can also do this when i have a convic-
tion about something, but only in the following form: i extricate myself 
from actual engagement; i push the judgment back and establish mere 
thought on the basis of the same content.”119
Physical Imagination structures the apprehension of an image, but the 
intentionality of this image apprehension structuring is complex because 
here the subject is aware not only of the sensible substrate (which awakens 
the image in a perceptual moment120), but also of the immanent distinction 
between image-object (what appears when we gaze at the picture) and the 
subject of the image (actual or ideal state of affairs – in the case of medical 
imaging – particular state of organs or bodily functions).
What is essential here is that the image serves as a trigger for the imagi-
native acts provoking the whole set of act-quality possibilities or empty inten-
tions, thus, centering the general structure of the so-called Consciousness of 
fulfillment. “This emptiness is not, however, a sheer blank; rather, the content 
of the perceptual act prescribes certain possible fulfillings.”121 Simultaneous 
119 elliott, B. Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger. London and new 
York: Routledge, p. 436.
120 The affection that occurs in the impressional moment of the living present awakens retained 
intentional contents having an affinity to those in the impressional moment. Awakening 
(Weckung) makes these contents available, informing one’s present sense of the object by 
past experiences.
121 crowell, S. G. husserlian Phenomenology, in A Companion to Phenomenology and Exis-
tentialism. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 15.
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presentifications (aspects of the same object or spatially and thematically re-
lated objects appearing “as if ” present in actual state), which end up with 
fulfillment or disappointment, provoke further series of anticipations (pas-
sive, nonthematic noematic units) and expectations (noemas, which are de-
termined by active ego involvement). for example, when radiologist asserts 
that “this part of tissue is cancerous”, the content of his/her assertion is pre-
sented in an empty or merely signitive mode (Leervorstellung). eventually, the 
diagnostic task is launched while expecting for the moment in experience, 
when intuition fulfills the meaning of the assertion and the same “cancerous 
part” of that particular tissue would be given intuitively (evidently fulfilled). 
This anticipatory structuring has been going on unnoticed too long in 
cognitive investigations. further parts of the article will be guided by the 
question of what the noematic structure is, which should be the “object” of 
intuition and the telos of fulfillment in medical judgment?
Constitutional analysis of Diagnostic Judgment
Judgment (Urteil) is one of the favorite husserl’s examples of active 
synthesis122. This kind of intentional act is at once aimed at the categorial 
object (Sachverhalte), i. e. particular situation or state of affairs (in our case, 
organs or bodily functions) and structured according to one or another cat-
egorial form (constitutional relations, such as “in”, “under”, “and”, “near”, 
“one”, “many”, “if ”, “not”, “some”, etc.): “Articulation of its perceptual content 
is the telos of judgment, the measure of its success or failure”123. 
husserl took a big effort to understand this kind of articulation124. Let’s take 
one example from medical imaging (breast x-ray – mammogram) and see how 
intentions directed to the depicted state of affairs (structured by several catego-
rial forms) and contained in expression “one mass in the center of the breast is a 
tumor and it is cancerous” can be fulfilled (or disappointed) (figure 1).
122 in the wake of i. Kant, husserl distinguishes between the understanding of “judgment” 
as Urteil (a kind of “cognition”) and Satz (“proposition”). This “double character” of judg-
ment that is its ontological factuality of categorical form and logical factuality of proposi-
tion must be acknowledged. however, only through phenomenological reflection we can 
identify logical meaning (Bedeutung) also as a phenomenological sense (Sinn).
123 in phenomenology, neither objective temporality, nor causality cannot explain relations 
like this – their genesis has its own logic guided by noematic structure, thus, this is sense-
based relation and not the causal one.
124 Due to intentional acts, such as a lie, hallucination or illusion, the content of my judgment 
could be presented in a merely signitive way as empty presentation quite unreflectively.
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Figure 1. Left breast mammogram. A spiculated tumor in the centre of the breast 
is a cancer.
for husserl, the most important structural feature of categorial intui-
tion is that differently from simple sense intuition, it is founded and it is 
founded mostly upon the simple perceptions (sense intuitions), such as 
geometrical shapes of a mass, and upon related depending moments, such 
as edges and density. The founding relation (Fundierung) also means that 
categorial intuition comes into appearance via several intertwined stages: at 
first, we apprehend the categorial object (“this particular mass in the center 
of the breast looks like a cancerous tumor”) in one undifferentiated glance 
becoming aware of the wholeness of the situation. The parts of this Sachver-
halte are also intended, but only implicitly. Secondly, the object comes into 
intuition in an explicit manner, now focusing attention on its parts125. This 
kind of partial objectivation is called by husserl subdividing act (Gliedernde 
Akte), in virtue of which the same “object” (“tumor” with all its predicates) 
becomes intended through the medium of color, shape, density, etc. Thus, 
our interest is redirected to the sense contents, in which the situation is 
disclosed through the elements, which present categorial object one “after” 
the other. finally, those two already mentioned stages of categorial objecti-
vation become unified in a categorial object as it is given.
125 for this step, husserl introduces the necessary intentional operation – destruction (Abbau) 
of the categorial object in order that foundational moments of sense could be disclosed.
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This transition from unstructured whole to partial intentions and back 
is governed by the synthesis of coincidence (as one modality of passive syn-
thesis besides association126), which “gives” the object in such manner that 
we are aware both that this same object has a shape or density in general 
and this kind of shape and density in particular. Also, this shows the func-
tion of sensuality in the framework of categorial intuition, i.e. to fulfill the 
founding intentions and present object as real, actual, thus, presupposing 
adequate judgment127. But if categorial intuition, as it were, finally does not 
rest on simple intentions, but, in turn, on this very synthetic activity, what 
is this non-sensible content, which full-files categorial intuition?
if the objects of founding acts are synthetically placed into a categorical 
form, fulfillment for categorial intuition asks more than perception. here, 
intuition can be interpreted as the second decisive break with the “natural” 
sphere after the fundamental conception of Intentionality. According to Loh-
mar, “the shift from unstructured perception to the subdivided perception 
is “double apperception”, because two different perceptions happened on the 
basis of the same content, different mode of the same object”128. Thus, the 
content of intuitivity appears to be the very act of coincidence of the inten-
tional moments. That means that synthesis of coincidence is responsible for 
two epistemologically decisive functions, because it enables to intuite catego-
rial forms129, and, secondly, though it’s “content” is given to us passively, after-
wards we are able reflectively to split it into partial intentions of the “object” 
(situation structured according to one or another categorial form). Thus, not 
just the structure, but also the content differ categorial acts from simple ones.
of the biggest importance for our topic is the fact that if fulfillment of 
categorical intentions depended only on sensual intuitivity of the founding 
acts, then some regions of knowledge, for example, axioms of mathematics, 
126 Association also serves as unification of the intentional content of different experiences in 
order to passively give identical objectivity.
127 contrary to correspondence theory of truth, where adequacy of ideas and things themselves 
was postulated, husserl understands adequation as experience fulfilling sense experience – 
laying hyletic data over on “previously” intended meaning, like geometric figures sometimes 
coincide. This operation, in turn, enables to concentrate attention on the particular moment 
of subdivided act (color, shape, density, etc.), not the whole categorial thing.
128 Lohmar, D. categorial intuition, in A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 115.
129 Another form of categorical intuition is collection, where synthetic intuition of an “and” 
relation (relating items even from different ontological “regions”) performs a fulfillment.
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would not express evident knowledge, because their contents dwell via signi-
tive intentions (intentions composed by systems of signs, but not by sensual 
fulfillment)130.
finally, we are ready to point out some suggestions based on phenom-
enological method to improve cAD’s software131. All of them are structured 
according to husserl notion of the Consciousness of Fulfillment and exhibit 
the dialectics between empty intentions and categorial fulfillments. Though 
some of them are more relevant for the improvement of cAD’s application 
in medical imaging, others can be used in modifying modalities of medical 
imaging itself132.
Suggestions for application
According to husserl’s epistemology of evidence, in any of its “case” 
(intentional act), reason via empty intending strives for evidence of the sort 
achieved in categorial intuition, in which judgments become confirmed or 
disconfirmed. This means that in order to widen usual horizon of possible 
diagnosis we must input into cAD’s algorithms more specific, contextual 
features or empty intentions, which, in turn, would demand for the relevant 
conditions of fulfillment.
Question may arise what in the case of computer software should be the 
content of simple sense intuitions, which must fund categorial tasks? hus-
serl makes clear that empty intentions formulated as signitive tasks can be 
fulfilled by signs133. Signs combine the expression, which, in turn, is consti-
tuted by objectifying or significative intention, which discloses the sense of an 
object in an expressible manner. According to husserl, everything is express-
ible, which makes sense, thus, anything intentionally presented can be trans-
lated into the meaning of an expression. Significative intention constitutes the 
signification that founds the expression. This signification, in turn, is trans-
formed into the determination of a sensuous sign in a signitive intention, as 
130 one exception could be husserl’s analysis of “authentic counting” (Eigentlich in its de-
scriptive and not normative sense), using perceptual objects while teaching kids counting.
131 This, of course, must be translated into algorithmic language. James Mensch gives one 
example of protention turned into algorithm (Mensch, J., 2010, p. 65).
132 See in this regard Suetens, P. Fundamentals of Medical Imaging. cambridge university 
Press, 2009.
133 See in this regard Lohmar, D. categorial intuition, in A Companion to Phenomenology and 
Existentialism. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006.
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the backbone of the expression. Thus, the meaning “gives” the object precisely 
as it was intended, and the object is the identity given in that meaning that 
discloses the object to us with all its significance. in short, the expression 
finally refers to the object precisely in the same manner as it is experienced.
Thus, empty intention can take a form of an image or command ex-
pressed in language, which in both cases can be translated into the realm of 
signs. on the other hand, we must take into account recent developments 
in other disciplines relevant to our investigation:
“Another project takes up directly from husserl, and attempts to 
enroll the tools of contemporary mathematical physics to show that 
husserl’s objections to the naturalization of eidetic contents were based 
on an outdated stage of scientific development, and that physics has 
now the means to detect the objective morphological structures in the 
natural processes subtending perception which alone can be put in cor-
respondence with the eidetic contents. The optic flux is not an amor-
phous sheaf of energy; it possesses enough structure to allow the visual 
system to “interpret” the “sense data,” and today’s mathematical physics 
can provide an objective account of this interpretative process.”134
To put it differently, if we translated the dependent moments (qualities, 
such as color or density) of categorial objects into relations between signs, 
we could form an analogy for sense intuition and appresentations, which 
accompany perception by the way of modeling significative intentions (dis-
closures of an objective sense of the relevant for medical diagnostics object) 
as a guiding vector for specific categorial tasks presupposing relevant an-
ticipatory structuring. here are four different examples showing how inten-
tional analysis can be applied to the improvement of cAD’s performances. 
All of them are the instances of consciousness of fulfillment, but differ in re-
lation to their “dominant” intentional acts and corresponding anticipation 
horizons. Thus, those four structures are both separated and intertwined:
• 1) Eidetic intuition 
We start from the most celebrated example of husserl’s consciousness 
of fulfillment, i.e. eidetic intuition (Wesensschau). eidetic intuition and its 
134 Andler, D. Phenomenology in Artificial intelligence and cognitive Science, in A Compan-
ion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 390.
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use via method of eidetic variation enable to “extract” the essential features 
of the particular phenomenon. first of all, eidetic intuition is not possi-
ble without the stage of splitting subdividing acts because we can get the 
ideal of color just running through the series of, for example, blue objects in 
perception or phantasy. factual is suspended while freely varying one unit 
until the limits of its variability are reached. And vice versa, while knowing 
specific features in advance, we can detect them in casual formations and 
patterns. for example, systematically varying the idea of concrete shape, 
edges, shade or color, we recognize that there is a certain limit (facture, 
brightness, etc.), which would prevent us from continuing to identify par-
ticular feature as such. After eidetic variation, identifying synthesis or rec-
ognition can unify the object into a class and identify an empirical species 
(low density) or ideal singular (the square)135 (figure 2).
Figure 2. Schematic picture of radiologically detected masses. The suspicion of 
malignancy grows with irregular and spiculated margins of masses.
Task: Make explicit subdividing acts of a given categorial object and 
investigate them separately in order to relate general names (empty inten-
tions) to specific unities (watch for the fulfillment of an empty intention by 
eidetic variation).
anticipation structuring: Geometrical forms, lines, shades, density, 
edges (figure 3).
135 Identification is defined by husserl as Recognition (das Erkennen), meaning the appropri-
ate form of fulfillment for objectifying acts. Recognition arises when meaning intention 
bases itself on intuition and thereby is related to an object. Actually, this brings husserl’s 
vocabulary right into the realm of cognitive investigations, where various types of Agnosia 
are defined as fundamental lack of the experience of recognition (when we perceive an 
object but cannot relate it to other units of experience or ascribe particular use to it) are 
discussed. See in this regard carter, R. Mapping the Mind. A Phoenix Paperback, 2010.
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 a)   b)
Figure 3 a) b). Right breast mammograms. figure 3 a) portrays a spiculated mass – 
a cancer. figure 3 b) portrays a well circumscribed mass in the breast representing 
a benign mass
• 2) Categorial forms
Task: Look for a particular categorial relation – “in”, “under”, “and”, 
“near”, “one”, “many”, “if ”, “not”, “some”, which would determine the context 
of inter-relation between relevant organs and bodily processes (figure 4).
 a)   b)
Figure 4 a) b). a) echogram on the left. A hypoechogenic mass (suspicious for 
malignancy) in the centre of the picture. Without visualization of nearby structures and 
organs, it is impossible to localise the lesion. b) Abdominal cT image of the same patient 
on the right. A mass (small cancer nodule) in the anterior wall of the stomach that is 
easily localized because of the clear visualization of adjacent organs and structures.
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anticipation structuring: Abnormal changes peculiar to a certain 
subordination between organs and/or bodily processes.
• 3) Image-consciousness
Task: Appresent (expression, for example, name can bring the object 
to mind, which is absent in person) and compare a depicted image (image 
object) of the particular organ to ideal (normal or abnormal) state of the 
same organ (imaged object) (figure 5).
Figure 5. Lumbar spine lateral X-ray picture. compression fractures of lumbar 2 and 
thoracic 12 vertebra. comparing with other, healthy normal vertebra, compressed 
ones are easier identified as not normal.
anticipation structuring: Appresentation of typical for some particu-
lar organ normal or abnormal modalities and comparison with the given 
one (presented) while anticipating “lay over”136.
136 congruence (Deckung) as the relationship between an empty intention and fulfilling in-
tention can be illustrated as such “lay over” between two geometrically congruent figures.
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• 4) adumbration (Abschattung)
The object is always perceived in a certain spatial perspective, under 
a certain aspect or shading – these are adumbrations or partial disclosures 
of the object137.
Task: compare a particular image of the inspected organ form a certain 
angle with expected normal or abnormal states in a manifold of adumbrations. 
 a)   b) 
 c)
Figure 6 a) b) c). a) chest X-ray picture with no obvious signs of lung disease. 
b) chest cT of the same patient. A small mass can be diagnosed in the right lung 
interlobar pleura that could be identified only on axial cT images. c) cT of the 
same patient, volume rendering software program shows a mass separate from 
other structures, vessels that could be a malignant.
anticipation structuring: Anticipate the state of organ or tissue, 
which would be normal or abnormal for that particular aspect, angle or 
137 Noema of perceiving organ adumbrates the hidden back side of it as a necessary part of 
this particular noematic structure and not by following any causal determination. it must 
be noted that the latest method of Digital Tomosynthesis in diagnostics can be very useful 
here, though it still has no application in cAD.
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perspective. compare different angles of the same organ, looking for the 
most accurate for the diagnostic decision (figure 6).
The expected result of these diagnostic processes is judgment. for hus-
serl, judgment also exhibits complex structure. The first level of judgment is 
experiential, i.e. subject is constitutionally involved or related to the state of 
affairs judged. it is the apprehension of something (Sachverchalte) as some-
thing (“Tumor is cancerous” means to apprehend this tumor as cancerous). 
only on the basis of such judgment as experience (fulfillment or disap-
pointment) we can build “propositional judgment”, which would carry the 
propositional meaning expressing the state of affairs, fulfilling proposition 
as a noematic sense of a judging act138.
We are looking forward to extend this investigation further, keeping in 
mind that appearances of cancer are evolving. on the other hand, perhaps 
one day we will ask what new ways of cancer detection can we expect to get 
from cAD itself.
Conclusions
• husserl’s general analysis of the role categorial intuition and imagi-
nation play in the constitution of noematic horizon for the inten-
tional act of judgment appears to be highly relevant for “regional” 
instances of knowledge, such as medicine, and for a specific catego-
rial “objects” as objects of diagnostic judgments.
• Due to multidimensional mediation of Pictorial image-conscious-
ness image awakens empty intention directed at the categorial object, 
which, in case of veridical judgment, must be fulfilled by synthesis 
of coincidence, using sense intuition of depending moments. every 
new fulfillment (or disappointment) enrolls certain horizon of judg-
mental possibilities in the form of anticipations (empty intentions).
• This model can serve for the improvement of cAD’s software, in 
which case the role of input (empty intention) can be ascribed to Sig-
nitive intention – name, proposition or image, which refers, recalls, 
138 here, husserl uses Aristotelian term Apophansis. “Apophantic domain” is disclosed in an 
act of reflection, as different from the “just intending” of the state of affairs of which i judge. 
The motive of such reflection is that the truth (evidence base) of the assertion is called into 
question, therefore, the apophantic domain arises only when we have an operative interest 
in truth.
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associates, compares and anticipates the patterns of tissue, mass, or-
gan or state of organs according to particular categorial context of 
inner-body space.
• We suggest four models for a better detection and diagnosis of can-
cerous patterns via medical imaging. each of them is based on dif-
ferent principle of noematic structuring (i. e., eidetic intuition, cat-
egorial forms, image-consciousness and Adumbrational character 
of experience), but all express the basic principle of husserl’s episte-
mology of Evidence, that is correlation of empty significations with 
judgmental fulfillments.
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ChapTEr IX
Toward the Ethical Difference: E. Levinas
Introduction
The history of difference, separation, distinction, and the like, though 
subordinate to the primary history of identity, has a very long tradition in 
various forms in Western thought. in Western philosophical history, many 
thinkers were grappling with differences of one kind or another, trying to 
systematize their thinking and make order of the real. Despite these efforts, 
it is clear that difference itself had not become an explicit problem of phi-
losophy. As long as difference is presented as a quality or as an opposition 
of components, then the differing of difference, the meaning of difference, 
or the way difference is given, is not truly thought.
The problem of difference was first explicitly formulated in Martin 
heidegger’s philosophy. To think difference in heidegger is to concentrate 
upon ontological difference, the difference between Being [Sein] and enti-
ties [Seiendes]. in heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time (heidegger, 
1977), ontological difference can be seen as the perspective of his thinking. 
The problem of ontological difference in this text is not yet explicitly or fully 
formulated, but problems are analyzed having this difference in mind. in 
lectures from his Marburg period, published posthumously under the title 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (heidegger, 1988), heidegger pays a 
lot of attention to ontological difference, naming and analyzing it, although 
it still remains not yet fully explicit and its relation to metaphysics is more 
presupposed than explained. The problem of ontological difference is expli-
cated in later texts by heidegger, after his well-known “Turn”. in relation to 
the mission of philosophy, heidegger makes clear that it is the ontological 
difference that makes possible or enables philosophy itself understood as 
the science of being and the possibility of raising the question of being. 
heidegger accuses metaphysics for forgetting the question of being and 
questioning only entities and only about them. Though all metaphysical 
problems have been formulated by trying to explain or define being and, 
in this sense, were aware of the problem of being, they did so from the 
essentially inadequate point of view of a metaphysics of entities. for hei-
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degger, claiming that metaphysics had forgotten being means that it forgot 
ontological difference. To think being is the same as thinking ontological 
difference. Thinking of difference between being and entities in heidegger’s 
philosophy finally leads to the “principle” of difference itself.
in post-heideggerian philosophy, it is obvious that the thinking of dif-
ference does not always mean an explication of or even attentiveness to 
ontological difference. in emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy, we find an alter-
native to ontological difference and one, which remains in critical dialogue 
with it. even if at first it may seem that difference introduced by Levinas 
is overturning of ontological difference, it is, however, neither a repetition 
of the ontological difference, nor a reformulation of it, but while perfectly 
aware of it, a radical alternative. Levinas does not avoid ontological differ-
ence, but deals “inside” of it: by overturning it, changing the place of the 
difference, going beyond it and finally introducing a radical alternative to 
heideggerian difference. Levinas’s thought represents a shift away from the 
centrality of ontological difference to the priority of ethical difference. in 
his own way, then, Levinas returns to transcendence and metaphysics, but 
without falling prey to the sorts of criticisms raised by heidegger. 
Levinas, along with heidegger, is considered one of the main critics 
of the Western philosophical tradition. in some way, Levinas’s philosophy 
emerges from a heideggerian context and a discussion with heidegger’s 
philosophy remains evident in most of Levinas writings. in interview with 
Richard Kearney, Levinas claimed that heidegger’s philosophy was a shock 
for him, that “one cannot seriously philosophize today without traversing 
the heideggerian path in some form or other” (Levinas & Kearney, 1986: 
15). in heidegger’s philosophy, Levinas sees the fulfillment of the entire 
Western philosophical tradition and, in most cases, critique of the philo-
sophical tradition today means a critique of heidggerian ontology. Levi-
nas’s main concern is not late heidegger’s philosophy, but Being and Time 
and his critique of it is explicitly developed even in his earliest two books, 
Existence and Existents and Time and the Other.
Levinas is attentive to the heideggerian notion of philosophy, where 
the basic problem of philosophy is the question of being, the non-represen-
tational thinking of being and the notion of ontological difference. in one 
of his earliest texts “On escape”, Levinas renews, as he claims, “the ancient 
problem of being qua being” (Levinas, 2003: 56). So, we could see that here 
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he, following heidegger, turns back to the question of being as well taking 
into account heideggerian discovery of ontological difference. Levinas un-
derlines in heidegger’s philosophy two most important moments: the differ-
ence of being and entities, and the verbality of being. in Time and the Other, 
Levinas points out that it is ontological difference which for him is the most 
profound thing about Being and Time (Levinas, 2005: 44-45). According to 
Theo De Boer, Levinas considers ontological difference “to be the rock-bot-
tom of heidegger’s philosophy and embraces it as the starting point for his 
own thought” (De Boer, 1997: 116). Jacques Rolland in his commentaries for 
the article “On Escape” notices that “virtually all of Levinas’s books begin by 
recalling, in various forms, the ontological difference” (Rolland, 2003: 99).
however, even if Levinas is attentive to the heideggerian difference be-
tween Sein and Seindes as well as to the verbality of being, he is no way hei-
deggerian. Levinas, like heidegger, asks about being, but his question leads 
to a very different direction. Levinas is attentive to the question of being not 
because of a nostalgia and not because he is attached to being, but rather 
because he shows the necessity of escaping from it, which necessity comes 
not from a lack of being, but from another surplus, a non-ontological sur-
plus. if philosophy is more than the raising of the question of being, and 
no one except heidegger has really ordered that it cannot be, it need not, 
then, restrict itself to answering the question of being, but may go beyond 
it. in fact, in one sense, escape from or going beyond being, which Levi-
nas names “separation” from being, is how the subject or existent emerges. 
for heidegger, the problem of difference is discussed for the purpose of a 
care for being, to go from forgetfulness to answering the question of being, 
while for Levinas, to the contrary, one must first move from anonymous 
being to even begin to grasp the significance of entities, and most especially, 
to the “hypostasis” of the separate or independent subject. in contrast to 
heidegger’s thought, which is always a return (or, in truth, the never suc-
cessful attempt to return) to the “always already” givenness of ontological 
difference, Levinas’s thought engages the emergence and novelty of mean-
ing in terms of the emergence and nobility of human being. So, even if 
we can claim that the problem of the difference brings these two thinkers 
together, at the same time it separates them. no less important, even when 
Levinas leaves “the climate of heideggerian philosophy”, he does not revert 
to pre-heideggerian philosophy either (Levinas, 2001: 4).
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Escaping Ontological Difference
The direction of Levinas’s philosophy is to find meaning beyond onto-
logical difference. Meaning beyond ontological difference is meaning be-
yond being. This attempt retrospectively can be seen in Levinas early writ-
ings as well as in his magnum opus Totality and Infinity and, finally, it is 
achieved in his book Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. here, he not 
only underlines the necessity to escape the being, but as well shows the way 
how it can be achieved. 
According to Levinas, all Western philosophy, including heidegger, 
did not sufficiently put into question the very fact of being. The fact that 
there is being was absolutely sufficient, a starting point as well as an end-
ing point. “Western philosophy struggled for a better being, for a harmony 
between us and the world, or for the perfection of our own being” (Levinas, 
2003: 51). Metaphysics from Parmenides and Plato was oriented toward 
ideal being and, as Levinas claims, “the insufficiency of the human condi-
tion has never been understood otherwise than as a limitation of being, 
without our ever having envisaged the meaning of ’finite being’” (Levinas, 
2003: 51). Levinas’s approach to the question of being is from the “other 
side”. from the question of being, from the meaning of being, from the 
ontological difference, Levinas moves to the meaning of the concretely 
human. The meaning of philosophy for him is to search and discover the 
meaning of transcendence through ethics, to find the deepest meaning in 
the encounter with the other human being rather than in the meaning of 
the existence/being itself. for Levinas, this search for meaning is the way 
how Athens and Jerusalem, philosophy and Bible meet: “in both cases we 
are talking about meaning, about the emergence of meaning: would it be 
what Greeks called ground, or what is in Bible shown as relation with the 
neighbor” (Levinas & Guwy, 2007: 123). 
if in his earliest texts “On Escape“ Existence and Existents Levinas shows 
the possibility to escape from being as il y a and being as existence, while in 
the book Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence Levinas deals with the be-
ing as essence: “the term essence here expresses being different from beings, 
the German Sein distinguished from Seiendes, the Latin esse distinguished 
from Scholastic ens” (Levinas, 2008: xlvii). for Jean Luc Marion, such defini-
tion of an essence names “brutal modification of the usual acceptation of the 
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term essence” (Marion, 2005: 314). Levinas underlines that being as essence 
is exactly the being of the heideggerian distinction, i.e. being of ontological 
difference. it is “an abstract noun of action for being as distinguished from 
entities in the amphibology of being and entities” (Levinas, 2008: 194n7). 
Asking what we mean by saying “being” Levinas points out that the word 
itself is not unequivocal: “is it noun or verb? Does the word being designate 
an entity, ideal or real, that is, or this entity’s process of being, its essence?” 
(Levinas, 2008: 23). however, even if together with heidegger we try to see it 
is as a verb, it is always a noun as it is always “fixed”. The answer to the ques-
tion “what is being” “is from the start in terms of being, whether one under-
stands by it entity or being of entities, entity or being’s essence” (Levinas, 2008: 
23). here, Levinas deals not only with problem of language by introducing 
the difference between “saying” and the “said”. More important is that he 
shows that the question of being, Seinsfrage, for him is not a fundamental 
question of philosophy, but rather the question, which from the very begin-
ning leaves no escape from the Western logic of ontology, where no novelty 
or adventure is possible. “if the question “what?” in its adherence to being 
is at the origin of all thought <...>, all research and all philosophy go back 
to ontology, to the understanding of the being of entities, the understanding 
of essence. Being would be not only what is most problematical; it would be 
what is most intelligible” (Levinas, 2008: 24). 
So, even if the distinction of being and entities, the “amphibology of 
being and entities” for Levinas is important, it is not final and basic for 
his thought. for him, ontological difference repeats the same ontological 
logic of being, “belongs on the same plane as being” (Levinas, 2008: 23). So, 
Levinas attempt to go beyond being as well means going beyond ontologi-
cal difference. 
Good beyond Being
Levinas’s direction beyond being leads not to overturning or denial of 
the ontological difference, but beyond the very logic of it. in Levinas’s phi-
losophy, “otherwise than being”, beyond ontological difference, is the good 
beyond being, epekeina tes ousias (Levinas, 2008: 95). for Levinas, otherwise 
than being is not an opposition to being (which would be the nothing), but 
the very otherwise. negativity and the nothing for him belong to the same 
logic of being and as such it would not introduce an irreducible otherwise. 
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even if in the Greek philosophical tradition Levinas sees the funda-
mental aim to reach unity, for him more important is the transcendence 
of the platonic idea of the good. especially in Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
follows Plato and thinks beyond the totality of entities, thinks, that is to 
say, the good beyond being. for heidegger as well Plato’s idea of the good 
beyond being is important, but as Levinas points out, for heidegger it is 
interpreted as being beyond entities (Levinas, 2007: 46-47). in Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas reminds us that Platonism in its different forms had an 
essential meaning for Western philosophical tradition. Plato, Aristotle and 
Plotinus were searching for “good beyond being”. in the Republic, Plato tells 
that “not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence 
of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of 
it, although the good isn’t being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in 
dignity and power” (Plato, 1968: 509b). even if for Levinas, as for Plato, 
good is beyond being, Levinas rejects the idea of platonic good, while he 
adopts the platonic beyond. The platonic idea of the good is too abstract, 
too disembodied, one might say, while Levinas’s conception of the beyond, 
transcendence, is concrete: goodness comes to the subject from the face of 
the other person. for Levinas, good is a moral term, moral in the sense of 
ethics, while for Plato moral good is just one of many characteristics of the 
form of the good, which is also beautiful, and true. for Levinas, good “is” 
not equivalent to or structured like being or essence. it is not denying of 
essence (or being, as Levinas in his later works shows that for heidegger 
being is essence), but dés-intéressement, dis-interestedness, or autrement 
qu‘être, otherwise than being, because it is being for the other (Levinas, 
2008: 50). “[T]he exception of the ‘other than being’, beyond not-being, sig-
nifies subjectivity or humanity, the oneself which repels the annexations by 
essence” (Levinas, 2008: 8). for Levinas, otherwise than being is oneself 
free from the anonymity of being, from its indifference and entirely onto-
logical responsibility as well as from its aesthetic play, which we can recog-
nize in later heidegger’s philosophy. 
Otherwise in Levinas philosophy introduces not a new ontology, but 
being-for-the-other, that is to say, goodness itself, which from the very be-
ginning is always moral and not an abstract idea of the good. ”To reduce 
the good to being, to its calculations and its history, is to nullify goodness” 
(Levinas, 2008: 18). Being for the other is ethical difference. 
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in the text “The Trace of the Other”, Levinas distinguishes two types of 
transcendence. The first is described by immanence, while the second, “tran-
scendence of the second degree”, is transcendence of the Good (Levinas, 
1986: 347). Good beyond being is neither idea, nor essence, but beyond in the 
sense of better (Levinas, 2006: 275). for Levinas, beyond [au-delà] is not an-
other world beyond this world, but an irreducible transcendence, irreducible 
because moral (Levinas, 2006: 275). Good beyond being points to infinity, 
when “heideggerian philosophy precisely marks the apogee of a thought in 
which the finite does not refer to the infinite” (Levinas, 1987: 52). 
for Levinas, in contrast to heidegger, the question of being is dis-
cussed not in a positive, but rather in a negative or critical way. he seeks to 
leave being understood as universality (Aristotle), and being understood as 
ground (heidegger). for him, philosophy as ontology “is reduction of the 
other to the same” (Levinas, 2007: 43). Levinas seeks to go beyond one of 
the basic problems of the Western thought, the problem of ground. Grund-
frage is considered as the fundamental question of philosophy from Leibniz 
to heidegger. The question Why there is something rather than nothing? – 
what is the purpose, as it were, or the meaning of being to be? – emphasizes 
being as the main and only concern of Western metaphysics (heidegger, 
1998: 2), (heidegger, 1995: 7). in addition, this question allows heidegger 
to raise the problem of the ground seen as being itself (heidegger, 1965: 92), 
and at the same time presupposes the real possibility of nothingness and 
alternative of the nothing and raised the question of the sufficient ground. 
Levinas already in his early writings under influence of henri Bergson de-
nied the real possibility of the nothingness. By rejecting the seriousness 
and importance of the possibility of the nothingness, the question of the 
ground as well losses its central importance. As Richard A. cohen writes 
in his book Levinasian Meditations, Levinas exceeds this “the most philo-
sophical of all oppositions, indeed the opposition that originally gave rise 
to philosophy and defined its parameters of thinking and being” (cohen, 
2010: 111). Levinas’s question is not “to be or not to be”, but an ethical ques-
tion. he asks not why there is something rather than nothing, but why i 
should not commit a murder, do i have the right to be? That is questioning 
oneself and as well moving from the question of ground to the issue or re-
ally the moral imperatives of responsible being. it leads us from the priority 
of freedom to the priority of responsibility, from the true to the good. The 
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subject does not seek to be free – and for heidegger the “essence of truth” 
is “freedom” – but to be responsible, responsible for others. Levinas affirms 
that the first question is not the Grundfrage, but Why I do not kill (Levinas, 
1998). in contrast to heidegger’s project of “letting being be”, for Levinas, 
the primary imperative is “letting be for the other“ (Levinas & Guwy, 2007: 
125) – “being for-the-other” prior to all else. 
Levinas is able to make the radical claim that we must start from the 
goodness, but not from the creation of the world. “The creation of the world 
should start from the goodness. <…> the world exists and is created through 
ethics” (Levinas & Guwy, 2007: 129). Precisely the ethical dimension lets us 
see how the main philosophical question has been changed. The statement 
of being’s other, of the otherwise than being, for Levinas leads to the very 
difference of the beyond, the difference of transcendence, which exceeds 
not only ontological difference, but the difference of being and nothingness, 
as well. This refers as well to the “good beyond being”, which is also infinity, 
and which for heideggerian thought is impossible, or merely “ontic”. “To 
be good is a deficit, a wasting away and a foolishness in being; to be good 
is excellence and elevation beyond being. ethics is not a moment of being, 
it is otherwise and better than being; the very possibility of the beyond” 
(Levinas, 1998: 69). it is not denying, negating or dropping being as es-
sence, but occurring otherwise, as being-for-the-other. Being for the other, 
goodness, cannot be explained through negativity. The main philosophical 
problem becomes not that of hamlet or Leibniz, torn between being and 
nothing, being and not-being, but a moral concern regarding the right to 
be. By changing the basic philosophical question, changing the question of 
ground for the ethical question, first philosophy is ethics not ontology, even 
if ontology is not denied and will find its “place” in relation to ethics. 
Ethical Difference
Raising philosophical questions beyond ontological difference is not an 
opposition, but a leaving of the very logic of that difference. But ethics is not 
therefore “irrational,” which would again be to define ethics as negation of 
being. This way, Levinas sees through ethics, from ethics as first philosophy 
and not as a secondary gloss on being. for Levinas, ethical concern for the 
other person is philosophically primary. otherwise than being is an escape 
from the indifference of being, which for Levinas means the nobility of eth-
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ics, the main moment of which is responsibility for the other person, con-
cern for the suffering of the other, in the singularity of a responsibility, which 
is non-indifference. otherwise than being, to be sure, but also better than 
being. Responsibility does not negate its other, but across language comes to 
the other in peace; it is a pacific relation. for Levinas, responsibility for the 
other is the difference of the oneself and the other, which is understood as 
the non-indifference of the Good (Levinas, 2008: 58, 123). instead of a cog-
nitive relation, whether scientific-representational or poetic-hermeneutic, 
Levinas introduces the relation of sincerity, proximity, which overcomes the 
indifference toward others of ontological difference. This non-difference for 
the other avoids the indifference of the ontological difference. 
Non-indifférence signifies involvement and concern. As we can see 
from Levinas writings, ego from the very beginning is indifférent and this 
situation can be changed by meeting the other. As cohen points out, the 
word Levinas uses is not accidental: “non-indifference” implicates me as a 
being at first indifferent. i am blind and deaf for the other. “The i’s concern 
for the alterity of the other comes in a non-indifference, rather than in a 
primary concern, because precisely a natural and original indifference to 
the alterity of the other must be disrupted” (cohen, 1994: 165). That is, it is 
the other – and not the question of being – who interrupts me and in such 
a disturbance the situation of significance is changed forever. 
heidegger’s philosophy is concerned about being, but that leads to an 
indifference toward one of the most essential distinctions: distinction be-
tween good and evil. ontological difference is attentive to being, but it re-
mains indifferent to the other. of course, it would be too strong to claim 
that in heideggerian philosophy one finds an explicit justification of evil, 
such as one might find in nietzsche, however, the difference between good 
and evil does not play a significant role. ethics is interpreted there as “nor-
mativity” and is relegated to the “ontic”. What is foremost is “letting be”, 
openness of the being, where everything is necessary and justified to the 
extent that it helps this unfolding. in some postmodern interpretations, we 
can find that this heideggerian position is taken as most ethical – letting 
things, nature and event “be” (Lingis, 2009). from Levinas’s position, we see 
that that would bring us back to irresponsibility, to meaningless existence, to 
il y a. Being is whatever happens, happens. in contrast, Levinas finds mean-
ing not in being, not in the openness of being, being’s move, but in relation 
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to the other. only through the non-indifference for the other we can escape 
the indifference of the ontological difference. non-indifference in this case 
is primary, but primary not chronologically or logically, but hierarchically 
– the moral priority of the other. The Levinasian notion of responsibility 
is so radical that it is not just responsibility for the other, but responsibility 
for the other’s responsibility. it is a truly infinite responsibility. for Levinas, 
in face of the other i am more responsible than i as a finite human being 
can even be responsible: “The more i answer the more i am responsible” 
(Levinas, 2008: 93). As a desire, responsibility comes not from a lack within 
the subject, a need, but from the surplus, infinite election by the other, and, 
hence, as a desire, desire for “the most Desirable”. The relation with the other 
cannot be reduced to the relation of the object-subject, the other is not the 
object i control or manipulate. By meeting the other i meet the idea of infin-
ity (which is as well the possibility of my infinity). The abstract idea of infin-
ity here is met not abstractly, however, but through the concrete vulnerable 
face of the other, and it is not in an ontological, but in a social level. 
Because of the infinite responsibility for the other, there is no longer 
the possibility (logical) of identification with oneself. The other disturbs 
the very structure of subjectivity. The true subjectivity is ethical and comes 
not from me, my pleasures, my sentiments, my choices, but from the other. 
i am a “hostage”, as my responsibility comes not from my free choice, but 
before any choice. i am chosen by the other, i cannot escape “the respon-
sibility under my skin”. i am “persecuted” and “obsessed” by the other 
and through that i find my genuine self as responsible and guilty. in this 
responsibility, nobody can substitute for me. So, this responsibility is also 
an “election”. The necessity to substitute myself for the other and to stand 
for the other, to make the other’s needs my obligations, comes from the 
infinite responsibility. 
This is specific intersubjective relation, which is not symmetrical. 
The difference of the other and the priority of the other are seen – in the 
first person singular – by the structure of the responsibility. The moral sub-
ject is responsible, but the appeal of the other, the meaning, which comes 
from the face of the other, is prior to the meaning i have from my own 
devices, as it were, does not depend on my initiative: “i am obliged with-
out this obligation having begun in me, as though an order slipped into 
my consciousness like a thief, smuggled itself in” (Levinas, 2008: 13). it is 
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not a freedom, but responsibility, which defines me: “This antecedence of 
responsibility to freedom would signify the Goodness of the Good: the ne-
cessity that the Good choose me first before i can be in a position to choose, 
that is, welcome its choice” (Levinas, 2008: 122). The obligation comes not 
from subjectivity by itself, however, wide the immanence of subjectivity be 
interpreted, including its worldliness, but from outside, and it shakes the 
traditional notion of subjectivity and as well shows Levinas shifting away 
from the Parmenidian notion of the one. i am chosen by the other – the 
initiative comes from the other, and the chosen finds himself passive and 
“obsessed” by the other: “a responsibility, an obsession with the other, be-
ing-one-for-the-other, which is the very birth of signification beyond being” 
(Levinas, 2008: 90). it is inversion of consciousness, passivity prior to any 
passivity: “The intention toward another, when it has reached its peak, turns 
out to belie intentionality. Toward another culminates in a for another, a suf-
fering for his suffering” (Levinas, 2008: 18). This demands a modification of 
the phenomenological method: the structure of intentionality losses its pri-
macy. however, it is not only the question of the method – it has a deeper 
meaning. in intentionality, Levinas recognizes the moment of recognition 
and representation, while inversion of intentionality opens being for the 
other. Passivity here should not be understood as an opposition to activity. 
it is an absolute passivity. Western philosophy, as Levinas sees, “remains 
faithful to the order of things and does not know the absolute passivity, 
beneath the level of activity and passivity, which is contributed by the idea 
of creation. Philosophers have always wished to think of creation in onto-
logical terms, that is, in function of a preexisting and indestructible matter” 
(Levinas, 2008: 110). it is passivity, where Levinas finds an anarchical trace 
of God (Levinas, 2008: 196n21). it is creation created through obligation 
toward the other. 
The impossibility to escape the other is ethical rather than onto-
logical: “if there were real impossibility, responsibility would be only an 
ontological necessity. But a “purely ethical” impossibility is not a sim-
ple relaxation of an ontological impossibility” (Levinas, 2008: 198n2). in 
our everyday lives, we always have possibility to turn away from the other 
person, to avert our gaze, to pass the beggar by, to refuse to aid the down-
trodden, and we do. But it remains nonetheless an ethical situation, where 
even being ignorant of (for) the other we are already in relation and we are 
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already responsible. Levinas introduces ethics, which is not based on norms 
or rules. its demand exceeds any rules. 
for Levinas, relation with the other is beyond ontological structure. 
By calling relation between me and the other with the other séparation, 
Levinas underlines the ethical meaning of séparation. it is respect for the 
other, for his radical otherness. The transcendence of the others establishes 
insuperable distance. Thus, the intersubjective relation no longer follows 
the logic of totality, where parts are defined by wholes or species by genera. 
each encounter with the other is always new, the difference is not given, but 
found every time again. otherness is not an attribute, which can be added 
to the other, which would be an entity like me, another me. it is an abso-
lute difference. By criticizing heidegger, Levinas draws our attention to the 
following: “The relationship with the other is indeed posed by heidegger 
as an ontological structure of Dasein, but practically it plays no role in the 
drama of being or in the existential analytics” (Levinas, 2005: 40). Dasein 
relation with the other, mitsein, is subordinated to being a structure of Da-
sein. in Totality and Infinity, Levinas underlines that he is opposing hei-
degger, as he “subordinates the relation with the other to ontology <…> 
rather than seeing in justice and injustice a primordial access to the other 
beyond all ontology” (Levinas, 2007: 89). understanding of being (and of 
the ontological difference), but not insight into the ethical difference, is the 
main feature of Dasein. Dasein “is” as an understanding of being. As long as 
understanding and contemplation is the main and primordial relation with 
the other, we are in the field of totality: “comprehension, in heidegger, re-
joins the great tradition of Western philosophy: to comprehend the particu-
lar being is already to place oneself beyond the particular. To comprehend 
is to be related to the particular that only exists through knowledge, which 
is always knowledge of the universal” (Levinas, 1996: 5). for Levinas, the 
escape from totality occurs as ethics, acknowledging the primacy of the 
other as moral obligation toward the other person. Thus, it is in ethical 
responsibility that Levinas sees the overcoming of totality.
furthermore, heidegger’s notion of being‘s historicity eliminates the 
ethical question of responsibility. Dasein is limited by the events of being 
itself, and, by this finitude, it is thrown into history, which it can at best 
make its own. The openness of being as the historicity of history is oblivious 
to the difference between good and evil. “When heidegger call attention 
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to the forgetting of Being, veiled by the diverse realities it illuminates, a 
forgetting for which the philosophy developed from Socrates on would be 
guilty, when he deplores the orientation of the intellect toward technology, 
he maintains a regime of power more inhuman than mechanism <…>” 
(Levinas, 1987: 52). An anonymous being is ethically indifferent, indiffer-
ent to guilt and responsibility. Levinas sees that: “the well-known theses of 
heideggerian philosophy – the preeminence of Being over beings, of on-
tology over metaphysics – end up affirming a tradition in which the same 
dominates the other, in which freedom, even the freedom that is identical 
with reason, precedes justice” (Levinas, 1987: 53). 
for heidegger, there is no difference between events in being as long 
as they help it to unfold. The highest imperative is to let Being be. But from 
Levinas point of view, it lacks the most essential and most precious element, 
that is, the moral dimension. opposite to heidegger, Levinas shows not 
only difference between being and entities, but by introducing ethics shows 
difference in being itself, a non-ontological difference in ontology – that is 
because of the uncovered difference between good and evil and the face of 
the other. 
otherness for Levinas is absolute otherness, while ontological think-
ing, effacing this is ignorant of it, ignorant in the sense of ignoring its gen-
uine significance. if heidegger’s fundamental ontology questions beings, 
Levinas is questioning responsible subject, the subject “put into question” 
by and for the other person. it is not that Levinas denies ontology or un-
derstanding. Rather, they are not enough. “i do not only think that he is, i 
speak to him” (Levinas, 1996: 7). encounter with the other is beyond un-
derstanding and cognition, it cannot be represented. 
in Levinas’s philosophy, the difference between saying and the said 
could be seen as one more way how to leave ontological difference. for 
Levinas, responsibility for the other is saying before the said. in Marion’s 
view, “ethics is instituted by a new difference, a difference of the second de-
gree, between, on the one hand, the entire ontological difference and, on the 
other hand, the Saying” (Marion, 2005: 315). The other appeals to me as his 
otherness would be my concern. his appeal is absolute, shattering being. 
it is “inversion of intentionality” (Levinas, 2008: 47). it is the primacy of 
the other. The face of the other is always saying. Saying is such a proximity 
to the other, where external features of communication, the contents, the 
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“what,” are no longer of sole importance. one must first hear what is said. 
Response is responsibility. 
Discussion of the question of being already showed that for Levinas 
everything that appears in logos is ontology. The said is the noun, there is 
always some order to it. “The birthplace of ontology is in the said. ontology 
is stated in the amphibology of being and entities. fundamental ontology 
itself, which denounces the confusion between Being and entities, speaks 
of Being as an identified entity” (Levinas, 2008: 42-43). for Levinas, the dif-
ference between saying and the said exceeds the logic of ontological tradi-
tion and ontology itself. Saying for Levinas is beyond amphibology of being 
and entities, prior to essence and identifications. in the Western tradition, 
knowledge is a sign and norm of spirituality, but by this very exaltation of 
knowledge transcendence – ethical transcendence – was eliminated from 
understanding as well as from philosophy itself. But “saying enigmatically 
and diachronically signifies transcendence or the infinite, the otherwise 
than being and the disinterestedness from essence” (Levinas, 2008: 154). 
for Levinas, saying becomes the passivity of passivity and being for 
the other. Saying is the being obsessed by the other. At the heart of the 
passivity of saying is sincerity. in obsession, difference shudders as non-
indifference (Levinas, 2008: 83). The other is in proximity as much as i am 
responsible for him. As Levinas says, “sincerity is not reducible to anything 
ontic, or anything ontological <…>. it is not an act or a movement, or any 
sort of cultural gesture; they presuppose the absolute breakthrough of one-
self ” (Levinas, 2008: 144). This kind of relationship with the other affects a 
breakthrough and goes beyond ontological difference. So, here, ontological 
difference is overcome by proximity and sincerity. As Marion says, “for hei-
degger, anxiety leads into the ontological difference, for Levinas, sincerity is 
excepted from it and liberates from it” (Marion, 2005: 318). 
We should keep in mind that Levinas is not only trying to go beyond 
ontological difference, but, positively, to show the primacy of ethical differ-
ence, the primacy of ethics over ontology. Proximity and sincerity preserve 
the difference of the other and go beyond ontological categories. Levinas 
reminds us that the other too often is understood “whether as an obstacle to 
freedom, intelligibility or perfection, or as a term that confirms a finite be-
ing, mortal and uncertain of itself, by recognizing it, or as a slave, collabora-
tor or God able to succor” (Levinas, 2008: 15-16). for ontological tradition, 
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as Levinas showed, proximity was understood as the limit of the adventure 
of essence (and at the same time being), while it was not a function of be-
ing. But genuine proximity – the “face to face” – is possible only by being 
responsible. “The proximity of the neighbor is my responsibility for him: to 
approach is to be the guardian of one’s brother; to be the guardian of one’s 
brother is to be his hostage. This is immediacy” (Levinas, 1998: 72), contact 
with the other is tenderness and responsibility (Levinas, 1987: 116). in 
proximity to the other, the otherness of the other remains, and i do not 
disappear in the other, as well. it is at once relation and non-relation with 
the other. 
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What today constitutes philosophical and scientific anthropology is a 
conjunction of most diverse views: biology, psychology, ethnology, cultural 
morphology, typology of world views, and so forth. With all this expanded 
knowledge about the human, our age knows the least about the human and 
no age was more in doubt about who we are than ours. Although the ques-
tion concerning the human may seem to be isolated, it is connected with 
our conceptions of society and history, and indeed, communications. The 
problem for the latter lies in the question of individual and society, of per-
son and culture. Although we have discussed the correlation between the 
individual and the sociohistorical, we have not shown what constitutes the 
individual. for phenomenology, this omission is not warranted if its basic 
conception is an analysis of all areas of experience and all presuppositions. 
And the individual is presupposed in all the attempts to deal with commu-
nication and interaction. 
There is a tendency to speak of the changing “view” of the human due 
to the discoveries of various empirical sciences. This “view” is, in fact, open 
to further changes, and in this case it might be that in the future what we 
now call the human might not be recognizable. And yet, we tend to speak 
without any reservation about the human of the past and the future, as if we 
possessed an understanding of something about the human that is a priori 
and essential, something that is irreducible throughout all of the promises of 
empirical sciences and social reconstructions. Sciences will not admit to this 
kind of “essential” outlook. They will simply say that the task is to note what 
humans were during particular times and places and what they are now. Yet, 
how is it that we speak of the humans in the past who were “different” and of 
the humans in the future who will be “different”? This opposition between 
an unconditional, although implicit universality, and the empirically ac-
quired knowledge is present in all of the contemporary researches concern-
ing the human. All that empirical science can say is something presumptive 
and without unconditional universality, and yet, what it seeks is accepted 
silently with an unquestionable certitude. While searching for an answer to 
this dilemma, Landgrebe pointed to the Kantian tripartition of the philo-
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sophical inquiry into “What can i know, what must i do, and what can i hope 
for?” and adds a fourth one: “Who is the human?” Landgrebe focused pri-
marily on the human in his action, his practical world orientation139. Be-
cause all activity is goal oriented, one must have an insight into the domain 
of goals and their order with respect to the highest goal, the highest good. 
This cannot be an object of theoretical knowledge, but of practical aware-
ness. from this follows a “practical” view of the human. But this practical 
view assumes an implicit understanding, prior to all philosophical reflection 
that we all have of ourselves in our actions and aims. This implicit under-
standing is prior to any specification into domains, to which the human 
might belong. from this follows that the a priori and a posteriori can be 
variously articulated and within which various empirical and methodologi-
cal conceptualities can be correlated. of course, this implicit “background” 
understanding and its implicit understanding of the world was rejected by 
the middle of the 19th century in favor of social and historical immanent-
ism. All we can know is the sociohistorical constitution of “intersubjective 
reality”. Yet, all such attempts to immanentize and, hence, to avoid presup-
positions is founded on presuppositions. Take, for example, A. Gehlen’s the-
ses of life’s self-formation for survival: it constitutes a point of relationship, 
from which all claims about the human must flow. Yet, this is a trans-empir-
ical assumption with necessary and universal validity-claim that cannot be 
justified. This means that any attempt to avoid presuppositions that are not 
empirically founded is self-defeating. Moreover, the very methodology is 
formulated by us and, hence, it is our view of the world and ourselves. how 
can the methodological question be answered if there is no “leading” view of 
what the human is? Without it we cannot distinguish the region of what is to 
be researched as human and what is not, what human communication is and 
what is not. if one does not offer essential differentiations of regions, then 
one cannot claim to add any essential knowledge through empirical or cul-
tural research concerning the human and one is in no position to determine 
the appropriateness of a method. for phenomenology, methods are not in-
vented arbitrarily, but must correlate to a given subject matter. if methodol-
ogy does not distinguish between subject matters, then it has no criteria and 
becomes an all encompassing abstraction that pretends to fit every subject 
matter. The problem of theoretical and, indeed, empirical anthropology is 
139 Landgrebe, L. (1968). Phaenomenologie und Geschichte. [Phenomenology and history].
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the problem of the “object” of their investigation: the object is ourselves. 
Before we ask a question as to who we are, we already address the world as 
regarded from a first person singular in relation to, and distinction from, 
other persons, and orientation to a common world. The singularity and all 
the relationships are given, yet left unexplicated. how does the singular indi-
vidual recognize itself as distinct from others, as a self? The relationship of 
the individual to itself is one of the relationship to others, that is, how the 
others see one. it is a mediated knowledge. The immediate access to the in-
dividual is one of reflection, and the latter is initially a reflection from a 
presupposed other, who is different and who is equally cognizant of itself. 
We have argued that the individual is part of a poly-centric field of experi-
ences, and the latter are in part shaped by traditionally transmitted linguistic 
systems and modes of communication. Thus, the individual experiences are 
extended by, and differentiated from, others and are mediated by the experi-
ences imbedded in sign systems. our phenomenological analyses made a 
good case for this complex view. Yet, further analyses are required to concre-
tize the communicative process and correlatively to discover the practical 
domain, in which self-recognition, recognition of others, and their differ-
ences and commonalities are articulated. in addition, our previous analyses 
had a presupposition: temporal continuity of the historically transmitted 
experiences. This presumption has been challenged by a variety of theoreti-
cal movements, most preeminent among which is the elusive postmoderni-
ty. This inner core is called by husserl “transcendental subjectivity” and con-
stitutes the basis of the world for me and the way i encounter others. What 
is peculiar about this “subjectivity” is that it contains the world and the oth-
ers in its immediacy to itself. Thus, “i bear the others in me”, but in such a 
way that this bearing in me is experienced as mutual. This is the reason why 
the transcendental ego is indeclinable and is ego only equivocally. in this 
sense, the world is also singular and a plurality of worlds is senseless. The 
question of the systematic “locus” of the object of anthropology is falsely 
stated when it is derived from an absolute universal “outside of me”. As a 
singular, i am indeclinable, a singularity that is prior to the distinction of 
individual and plural. Thus, philosophical anthropology does not have an 
entity as its theme, not a generic entity with essential universality, but the 
indeclinable singular. The interrogated is not a universal “what” or an “es-
sence”, but the interrogator. in the relationship that the singular has to itself 
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is the ground for the possibility of differentiation of the a priori universality 
and empirical specificity. hence, the “absoluteness” of the singular is neither 
the generic-essential universality, nor empirical individuality. The singular is 
in a constant activity that can never be finally fixed or deciphered; it con-
stantly surpasses itself and its achievements of world orientation. its inde-
clinability correlates to the given, which too is inexpressible and requires a 
continuous change of presentations, which are to be surpassed. The ground 
that lends the singular experience is beyond universality and specificity. in 
this sense, it cannot be understood metaphysically as the absolutely univer-
sal. Landgrebe found a correlation of the indeclinable singularity of the hu-
man core prior to the search for the a priori universal and the a posteriori 
empirical to the inexpressible “given”, which has not yet been differentiated 
into a priori universality and its specific instantiations. Like the singular, the 
given too escapes constantly the presentations, calls for more and opens the 
activities of the singular object. it seems that in this sense the singular and 
the given cannot yet be clearly distinguished because their separation would 
presuppose a division of regional ontologies. here, the self and the world are 
one140. The problem is that the functioning of the transcendental life is anon-
ymous and is not indicated by our being a child of this world. how is it that 
this transcendental domain is “liberated” from its anonymity? Landgrebe 
suggested that it is necessary to return to the initial experience, in which 
each experienced moment implies the world horizons. Moreover, what is 
implicitly in the consciousness is a genesis, on the basis of which we come to 
our awareness. in this sense, our awareness of the world is not direct, but 
mediated through our generative life. This is to say, how something is given 
and becomes mine points to history, in which all of our meanings have been 
constituted. our awareness is always shaped by the history of sedimented 
experiences, and this history is nothing else than the history of our world. 
This history is an event that is “in us” and it is implicated in every decision 
for universal reflection. This implication is found in our aims, limitations 
and activities. Philosophical reflection, thus, calls for history. our world has 
historical horizons. But if this is the case, if the process of historical constitu-
tion of world horizons is relevant for our coming to the transcendental re-
140 Landgrebe, L. (1982). faktizitaet und individuation: Studien zu den Grundlagen der 
Phaenomenologie [facticity and individuation: Studies in the foundations of Phenom-
enology]. hamburg, West Germany: felix Meiner Verlag.
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gion, to what extent are we free to take a critical position to it? can the his-
torical world be surpassed? Moreover, the reflection is accomplished by the 
individual and, indeed, a reflection that individuates; but this individuation 
owes its singularity due to self-separation from others: i bear the others 
within myself, said husserl. But in this sense, the singular emerges from the 
historical horizons of the world and finds the others there; thus, in its own 
responsibility, it has already taken up the responsibility of others by having 
taken a position to its own experiences. This is the condition for the singular 
experience, which is there only in the differentiation from others. This ca-
pacity of self-knowledge is a presupposition for a critical reflection on all 
that is transmitted as valid. This singular certitude is the certitude of “abso-
lute experience”. it is transcendental experience because it is an unavoidable 
ground for anyone taking a position to any objectivity and to experience it-
self. The historical flow of the world contains the possibility for individua-
tion. This reflection finds its motivation only in its history, in which reflec-
tion occurs. But precisely the scientific history was a teleological striving for 
knowledge and at the same time for practical responsibility for the use of 
such knowledge. if this is forgotten, then the world becomes alien to the hu-
man. if knowledge becomes detached from responsibility, as has happened 
in our modern history, then this history contains the motive for the tran-
scendental turn and the singular reflection regarding the validity and limits 
of such knowledge; this is a teleological question, and all practical conscious-
ness is teleological, and the teleological structure of history is founded on the 
teleology of such consciousness. Being part of this history, the subject is also 
history allowing for reflexivity, which reveals the true autonomy lending the 
human a meaningful possibility of absolute self-formation and the forma-
tion of the historical world. The subject has a passive and an active history 
and the absolute sense of the world is the conjunction of the two. it is abso-
lute in the sense that any claim to something given must go through the 
analyses of experience that validate the claims, and the latter can be upheld 
only to the extent that something is accessible to experience and that experi-
ence does not imply existence. Phenomenological reduction frees us from 
the question of something “behind” the world constituted historically and 
inaccessible to experience. indeed, it is possible to make historical claims 
and claims about the past. Yet, such claims are effective only to the extent 
that the experiences can be recalled. The question is how such recollections 
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constitute a common history? how can one’s recollected experiences be-
come those of the others? 
husserl attempted to answer this question by the “passive” side of expe-
rience. The latter is also the “natural side”. This side is our experience of 
corporeity, of motility that is ours and that too has its history; but my corpo-
reity as mine is experienceable only on the basis of it being distinguished 
from others. What makes corporeity individual is not explicable through 
organic constitution, but only through the egological claim of “my body”, my 
movements. This suggests that consciousness too is an event sui generis, 
which cannot be derived from something that is non-consciousness. Al-
though consciousness is always corporeal, it is not explainable by any rules 
of organic development. The emergence of individual consciousness is but a 
common sedimentation in the perceptual presence of corporeally instituted 
structures, such as movements, sounds, marks, accounts, and institutions 
that have their source in the past. in this sense, the mutual effectivity moves 
through the passively pre-given background, or the “natural side” of subjec-
tivity. The singular, with its movements, as sui generis, is also an absolute 
beginning. Yet, how can this be if the singular is there only in distinction 
from others and on the passive background of historical sedimentations. The 
individual not only lives in a tradition; it also takes over or rejects the tradi-
tion; it assumes a position to the tradition and in this positional reflection it 
can institute novelties. only this allows for history. Yet, if history is through-
out facticity, how can we speak of a priori presuppositions of history, that is, 
if it is impossible to raise questions beyond history, are we not entering the 
sphere of relativity? What this question implies is how is it possible to ac-
commodate the facticity of history with phenomenological claim of essential 
and universally valid insights? husserl has seen this problematic. historical 
facts are understandable from a priori insights into essential structures; yet, 
the a priori presupposes historically factual awareness. here appears a basic 
problem within the context of our previous discussion of history and the 
individual, specifically the efforts by science to explain the individual his-
torically. is not all science founded on idealization, which is also in historical 
space; does this not presuppose a history as an a priori that is factual, and 
that is itself an idealization? This is to say, the thought of a priori is a consti-
tutive product of history, which itself is factual. Although husserl has not 
given an explicit answer to this problem, he has some suggestions for its 
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resolution. he asks: what would happen with the a priori of all the a priori 
sciences if humans were unable in principle to constitute a horizon on the 
basis of free variation in order to discover the invariant world structure? if 
this possibility is excluded, then it must be shown that humanity still has the 
capacity for this variation even if it is not factually developed. What this 
means is that the apodictic content of the a priori of history belongs to the 
capacity of reflection on the thought that establishes the historical a priori. 
This thought appearing “in” history belongs latently to humanity. This is the 
essential characteristic, which is also a historical fact. The thought of this a 
priori is developed in history, but this development is not an invention, but 
a discovery. This brings us back to the problem of the relationship between 
transcendental subjectivity and history. To notice the priority of history over 
the individual is to introduce reflection. it is this reflection that allows us to 
take the positron to history and tradition that includes others. To take a po-
sition to history is also to take a position to one’s own history and future. 
how is one’s own past and future unified with those of others? husserl had 
attempted to answer this question teleologically, that is, on the basis of the 
intentional structure of consciousness. Whether this is adequate for the un-
derstanding of the unity of history cannot be answered. What must be of-
fered is a precursory ground that would show on the basis of time analyses 
the temporal structure of teleology, and thus, of historical time as well as 
reveal the basis of husserlian a priori. Such analysis was not offered by hus-
serl. Landgrebe’s answer rests on the “passive” side of our awareness, that is, 
the natural side of corporeal functions of kinaesthesia, which are related to 
the sensible environment and to others. This turn rejects any empiricism 
and idealism. This relationship to the surroundings is a fundamental struc-
ture of the lived world and constitutes a common time of our daily activities. 
The common time is not a product of objectivating achievements of apper-
ception, but already sketched in the passive background of subjectivity, 
which we share with others. The passivity in this context does not imply an 
inactivity, but a process that is so fundamentally taken for granted, that it is 
hardly ever noticed. of course, this common time is not purely subjective 
because it is shared by a community of engaged subjects. This is nothing else 
than the time of history prior to the abstract measure of time of historiogra-
phy. it is accessible to anyone in recollection, which is not an arbitrary fan-
tasy, but implies what has been experienced by someone. Without such a 
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recollection, there would be no planned activity and orientation in a situa-
tion. The situation is an all-encompassing concept revealing what for us is 
already there. The situation includes its recollections and implications for 
future activity. how come we are in this situation, what mistakes were made, 
and how are they to be corrected? here, recollection is already in action. But 
recollection does not “represent” everything and anything, but what is sig-
nificant for the present action. it is selective, and in this selectivity we build 
our history. But this means that history is not a causal succession of events, 
having no disruptions, but is constantly reconstituted in recollections and 
expectations. history is “given” only at the present in constantly new ways. 
history is not linear because (a) each present has its temporal horizons of 
the passing and coming, of the sedimented past and expected future-this is 
the “depth-dimension” of the lived history, and (b) historical time is not a 
line because a line is conceived without breaks. But historical time is not a 
form in which historical events take place. history is built, changed and cor-
rected. This is to say, the unity of history is constantly built and rebuilt and is 
not given as an a priori form, even if it is a factual a priori. husserl, in his 
Krisis, still posited the “infinite idea” of history as linearly teleological, de-
spite the fact that his time analyses had already constituted a radically differ-
ent ground for history141. Although his insight into teleology stemmed from 
the teleology of subjectivity, his project of historical teleology stems from the 
collapse of the european world in World War i. The technologizing barba-
rism leads to a common history not in thought, but in practice. The question 
then is to discover the origins of this historicistic barbarism and to discover 
whether this barbarism can be overcome in order to lend human life some 
sense in historical teleology and responsibility. Krisis is not a metaphysical 
question, but a practical question of philosophical responsibility. husserl 
was completely aware of the problem: the reflective act of orientation reveals 
something that is already “ontified”, whereas the act of this orientation is 
something of which we are not aware, and hence, it is not the originary phe-
nomenon. The wondrous being for oneself in the living present can never be 
a phenomenon. it becomes only such when it is ontified in reflection. Reflec-
tion orients itself toward something that has already occurred. it is a tracing 
of a functioning that cannot be incorporated by reflection. At the moment of 
141 husserl, e. (1970). The crisis of european Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
Trans. by D. carr. evanston, iL: northwestern university Press.
227
Chapter X. Concretization of Intersubjectivity
reflection, the functioning has become something other, namely the occur-
rance of the reflective act that is not objectively present. This is the ultimate 
limit that reflection cannot transgress. 
The absolute streaming, the original passivity as the ground, is abso-
lutely anonymous. What is this transcendental subjectivity, what are its 
activities? in its anonymity, it escapes any sense-constitution, any apper-
ception. if it cannot be grasped in terms of apperception, then must it be 
creation? To understand this more precisely, we must find another, more 
concrete basis. This basis belongs to the functions of passive, that is, bod-
ily unmediated engagement with the world, pre-constitution, and thus, to 
transcendental subjectivity; body is not constituted but constituting. What 
is the relationship between corporeity and temporal self-constitution? Al-
though husserl initially spoke of the hyletic data as a formless stuff, as a 
primordial impression, this view was surrendered in the Krisis: in the depth 
source of pure experience one may not take a recourse to the supposedly 
immediate impressional data as if they were the immediate given character-
izing the lived world. how this correction of hyle results from the analyses 
of kinaesthesia has been shown by claesges142. in ideen ii, husserl has also 
suggested that the kinaesthetic abilities are to be traced back to the primor-
dial abilities of the subject. 
What is at issue here is that the primordial datum is apperceptive and 
is temporally constituted. The impressional datum already has a form and 
content and both are mediated by the constitutive activities of temporaliza-
tion. These activities could be called protension-retension and their synthe-
sis in the streaming present. But this is an abstraction because it disregards 
what is synthesised with this process. initially, husserl thought it was a da-
tum, such as a tone or a color, but it must be recalled that to grasp them 
one must orient oneself to them. This is to say that the passive syntheses 
must be associated with the kinaesthesia; without apperceptive impressions 
there is no time constitution, but without kinaesthesia there are no impres-
sions. The impressions are always synthetic unities of kinaesthesia. in this 
sense, kinaesthetic consciousness is time consciousness. The impressions 
originate with kinaesthetic process, without which there is no streaming 
present. But in this case, the constitutive activities are creative. 
142 claesges, u. (1964). edmund husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution [edmund husserl’s 
Theory of the constitution of Space]. The hague, netherlands: Martinus nijhoff.
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in this sense, corporeity is not constituted, but constitutive. it is a sys-
tem of empowerments, to which the sense fields are coordinated and, as 
such, belong to the transcendental subjectivity. What can become a datum 
for me is established by the relationship of sense fields to corporeal organi-
zation. in this sense, the hyle comes from me. But this makes precedent of 
corporeity as “i can”, that is, a practical consciousness. it is something that 
is at my disposal prior to it being an object. The consciousness of corporeal 
empowerment is genetically prior to the developed ego consciousness. The 
discovery of the “mine” precedes the discovery of the ego. The experience 
of this corporeity is not “inner”, but rather kinaesthetically situated; it is a 
primordial opening up of the world and it can never be fully exhausted by 
reflection. This is the nature side of the transcendental subjectivity. here, 
the world and other relationship are pre-delineated in the passive process 
at the “natural” side of the transcendental subjectivity. This means that this 
subjectivity does not have nature as something facing it, but something that 
is immanent in this subjectivity. how are we to understand this? obviously, 
the primordial streaming event is creative. nature is understandable only 
in relationship to our corporeal kinaesthetic activities of constitution. We 
know of it only as much as it announces itself in our corporeal events. All 
our knowledge and all our theories are related to this event. This event is 
something that is at our immediate disposal in distinction with events that 
are not so disposable and that are “external”. But this “external” that affects 
us is not something that has its basis in something foreign (Kant’s matter 
as a sign of something unknown that affects us), but rather belongs to the 
transcendental becoming itself. This is the creative process that escapes re-
flection. it is “indifferent”, that is, a groundless ground. Yet, it bears in itself a 
principle of individuation, although in its anonymity it cannot establish in-
dividuation; it pre-establishes an organization that can be claimed as “mine”. 
 Subjectivity is not individuated through corporeity, as Merleau-Ponty 
had thought, because what is presupposed is that someone is bodily and 
learns to “use” it before one discovers one’s ego. it is not the body that dis-
covers the ego, but the ego that discovers the body as one process. The ego 
can be “pure” because it is not produced by the body, but rather that through 
which the body is “mine”. The ego discovers itself in the transcendental gen-
esis as a transcendental history. But it is discovered as an ungraspable re-
siduum. This residuum can be grasped only as something atemporal. This 
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cannot mean that each affectivity is contingent in relationship to the stream. 
not every affectivity, emerging in the genesis, takes place through this “an-
stoss”, because each hyle is already a sedimented history. The atemporality 
of the anstoss can only mean “absolute facticity”. it is not contingent in the 
sense of factum brutum, because the contingent and the necessary com-
prise a constituted distinction and emerge from the reflection on the condi-
tions of becoming. in this sense, there is no accident in the absolute factic-
ity of the primordial stream. But it is not a necessity either, because all 
necessity is constituted by eidetic variation. Thus, it is beyond the universal 
and specific, eidos and fact. The ego is an absolute facticity just as is the 
primordial stream. This is how we are to think the constitutive event as 
creative. The being of each singular is not derivable from an event that 
would allow the emergence of singularity. it is rather itself absolute and, 
thus, absolutely responsible. To push our analyses further, we cannot deal 
with the logical problem of individuation, in which the individual is a “case” 
of a universal; rather, it raises a question of the individual in a historical 
problematic. is individuation a product of sociohistorical development, or 
is the individual a condition for such a development? husserl said that his-
tory is the grand fact of absolute being. This is in distinction to husserl’s 
notion of fact of the ideen, where fact is contingent. But the absoluteness of 
history is not something accidental: it must be necessary. how is this abso-
lute being related to individuality? husserl has traced this question, in his 
way, as a relationship between the transcendental and the mundane. he 
finds the difficulty in the equivocation of the meaning of ego. The transcen-
dental ego is such only by equivocation. The transcendental absolute, which 
is transcendental intersubjectivity, has its ground in itself; hence, its neces-
sity is not one of essence, because the latter is correlated to the fortuitous 
facticity. The retrogression to the depth dimension of intersubjectivity as 
the primordially streaming activity is the self-temporalization of transcen-
dental intersubjectivity, which is the ultimate point of self-certitude of in-
tentional activities and implications. here, the absoluteness means that re-
flection reaches a dimension that cannot be transcended or subtended. 
With this dimension the question reappears: to what extent can this pri-
mordial stream be thought of as a diffused stream that constitutes a condi-
tion for individuation? or is it the case that this stream is possible only 
through the facticity of the singular? husserl’s assumption is that this anon-
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ymous primordial stream can be constantly discovered through transcen-
dental reflection. But the question remains whether the primordial stream 
has individuality or is individuality postulated in it by husserlian analyses. 
if the primordial stream is teleological, then it must be seen as if the indi-
vidual ego has dominated it at the outset. is it possible for transcendental 
phenomenological reflection on the constituting functions of the subjectiv-
ity to lead to something other than postulates if it does not wish to remove 
itself from phenomenological understanding and engage in speculative 
constructions of the absolute? What must be accomplished is a delimitation 
of individuation as an absolute fact. husserl’s analyses had suggested that 
this absolute fact is beyond contingency and necessity; but he left it at that. 
The question can be approached through the discussion of the problem of 
the contingent facticity of the world. This discussion relates to Luhmann’s 
theory of evolution of social systems. Luhmann has shown that the genesis 
of facticity emerges with the modern times, in which the classical eternal 
truths have been dethroned143. final blow was offered by Kant. This led to 
the loss of all norms. if the basis of norms has been dethroned, then it seems 
that the human becomes the basis of all norms. Luhmann saw husserl as 
drawing this consequence, where the objectivity of truth is understood in 
its intersubjectivity; from there, Luhmann draws the conclusion to the con-
tingency of the world. The absoluteness becomes the absoluteness of the 
factual individual and inter-individual relationships: contingent absolute-
ness. This being the case, that is, the contingent world is correlated to the 
contingent mundane intersubjectivity, it can be said that the intersubjective 
discovery of “natural laws” reveals the cosmic history. But that this history 
of cosmos is grasped is itself a fact and that this fact can understand history 
depends on the historical contingence of the human being, who began to 
understand himself as contingent when he dethroned the eternal truths. 
What this means is that the contingency of the human cannot be reduced to 
the contingency of the cosmos, but conversely, the experience of human 
contingency is the condition for thinking the cosmos as contingent and 
from there to develop the thought of the history of cosmos. But what does 
the experience of contingency mean in relationship to “absolute experi-
ence” leading to the notion of the individual as an absolute facticity? in 
143 Luhmann, n. (1982). The Differentiation of Society. Trans. by S. holmes & c. Larmore. 
new York: columbia university Press.
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what way can our understanding concerning the absolute fact be made 
more precise when its transcendence of necessity and contingency is not to 
remain a mere negative claim? how are we to show that the understanding 
of contingency can be found only in the individual experience and from 
there to develop the understanding of history as the grand fact of absolute 
being? The reflective turn on the achievements of the consciousness-phe-
nomena, inclusive of the identity of the ego, the “i think”, leads to the dis-
covery of the fact of the “i think”, which also constitutes its limits. But re-
flection cannot determine what this fact is as “absolute”. The analysis of the 
intertwining of intentionalities and functions cannot determine the abso-
luteness of the facticity, because it remains within the context and limits of 
these activities and intentionalities. Thus, there is a needed step beyond the 
reflective activity that would show the facticity. This requires a formal “pre-
project” of the basic structure of human existence. The opening of this di-
mension is not an arbitrary undertaking, because humans in all times and 
before all philosophical reflection have had an understanding of it in myths, 
stories and “explanations”. in these, the human being speaks of himself not 
determined by theoretical interpretations. What belongs to the facticity is 
the ability to be; hence, this facticity is distinguished from the factum bru-
tum as a case of a category. The factual human does not experience himself 
as a mere fact, but understands himself in his abilities. What precedes all 
acquaintances with the world is the ability for self-motility. This movement 
occurs from the here and now, which are not insertions in temporal spatial 
loci, but from which the world is opened in tasks, activities and receptivi-
ties. in this sense, husserl has seen corporeity as an absolute null point of 
all orientations, to which all spatio-temporal events are related. Yet, he has 
not included this in his explication of the absolute fact of history. in this 
sense, his Krisis work found no basis to connect the problem of the teleol-
ogy of history with the lived world. Although heidegger has numerous sug-
gestions concerning the “facticity” of the Dasein, he has not been able to 
show what constitutes the facticity as a singular and inexchangeable pro-
cess. if history deals with the singularity and irrepeatability, the hermeneu-
ticists following heidegger have not shown the basis of this individual sin-
gularity. The transcendental domain, which in its self-temporalization 
accounts for the syntheses of the ego, is world constituting. 
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This is to say that it maintains open horizons, which are “mine”, “ours”, 
or “anybodies”. Without this horizon, the meaning of the term “world” is in-
determinate and empty. This world constitution belongs to the ego itself and 
is the condition for any communication whatsoever. if it were not there, we 
could not understand the others as “like us”. But how does this lead to factic-
ity? in this self-evident constitution, husserl had noted the central problem 
of phenomenological reflection. it is a problem of its insurmountable limit. 
What is revealed on the basis of transcendental reflection is the eidos 
ego, encompassing all of its constitutive functions. The concepts of these 
functions are unconditionally universal, with universal validity. The singu-
lar becomes an example of eidetic structures. But the view was surrended 
by husserl. The eidos “transcendental ego” is unthinkable without the tran-
scendental ego as being factual144. This ego is one of enablement, which has 
been factually achieved. in this sense, the ego must be called “absolute fact”. 
its necessity is not essential necessity correlated to contingencies. More pre-
cisely, it is neither a contingency, nor a universal necessity to the extent that 
it cannot be explicated by essential structures and cannot be reduced to cir-
cumscribed facticity. All essential necessities are moments of this facticity, 
ways of self-understanding. 
What follows from this absolute fact as a limit of reflection? Any essen-
tial or contingent determination of this facticity turns out to be inadequate. 
in this sense, it is a “groundless being”, because it belongs neither to es-
sentiality, nor to contingency. Transcendental phenomenological reflection 
reveals conditions, for the possibility of any experience, that are not attain-
able by argumentation. Reflection does not constitute them. They are func-
tions and activities of consciousness, with which we are tacitly acquainted. 
hence, the fact of these functions is not an unarticulated dumb ground, 
but yields itself to reflection for explication. one is already a child of the 
world and, although questioning the correctness of some views and facts, it 
does not question the world. it is a worldly attitude, in which we live. The 
thematization of this attitude is a first step in phenomenological reflection. 
To take a position to it, one must distance oneself from it through brack-
eting. This reflection neither constitutes, nor abolishes this base; rather, it 
144 husserl, e. (1973). cartesianische Meditationen. husserliana, Vol. XV. The hague, neth-
erlands: Martinus nijhoff, p. 385. english language version (1970), cartesian Meditations. 
Trans. by D. cairns, Trans. The hague, netherlands: Martinus nijhoff.
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makes it thematic. it is the thematization of the belief in the world. Belief 
is not an opinion that can be subsequently affirmed or corrected. it founds 
all opinions, and is not given to a judgmental certitude. All our intentions 
are related to it as a tacitly presupposed framework and content. This is 
the unthematized “lived world”, which was skipped over by Descartes, al-
though assumed by him and in all subsequent discussions. husserl brought 
to awareness what the modern tradition had lived, but left undiscussed. The 
thematization of the lived world is not a description of the modes, in which 
the humans live their daily lives, their conceptions, wishes and engage-
ments. These have been considered by numerous philosophies and sciences 
from various perspectives. each of us has a lived world, a history, and this 
can be investigated by empirical sciences, such as sociology. But this is only 
the first step for the thematization of the lived world. The latter grounds the 
possibility for comparing the social and cultural lived worlds. Phenomenol-
ogy aims at the concrete transcendental functions and achievements that 
comprise the conditions for the appearance of these worlds. 
hence, the empirically pre-given worlds will be clues to these func-
tions. if these worlds are different, then their understanding assumes a 
commonality, on the basis of which they can be compared. This vantage 
point cannot be acquired through comparisons, because it is the condition 
for comparisons. if the basis on which our lived relationship to reality is a 
belief that cannot be interrogated through epistemic means, then the inves-
tigation calls for the manifestation of intentional functions, in which this 
basis is constituted. in these functions, one then can show what is common 
to all lived worlds, what is invariant in all of the variations, and hence, what 
constitutes the conditions for communication. 
This invariant is the more fundamental lived world and this is the a 
priori, which cannot be eradicated. The “intentional” activities constituting 
this lived world and at the same time specifying it in historical, social and 
cultural variants are the “pre-historical” conditions. This lived world is not 
deducible from the factual worlds of the “we”. As time and history consti-
tuting functions, they are not historical, but are the ground that founds the 
question of the belief in the world. This dimension will allow us to speak of 
the “i am” as an absolute fact. 
even in an uncritical attitude, the world belief is not an epistemologi-
cal affirmation, and neither is the self. They accompany all we do and un-
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derstand. Reflection cannot ask “that” they are, because any such question 
presupposes the facticity of the questioner. And the questioner is always 
tacitly aware of this absolute facticity. it is the null-complex, from which 
such questions emerge and from which specific space and time configu-
rations are comprehensible. it cannot be escaped and interrogated from 
“outside”. This null-complex is revealed in the simple corporeal gesture of 
pointing. This gesture is a corporeal movement, which is set spontaneously 
as “mine” and is not exchangeable with anyone else’s movement. And the 
corporeity is “mine” not as a possession of a “spirit”, but in which i am 
totally immersed and limited. even a child explores the world corporeally 
through movement as a way to “effect” something. This initial effectivity is 
the transcendental source of effectivity as such. it is an ability to relate and 
effect before any reflection and a capacity for its own concrete “knowledge”. 
in this experience, there is an implicit source for the distinction of what 
is mine and what belongs to others; it is the most fundamental concept of 
property. What one can is empowered by the pre-reflective corporeal motil-
ity, and this empowerment is the source of our conceptions of power. 
Although pre-reflective, the corporeal movement constitutes self-ref-
erence. in a missed attempt to reach something, the attempt is repeated; in 
this sense, movement already contains initial self-reflection. one could say 
that the initial reflexivity is expressed linguistically in the phrase “can i do 
this?” This reveals not a dumb facticity, but an already articulated field of 
abilities and limits. it is the limit of “enablements”, of something that “i can-
not do”. What i cannot do is not a dumb limit given kinaesthetic corporeal 
reflexivity, in a testing that implicates the corporeal abilities. Thus, the re-
lationship to the absolute facticity is founded on a precedent affirmation of 
the unquestioned belief in the world. The latter not only implies our enable-
ments toward all that comprises our world, but also a variously articulated 
relationship to the absolute limit of our abilities. The relationship to this 
limit might not be recognized, but rather “suppressed”. Suppression in this 
sense means that the call to engagement is not accepted, but deflected. This 
appears in revolts against everything that questions human claim to abso-
lute self-mastery; it can also appear in the various suppressions of death. 
The absolute facticity as a limit is thus an articulated, meaningful limit. it 
manifests itself in its pre-reflective kinaesthetic reflexivity. This position 
undercuts any scepticism, because the null-complex of corporeal kinaes-
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thesia includes the primordial relationship to and a meaningful communi-
cation with the world and our primordial belief in it. The reduction, then, 
leads to the web of concrete intentional functions, which are completely 
intertwined in the lived world. But these functions are such that they can 
be done by everyone and, hence, already include the others. The other is 
pre-reflectively present in his yielding or resistance, in the yielding of or 
opposition to the past others, who are part of experience. 
hence, the others in their facticity also constitute my limits. The tran-
scendental effort to decipher “my” factual history includes the histories of 
others that can be opposed, reworked, or extended, and, in this sense, in-
cluded in my history of “enablernents”. But this means that history is not a 
fixed structure or condition, because it is related to the facticity of the indi-
vidual in his null-complex of orientations and spontaneities. history can be 
“novelized” from this null-complex. in this sense, there is no serial history. 
if there is a principle of correlation of various lived worlds, this principle is 
to be sought in the enablements and their limits that constitute the ground 
for the understanding of what they “can do” or “cannot do”. The question of 
the abilities, of what one can and cannot do, leads to an answer of individu-
ality and community at the practical level. if individuals communicate and, 
thus, presuppose some commonality and some differences, then such com-
munication has to rest on direct phenomenological evidence of corporeal 
interaction. As already hinted earlier, from childhood on, the world is ex-
plored through bodily movements, revealing the abilities to do something, 
to reach, push, pull, handle, and let go. By exploring the world, we equally 
explore our movements and abilities in a way that there is a direct inner-
communication with the world. concurrently, a process of reflexivity arises 
in missed and prolonged efforts to effect some aim. 
A missed reach, an unattained object directly reflects on the move-
ment eliciting either prolongation or variation of the movement to reach. 
This reflexivity constitutes three important experiential factors: (a) the ac-
tive abilities are not a one-to-one reaction to a stimulus, but a self-articu-
lating field of activities, (b) the object is not given as a brute fact, as a thing 
with pre-given characteristics, but as an explorable and variable system in a 
horizon of possibilities, and (c) a tacit “self-recognition”, a concrete aware-
ness of what one can and cannot do. This is not to say that the reflexivity of 
movements institutes an ego or an “inner” subject. The movements, and the 
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explorable systems, are neither extrinsic nor intrinsic, but sediment them-
selves into recognizable and repeatable functions and relationships; these 
comprise an initial “practical” self. 
This initial step to individual self-recognition includes two other mo-
ments: (a) the commonality of an action with another person, and (b) the 
separation of this commonality into “mine” and “yours”. This is to say, there 
appears a direct intercommunication at the level of movements and activi-
ties between persons. When a child reaches for something and fails, the 
mother reaches further and hands the object to the child, and thus, reveals a 
common reaching activity and yet the differentiation of the activity into the 
mother’s “i can” and the child’s “i cannot”. Such an awareness of common-
ality and differences can be varied across numerous contexts and increas-
ing complexities. in a simple action, i recognize what i cannot do because 
i tried and failed where i saw others succeed, and thus, have recognized 
my abilities. in more complex cases, involving a performance of a common 
task, one is engaged in a “bodily dialogue” of activities. 
in moving a load, the other sees where i am inadequate and lends me 
a hand, and thus, helps me in the task and yet does so from another angle, 
from a different leverage point, and hence, comprises our differences in 
a commonality. Such performances can be called “filling in”, where one’s 
abilities are needed, where the gaps in the abilities of the others appear and 
where the message of what to do is communicated directly through the 
requirements of the task and the movements and expressions of the other. 
once again, the task is not simply a fact, but a system of interrelated require-
ments correlating to abilities that constitute the identities of and differen-
tiations among individuals. The individual is thus a system of sedimented 
activities, having commonalities with, and distinctions from, others. 
The correlation of developed abilities to common tasks and to the 
abilities of others is coextensive with the expressive corporeity and with 
language. in one’s action, one communicates with the other in relationship 
to the tasks and expresses this relationship through body gestures and for-
mations. one can see in the other’s body shape and expression that he is 
straining, wondering, resolved (even if unable to do the task by himself), 
and even indifferent. in brief, the structure of the task, its systematic re-
quirements, are expressed in the performer’s body, revealing his attitudes 
and abilities for all to see, and even communicating the demands on others’ 
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abilities to lend a hand, to fill in, to extend his abilities by different abilities, 
and hence, to relate and at the same time to individuate him and the oth-
ers. Although such a communication assumes common tasks and common 
abilities that differentiate themselves into unique individual sedimentations 
and systems, the abilities have another commonality that is part of the ac-
tive communication with the world and with each other. obviously, the 
abilities that each individual develops are not one-to-one reactions to spe-
cific characteristics of objects, but have a generality that is neither a sum-
mation of individual facts or functions under a concept, nor is it a structure 
from which facts are deducible; rather, an active function can extend across 
typologically different factual systems. in face of a task, such as pounding 
a peg into the ground, the hand is a general function that can pick up a 
stick, a stone, a hammer or a shoe in order to accomplish the task. The 
generality of an ability communicates across diverse factual systems their 
practical analogies. This is to say, although typologically distinct, they can 
function as analogates of each other because of a general ability to pick 
them as replacements of one another in face of a task. The stone is like 
hammer and like a stick, because my hand communicates their analogi-
cal function on the basis of a task and an ability: i can use either of them 
to pound a peg into the ground. Thus, the very function of our acquired 
abilities has a generality that can be extended to others and the structuring 
of their abilities that can equally communicate analogical performances. 
The performances themselves become extended analogically from person 
to person. Such an analogical inner-communication at the level of practi-
cal activities comprises the ground for the understanding of concrete and 
context bound meanings. indeed, without the language of abilities or of 
intimation of concrete interaction with the world and with each other, the 
theoretical discourses would not make sense. We shall treat this question 
of sense subsequently. Given the phenomena of individuation in concrete 
action and practical communication through tasks and abilities, we are in 
a position to argue against a theoretical interpretation of history and the 
assumption that history offers continuous linguistic and institutionalized 
domains of communication. history is built by practical activities and what 
is fundamentally transmitted from person to person and generation to gen-
eration are tasks and abilities that have no necessary continuity. To fully 
grasp this, we must bracket the theoretical time founded on the ontology 
238
The Science of communicaTion 
of the continuity of nature. What remains after such bracketing are human 
tasks that constitute purposes, hopes, and even progress. We are concerned, 
then, with the effectivity of our actions and abilities in face of the tasks 
and aims. Some initiated tasks may surpass our ability to complete them, 
and hence, they are dropped in favor of other tasks. in this sense, there 
are discontinuities in the meaning of activities and, in face of other tasks, 
in their restructuration. no doubt, increasing and changing abilities may 
communicate that the previously discarded task is now within the ken of 
our acquired abilities. All the failed efforts to fly, all the winged leaps from 
cliffs that ended in failure and were abandoned, were resumed subsequently 
with success. in this sense, the historical time is coextensive with our abili-
ties and tasks, our purposes and aims. 
This means that the understanding of history is possible in terms of a 
teleological finality that mediates between expectations and factually initi-
ated activities. The telos is not given in judgments, but in hope and belief. 
This is to say how history, as it acquires continuity through our activities, 
and thus, becomes a world history with a common aim, cannot be deci-
phered from a posited univocal future. can one aim guarantee continuity 
of different activities? if history is founded upon our practical activities, 
then there must be an understanding of time related to such activities. for 
tradition, so well expressed in Kant, the only time is the form of “one after 
the other”, which constitutes a linear succession of impressions and repre-
sentations. But this is not an adequate form to understand the time of ac-
tion. husserl, and following him Merleau-Ponty and Straker, have offered 
us a time analysis that is more helpful and that avoids the simple succession 
of events in a pre-given form. The common element in their discussion of 
time of action is the concept of field and horizon that are not located in a 
pre-given space and time, but are oriented. one cannot say that activities 
occur in time or space; rather, the activities build their own spatial and tem-
poral horizons of possibilities, among which we select our aims and hopes, 
our tasks to be accomplished, and the appropriate means and actions for 
their fulfillment. The experience of the present is based on the experience 
of the expected, which is not yet represented, but is directly present as the 
field of action. 
What is relevant for the understanding of history is the notion of ac-
tion, orientational stress of which is on expectation, comprising the field 
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for aims. expectation is what opens “hope”. But what is open is founded 
as a possibility of our corporeal enablement in the practical sphere. This 
orientation is the condition for possibilities as aims and their realization. 
And this is what constitutes the “teleological” nature of the human. if his-
tory originates with human activity, then the experience of its becoming 
contains a teleological principle at the most fundamental level. And at this 
level one is already situated, that is, lives among facticities and a fluidum 
of views and meanings that are historical and that enhance or hinder our 
activities. What can we expect from this situated present? Although this is a 
simple question, the philosophers of history had never asked it. 
All striving that aims at maintaining the vanishing past needs to main-
tain it in order to be able to fulfill expectations. one has a basis of sedi-
mented enablements, from which to probe the expectations and, in fact, 
raise questions in case of difficulties, such as how did it come about that 
we got ourselves into these difficulties? here enters recollection both of the 
individual and of the community. Recollection does not reveal all that there 
is, but only what is significant for the present activities in the context of 
tasks and possibilities. The things of the present will be seen in their ori-
ented context as yielding and valuable hinderances, and hence, will open 
the recollections of their coming to be in this situation. But if history con-
stitutes this way of recollection, then it means that the time of history is 
not something continuous, a homogeneous form, or a sequence of events 
constituting a gapless causal succession. As the Greeks asked, the question 
is not of cause, but of aitia-responsibility-owing to what. The question then 
is not how history happens on the basis of events, as if in our experience 
we had a gapless interconnection of causal series of events, represented in 
a sequence of impressions and thoughts. Rather, the question must be sub-
verted: how do we come to the conception of an uninterrupted temporal 
series as the form of causally understood process of continuous events from 
our originary experience of temporality of activity? continuity is thinkable 
in terms of finality, not a finality of divine predestination, but one that is 
decided on in the freedom of our activities. The events present in the situ-
ation are interrogated with respect to what possibilities they lead to and 
what possibilities they deflect in our activities. This teleological meaning is 
not a subsequent imposition, but is present in the originary experience of 
activity and the objects oriented within the context of activity. how are we 
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to grasp the continuity of history? As a unity of events, as they appear in 
the consideration of possibilities of action in a situation with regard to the 
conditions, under which the events have become visible, the events for us 
and how they are reestablished in our affirmations and activities become 
parts of the enablement for the future. 
There are various consequences stemming from this level of activity as 
practical communication. first, the communicative practice is a concrete 
corporeal action that individuates and is coextensive with the actions of 
others on the basis of common tasks. Second, tasks and activities are ori-
ented toward completion, and hence, include human hopes and aims. What 
they communicate, and hence, what communication at this level includes, 
are responsibilities. We select the possibilities of orienting the factual sys-
tems and we are responsible for what they mean and how they are struc-
tured. Third, different possibilities and tasks, calling for different activities, 
need not be continuous or homogeneous with other tasks and activities, 
and resultantly, we cannot speak of the historical time or the aim of his-
tory and communication. fourth, the communicative activities, that is, the 
corporeal practical engagements, yield commonalities of abilities that, al-
though inter-corporeally coextensive, do not necessarily imply a historical 
continuity. fifth, although such continuities, differentiating themselves into 
individual variations of “i can” and “i cannot”, comprise the factual domain, 
their facticity is neither one of universal necessity, nor of simple datum. 
Rather, they are open and variable systems of practical experience. And it 
is precisely this practical experience that offers a concrete understanding of 
communication. it is necessary, therefore, to phenomenologically show the 
inadequacies of the claims of various theories, specifically the theories that 
purport to challenge phenomenology on the grounds of concrete historical 
contexts of linguistic interpretations and rules.  
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The practical domain of communication depicted earlier has to be deep-
ened along with a number of critiques of some recent theories of communi-
cation, specifically those that consider language and interpretation to be the 
basis of communicative understanding. in addition, some of the linguisti-
cally based theories appeal to scientific explanations of human interaction, 
and thus, use the formal systems as the most universal means of transmit-
ting information and of explaining phenomena. upon closer analysis, the 
explanations are completely abstract from daily discourse and experience. 
This is one of the unique claims of scientific thought: it purports to deal with 
the concrete, and yet, it offers radically abstract and formalized systems. The 
answer, of course, is in the demonstration that such systems are applicable 
to concrete activities and practical purposes. This claim lends credence to 
the views that an understanding of situations and contexts is a sociohistori-
cally learned adaptation of rules, of interpretations of normative and theo-
retical structures, resulting in a conjunction of theory and concrete actions. 
Such claims are possible on two traditional assumptions: first, an application 
spells dualism between form and content, thought and reality, structure and 
manifestation, and second, the conjunction is possible in an instrumental 
sense, that is, science is not a theoretical explanation, but an instrumental 
system for the mastery of nature in favor of human purposes. in both cases, 
the outcome of this conjunction is metaphysical virulence, that is, metaphys-
ics, as a normative construct, is used to change the world to fit the meta-
physical constructs. in this sense, the abstract, formal systems, inaccessible 
to any perception, assume an inordinate preeminence against the concrete 
experience, because the formal systems become reality by being instrumen-
tal145. As most serious researchers have seen, science no longer explains and 
makes events happen. There is, in fact, a current tendency, resting, perhaps, 
on the modern conception of the instrumentality of science, toward practi-
cal basis and explanation of human activities. Most diverse theories, from 
neo-Marxism through communicative competence, to postmodern concep-
145 Volkmann-Schluck, K. h. (1965). eirifuhrung in die Philosophie [introduction to Phi-
losophy]. frankfurt am Main, West Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.
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tions of the production of truth, assure us that their theories are praxis laden. 
These theories equally claim that human activities are imbedded in a human 
world with its historical horizons. one specific characteristic shared by such 
trends is the claim that their conceptions of praxis are based on concrete 
historical contexts, allowing for interpretive discourse of scientific thinking 
and formal rules, and that such discourses offer a concrete domain that can 
avoid the pitfalls of some of the transcendental phenomenological trends. 
The latter are deemed to be idealistic and solipsistic. if communication is 
possible, then its basis stems from historical situations – particular forms of 
language, interpretation and understanding. 
it is argued that phenomenology’s focus on the “objective” given dis-
connects the given from its context, its social and historical interpretations, 
and assumes that such a focus offers universally acceptable claims. Moreo-
ver, the presumption of objectivity leads to the view that the individual is in 
a position to observe the given without any relationship to others and with-
out any introduction of interpretations by historically acquired languages. 
in communicative terms, the charge against phenomenology states that one 
cannot be a pure observer of the given without any admixtures of others 
and various intermediaries, such as language. only the historically and so-
cially acquired common usages and practices allow for the understanding 
and the communication of the given. The actions and practices of the indi-
vidual are examples of the common practices, customs and usages, that is, 
he is a representative of something intersubjective and common. 
Despite the phenomenological arguments for the primacy of significa-
tion, of meaning as phenomena of experience, the attacks on phenomenol-
ogy insist that meaning is linguistic, and the latter not only transcends the 
individual, but allows him/her to make sense of himself/herself. Moreover, 
the phenomenologically conceived perceptual object, with its spatiotem-
poral horizons, is deemed an inadequate point of departure, requiring a 
historically effective consciousness, an objective spirit, encompassing insti-
tutions and individual activities one is born into a communicative system. 
The individual lives and acts, thinks and feels in the sphere of commonal-
ity of rules, plans and customs, reaching into individual motivations. Thus, 
every plan, every explanation, is group specific. This supposedly comprises 
a more encompassing and concrete domain. The individual activity is a 
situational application of the modes of prescribed activity. in essence, the 
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sense interconnections of a tradition appear in a common praxis, constitut-
ing a form of life and a life world, and precede the individual. it follows, 
then, that the genesis of experience inheres in the common forms of his-
torical life, institutions and traditions that have far surpassed the individ-
ual. in Kantian terminology, without them human activity would be blind, 
and with them, it is directed by an authority of a tradition. The intentional 
activities of the individual are situative specifications and individuations 
of a historically and socially pre-given intersubjectivity and life world. The 
latter are the subject, whereas the individual is their determinate object. 
We encounter, here, a peculiar circularity. The common meanings must al-
ready be in place and understood if (a) the individual is to make any sense 
of events, and (b) if the sense of practical activities is to be grasped. But 
this suggests that meaning can be derived only from the already pre-given 
common meanings. for phenomenology, the issue is with the “derived” and 
the “only”. if it is presumed that an activity is understandable because it is 
a logical derivation from pre-given meanings and sociohistorically estab-
lished rules, then one would have to account for various interpretations 
of the “same” meanings and rules. The variations would have to be attrib-
uted either to the incompetence of the individual, or to another level of 
language, that is, the interpretive level, or to a silently experienced domain 
that makes sense of the meanings and rules simply by being their unac-
knowledged source. The latter would have to make sense on its own if it 
becomes an interpretant of the sociohistorically found common concep-
tions. The making of sense that can specify and concretize the conceptions 
apparently must be a process that is not blind and is in a position to “know” 
how to communicate with the world and how to “apply” the sociohistori-
cally acquired common meanings, concepts and rules. The issues are by 
now quite complex, and their resolution by those, who argue against phe-
nomenology, takes recourse to a pedagogical thesis146. The thesis purports 
to explain the conditions for the possibility of the individual’s awareness of 
proper, concrete activities. it is said that an activity makes sense, is mean-
ingful and proper because of the teaching of customs, concepts and ori-
entations to the next generations. Granted, but pedagogy is what here be-
146 Dilthey, W. (1921). Der Aujbau Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. [The 
constitution of the historical World in the human Sciences]. Gesammelte Schriften, 
Vol. Vii. [collected Writings]. Leipzig, east Germany: Teubner.
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comes problematic, because it too must presume the priority of history that 
far surpasses the abilities of any pedagogical undertaking, and indeed the 
pedagogical practice would have to make sense only under the dictates of 
the historically transmitted meanings and rules. hence, the very practice of 
pedagogy is one mode of individuating the common meanings, one variety 
of interpretation that cannot claim to be in a position of transmitting his-
tory per se. Moreover, even if we were to grant that the historical meanings, 
customs and institutions contain learned generalizations from individual 
cases, we would have a reversed problem: now we would have general rules 
or concepts and meanings of individual cases abstracted from their con-
texts. Yet, it is precisely the context boundedness that is being advocated 
by the historical, anti-phenomenological thesis. The only way that such a 
thesis could escape this dilemma is by assuming the generality of contexts, 
and thus, by abolishing any claim to concreteness. This is to say, if one is 
compelled to generalize the contexts, then one is simply postponing the 
issue of concreteness and specification. it is precisely the efforts to avoid 
the transcendental, consisting of experiences accessible to anyone – even if 
never completely – that lead to such dilemmas. 
Yet, even if we assume that communication is possible on the basis of 
historically achieved intersubjectivity, with its mutual and universal under-
standing, we would not be closer to answering the question of such a uni-
versality in understanding. in what ways could history contain some type of 
commonality and universality, when the proponents consistently claim that 
all abstract and universal conceptions must be derived from, and reinter-
preted back in terms of, the concrete historical contexts? This seems to be 
an admission that historical process consists of contingent events, unless, 
of course, one has tacitly granted the transcendental generality of experi-
ence accessible to everyone. The sly move of the historicizing theses appears 
obvious: assume the generality of the transcendental awareness, as depicted 
earlier at various levels of communication, reduce it to the property of a 
particular, factual being, and then argue that such individual cannot yield 
commonalities of communicative meaning accessible to others without the 
props of historically effective consciousness. 
The dilemma of historically effective consciousness, with its claim of 
intersubjective communication access, is that it is particular, perhaps hav-
ing no two situations alike, and thus, it must import generalities from an ex-
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periential domain in order then to discover them in such a consciousness. 
if it is claimed that the historical subjects are contingent, and particular, 
then the question as to the possibility of comprehending the historically 
transmitted generalities cannot be answered. neither such a factual sub-
ject, nor even an intersubjectivity of such subjects, could presume to grasp 
more than they are, unless, in fact, they are more, that is, experiencing sub-
jects, who are related to, and engaged in, a transcendental generality prior 
to any factual singularity or generalized universality. no doubt, there is a 
historically transmitted knowledge and, as we noted earlier, a poly-centric, 
corporeal subject, but the conditions of the possibility of awareness of this 
transmitted knowledge are not necessarily historical. historical experience 
presumes the transcendental in order to make sense of its ability to locate 
and transmit the universal147. indeed, the very arguments for the priority of 
historical traditions and intersubjectivity are transcendental. 
our arguments against the priority of intersubjectivity are not de-
signed to reject it, but to show that the historical base for intersubjectivity 
leads to blind alleys. There appears a tacit assumption that the individual 
is contingent and totally incapacitated without the intersubjective, that is, 
the individual is contingent, whereas the intersubjective is a necessary con-
dition for the former. But the necessity of intersubjectivity, as something 
above the individual, implies that the former is not historical, but transcen-
dental, and thus, requires transcendental subjectivity for its access. in turn, 
if intersubjectivity is seen as a historical accumulation and transmission of 
accumulated practical and epistemic views, then such a history could not 
offer any general conceptions, under which the individual could be sub-
sumed. As noted in our previous chapters, communication is an accepted 
occurrence; this implies that intersubjectivity cannot be an aggregate of ei-
ther contingent, totally time-bound factual individuals, with their specific 
psychosomatic functions. on this basis, intersubjectivity is precluded at the 
outset. indeed, the contingency of history would be exposed to the same 
charge. Resultantly, the possibility of intersubjectivity can be maintained 
if it is taken at the outset to be transcendental, offering an access to ei-
detic generality that subtends both the facticities and the universalities and 
is accessible to any subjectivity. This conclusion is revealed even by those, 
147  Landgrebe, L. (1968). Phaenomenologie und Geschichte [Phenomenology and history]. 
Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliches Buchgesellschaft.
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who argue against phenomenology. When one claims that all subjectivity 
is within the horizon of historical intersubjectivity, the claim has an eidetic 
generality as a basis for communicative understanding. This is to say, such 
claims are transcendental, and thus, accessible intersubjectively by various 
subjectivities. 
There is still another dilemma for communications. Assume that there 
are traditionally pre-given and learned rules of language, present in their 
intersubjective universality, and then applied interpretively to situations. 
The communicating individuals, using such language, do not somehow dis-
card it and its rules, meanings and concepts during application. even if one 
had a dual language – and there is no indication of this being, the case – 
one with traditionally acquired intersubjective rules, and one that is spoken 
situationally, the latter would turn out to be equally historical and tradi-
tional, with its general rules and usages, calling for specific interpretation 
during application. hence, the issue of concrete, situational specification 
is not resolved, but merely postponed. Any linguistic usage, its rules and 
prejudgments, takes for granted a general understanding of the meaning of 
situation, context and concrete action in order to speak of concrete specifi-
cation of communicative practice. But this implies that if the historical and 
intersubjectively understood language does not have within itself the req-
uisite concreteness and specificity, then the latter is presupposed and must 
originate from another source. After all, the transmitted language can be 
specified concretely not in any arbitrary way, but selectively. The selection 
presupposes that we already understand the concrete situation, the context, 
wherein to order the specifications of a language properly. 
The proper ordering depends on experience of concrete domains that 
are not simply cases of traditional categories and rules, but systems of fac-
tual experience founded on situated and significantly interconnected cor-
poreal functions. The presumption of the priority of the intersubjective, the 
social, and the historical over the individual fails to account for a number 
of important issues. first, the practical engagements and the concrete con-
texts cannot be understood; second, the singular, the individual, becomes 
absorbed into a domain that he can neither survey nor manage; and third, 
the experience of the other is taken to be self-evident. Yet, this experience 
is most complex and difficult to decipher. in previous chapters, we have 
argued for a practical domain, wherein the self and others acquire their 
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mutuality and differentiation, comprising individuation within a unity. 
This domain was seen to be corporeal and coextensive with the systems 
of meaningful activities and enablements. Yet, the latter are not facts, but 
systems of kinaesthesia, possessing a generality that is neither a universal 
abstraction, nor a datum. The generality, moreover, has another dimension: 
orientational schema. Although the physiological body might be located in 
a homogeneous space and might consist of a symmetrical structure, such a 
body and space cannot deal with orientations. Space consists of indifferent 
points that cannot be assigned meanings, such as “here-there”, “up-down”, 
and so on, unless one borrows such meanings from a functional body. The 
latter is the condition for the possibility of structuring and communicating 
a world of places and locations, of ups and downs, lefts and rights, forwards 
and backwards. The asymmetry of the functional body disrupts the homo-
geneity by communicating directions, orientations, and thus, instituting 
a practical world. it is to be noted that functional directions are not ex-
changeable. What is up front, reachable by a forward movement, is distinct 
from what is in the back, and the latter can be reached best by a reversal of 
directions. The same can be said of left-right compositions. 
excellent phenomenological and critical analyses of the functional 
body are available in Straker’s work and need not be repeated. We only wish 
to indicate the experiential fact that such a body is a setting for practical 
understanding and its functions are involved in numerous linguistic con-
ceptions and rules. A brief indication of such functions ought to suffice. We 
note, for example, that many linguistic expressions in politics and mytholo-
gies, in sciences and daily activities, are structured by the left-right orienta-
tions. Leanings to the left or right, to the radical right, to the extreme left, 
are common in daily discourse, and yet, without a functional body, such 
terms would have no sense. one can easily trace an entire history of this 
bodily function in numerous expressions, and indeed, in most important 
locations of human figures. The same could be said of the vertical orienta-
tion, up-down or high-low. When we speak of social status, of degrees of 
significance of theoretical functions, when we designate offices and their 
hierarchical rank, we are constantly using the language of an uprightly 
functioning body148. 
148 Stroker, e. (1987). investigations in the Philosophy of Space, p. 62-71.
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Perhaps the most preeminent corporeal function, appearing in lin-
guistic compositions, is one of the differentiation between the frontal and 
backward movements. The frontal movement is most favored in practical 
activities. indeed, the practical activity is most preeminently a frontal activ-
ity, even if minimal backward movements are called upon as compensa-
tory requirements, and does not contend with objects behind as with those 
found in the lateral and frontal regions. The language of means and aims, of 
goals, is dominated by concrete frontal activity. it must be understood that 
it enters not only into spacial terminology, but also into temporal concep-
tions. We are leaving the past behind us and are moving forward toward 
the future; we look ahead to better days, participate in the forward march 
of history and progress and face the tests and goals of tomorrow. The very 
language of overcoming, transcending and surpassing, is a frontal language. 
This suggests that the very conceptions of history, the rules of language, 
the interpretations of significances, hierarchies and ranks, and even the 
contexts, assume the concrete meaning of the asymmetrically functioning 
and active corporeity. Such a corporeity is the concrete context, and thus, 
escapes being a singular fact subsumable under a universal rule and pos-
sesses its own generality. in language, this generality appears in all spatio-
temporal contextualization, and hence, it is even the ground of concrete 
understanding of history. The application of discursive rules, images and 
customs makes sense in a situation because the situation itself is a meaning-
ful corporeal context with functional and oriented differentiations. 
This concrete systematics of communication structures a practical 
domain of oriented places. use objects and functions, inclusive of bodily 
activities, have oriented places. The places depend on customary conveni-
ences for activity. Something useful is found “where it belongs” and is easily 
accessible. use objects are not found in a point of a homogeneous space, 
but in a place with a slack that allows changes without the object leaving its 
place. it is on the desk, in front, and a little to the right, and it is accessible 
to correlations with other objects in the vicinity. They are interconnected 
significatively and function under the practical transpositionality discussed 
in the previous chapter. Places with their slack include dimensional corpo-
real activities that lend and, in turn, require the accessibility of objects. The 
latter cannot be too far, out of reach, or too close, crowded and obtrusive, 
and thus, a hindrance to activities. 
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The practical world of oriented places is much broader than the situ-
ation structured by the direct activities of the body. every place of practi-
cal objects can be comprehended as an oriented and flexible structure in 
correlation to other such places, comprising an oriented system of flexible 
and functional interrelationships. Things have a place on the desk, the desk 
is in the house, the house is in chicago, and so on. The movement in this 
flexible system of places is communicated on the generality of the bodily 
functions. one leaves some place “behind” and goes “ahead” to another 
place, and if one is in a hurry, one avoids excursions to the “sides”. Regard-
less of how vast the places become, they never lose the corporeal system of 
functional communication: we are leaving the coast of united States behind 
and are heading toward europe. obviously, we should not confuse func-
tional orientations with some inner bodily characteristics. orientations are 
completely intertwined with the practical world and correlate to the places 
and systems of interconnected and oriented objects. To use the language of 
Waldenfels, the corporeal orientations constitute an “in-between” domain, 
wherein even the physiological body is located and articulated149. initially, 
we suggested that experience means, signifies and provides an intercon-
nected, sense-making process. Thus, when we spoke of the experiential 
constitution of a physical object, appearing from various sides, we silently 
assumed a practically orienting body. objects “in themselves” do not have 
sides, tops, bottoms and ends; they are constituted on the basis of bodily 
orientations. The desk has a top because we are upright, it has sides because 
we assume a corporeal position and action from a particular vantage point. 
This is to say that although the theoretical constitution of the experience 
is comprehensible and can be transmitted by an intersubjective, historical 
tradition, the comprehension assumes a concrete system of practical ac-
tivities that already makes sense and allows the “reading” of the transmit-
ted conceptions. Thus, one may learn the formal rules of playing chess, but 
such rules are understandable and communicable only in a context of func-
tional orientations: forward movements, diagonal movements, retreats and 
advances are bodily orientations. The Wittgensteinian theory of the lived 
world as a “language game” with learned rules and grammatical sequences 
would be completely incomprehensible to a being that did not structure its 
practical world along our functional systems of action. A sequence of gram-
149 Waldenfels, B. (1971). Zwischenreich des Dialog [The in-between Region of Dialogue].
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matical composition, either from left to right, right to left, or top to bot-
tom can be communicated and applied because of the tacit communication 
of the practical body. in fact, our unquestioned experience and discourse, 
concerning the social architectonic, inclusive of routes of communication 
and commerce, are modeled after the functional body. 
houses have fronts, sides and backs, we sit in the front or back seats 
of vehicles, and the latter have forward and backward movements and lo-
cations, and our numbering of houses on streets is “up”. Phenomenology, 
thus, contends that our practical experience of bodily structurations is one 
of the most fundamental domains in the comprehension even of the “high-
er” theoretical constructions. 
Given the level of practical activity and its oriented and flexible sys-
tem of places, there is equally a flexible and oriented system of time that 
is also fundamental to communicative interaction. in our critique of the 
preeminence of traditional and historical conceptions, we have suggested 
that historical time needs not be based on an abstract and theoretical con-
cept of continuity; rather, if we build history, then historical time and what 
it communicates must also be built on the basis of activities. We have noted 
that the dialogical interaction, even at the linguistic level, is not composed 
of a sequence of words or statements, but is made possible by a structura-
tion of a common theme across passive-active-passive phases that unite 
and differentiate the dialogical partners. Such phases constitute a flexible 
temporal field that offers options and possibilities. The possibilities appear 
within contexts of relevant events and the latter signify options for possible 
changes. This is to say, the field has horizons, wherein events signify possi-
bilities of activity and handling of such events. Thus, one event may suggest 
various possibilities, whereas numerous events may focus on one option. 
This abolishes a causal notion of activity and institutes a field of shifting 
selectivities, constantly articulating the various options of the “future”, al-
though the latter is not simply something that we expect, but figures already 
in what we do at the present. 
Just as with places, times are equally structured in accordance with 
practical activities and corporeal orientations and are divisible into various 
nearnesses and remotenesses within the contexts of tasks. Something will 
take a day to do, something will require a month, and functions and events 
are assigned their locations within the allotted temporal field. Some options 
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are excluded as too time consuming, some are modified, and others may be 
combined. Such structuration is a highly complex experience and language 
is inadequate to follow its complexities. To grasp such a state of affairs in 
communicative praxis, we must reintroduce the previously discussed prac-
tical reflexivity, although now at the level of practical time. our activities 
reflect one upon the other in practical terms of what we can and cannot 
do, what can be repeated, and what is not worth the effort. Such reflexivity 
takes for granted temporal communication. While undertaking a task, we 
set a temporal field for its achievement, such that the “future” possibilities 
of completion reflect upon the selection of activities at the present; one can-
not take up another task today, or one cannot take 3 days off, because such 
options, reflected from the possible completion of the accepted task, must 
be excluded. in turn, within the temporal field of action for the completion 
of the task, there arise “inner-reflexivities” of possibilities of selection of 
actions and of numerous objects and instrumentalities for the task. if one 
must finish the task in 1 month, then one must accomplish the requisite 
actions in 2 weeks to get to the end of the task, but this means that by next 
week certain things will have to be in place if the 2-week work is to be at-
tained; all this leads to reflexivities of time in time, of complex possibilities 
within possibilities, comprising the temporal field of action. one does not 
perform an action at the present and then another action at the next mo-
ment; each action, and every implement, object and event, have complex 
temporal interconnections that structure those actions, objects and events 
significatively150. in short, practical activities are composed of a practical 
system of inner-communication. 
obviously, any sort of location of an event “in history” presupposes the 
event’s concrete location in the oriented world of places and times, of op-
tions taken and options rejected, and not in a world of homogeneous space 
and uni-linear rime. Again, we encounter particular phenomena, previ-
ously described as concrete, yet general, given, yet not given as a brute fact 
or a datum. These phenomena were called “eidetic” because of their con-
creteness, and at the same time of their generality. The flexible and inter-
related systems of places and times are concrete and completely coextensive 
with and intertwined in activities and tasks, and yet, they have an eidetic 
150 Luhmann, n. (1968). ZweckbegrifJ und Systemrationalitiit [The concept of Purpose and 
System Rationality]. Tubingen, West Germany: J. c. B. Mohr, ch. 4.
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generality that is accessible to everyone. Whether one points to something 
and, thus, establishes a direction from here to there, or whether one says 
that a certain activity should be postponed until tomorrow because other 
things have to be done today, one is communicating concretely and in a 
sufficient generality that can be loosened up, made more flexible, complex, 
or tightened up, without reaching any geometric or digital precision. in-
deed, in the world of action and practical communication, such precision 
is comprehensible in a context of places and times, tasks and possibilities, 
and hence, constantly situated and transgressed toward the field in which 
it makes sense.
The inexactitude and the flexibility are the initial experiences of the 
factual systems, that is, every fact is a system of explorations, implications 
and interconnections. Such systems exhibit characteristics of things that are 
“loose”. Things appear with what Straker calls “morphological” features151. 
communication at this level is structured between the universal, ideal, rule-
like structures and the pure factual data. The ideal, geometric and mathe-
matical, do not picture, suggest or represent anything in the practical world. 
Although they can deal with enumerable facts, the understanding of such 
facts is contextualized in practical systems, and thus, assumes in-between 
experiences that have a looseness, a play, both toward exactness and ideality 
and toward pure datum. if the ideal systems are to be situated, they assume 
the experience of morphological features. indeed, our languages commu-
nicate morphologically; we speak of sizes, shapes, comparative differences, 
sketches, outlines and contours that have singular and factual generalities. 
We speak of oblong, rectangular, egg-shaped, flat or wavy, straight or curvy, 
smooth or rough characteristics; they are accessible to corporeal and active 
processes and have fitting, unfitting, appropriate or inappropriate relation-
ships. We can say that the table is too big for the room and that the pot is 
too heavy for the stand, without going into precise measures. Their being 
“between” ideality and pure datum allows for flexibility that can range from 
broad generality to increased specificity without a loss of their morpho-
logical functions. obviously, such flexibility is important in the practical 
domain, where things have to be adjusted in their places and relationships. 
We should avoid confusion by stressing the distinction between “facts”, 
“idealities” and morphological characteristics. facts are located in homo-
151 Straker, e. (1987). investigations in the Philosophy of Space.
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geneous space and time and have two levels of characteristics: the impres-
sional, given through the so-called five senses, and the quantitative, given 
by the system of measurements. idealities, as we saw in previous chapters, 
can be communicated without any specific relationship to things; we can 
deal with numbers, geometries and logics, without referring to anything in 
the world of perceptual processes. Morphological features are experiential 
explorations that do not coincide with impressions or with ideal structures. 
one cannot speak of an ideal egg-shape, or perfectly rough surface, or an 
absolutely crooked street. The looseness of such features is what allows for 
communication in the practical domain. indeed, one’s experience of some-
thing egg-shaped is very specific, and yet, its generality is sufficient to war-
rant a commonality that accommodates unique differences without a loss 
of a given morphological composition. 
finally, the practically communicated world is peculiarly relative be-
cause this relativity does not preclude communication. The practical expe-
rience seems to be the locus that provides the intermediary, the in-between 
domain that does not demand an abstract lingua universalis or its reverse, a 
sum of facts for a successful communication. Rather, it is flexible, yet com-
prehensible processes, involving functional corporeity and its structuration 
of contexts. When we speak of relativity, we must also speak of these cor-
poreal functions in relationship to the morphological features of practical 
things and surroundings. if we ask about the experienced size of a thing, 
we must understand that the size is not a property of the thing alone, but 
is a functional relationship between the body, the thing and the surround-
ing context. The object looks big because we are next to it; if we move away 
from it, the object looks smaller, and if we climb a hill, the object looks 
“insignificant”. This suggests that phenomenology does not give an absolute 
credence to objects and their “inherent” qualities, but is very keen on the 
practical, and hence, the relational and morphological characteristics that 
belong in concrete settings and engagements. Such settings are sensible, 
corporeal experiences in practical action and provide the already assumed 
meanings of factually interconnected events and actions, within which con-
textual generalities the historically and intersubjectively transmitted con-
ceptions assume their concrete communication. 
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